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This thesis is a comparison of face-to-face and written digital conversation. I start with the 
intuition that face-to-face conversation can often appear more engrossing and satisfying 
than its digital counterpart. I argue that one of the most promising ways of understanding 
this difference can be seen when we consider the contrasting coordinative structures of 
these two types of conversation. In face-to-face conversation the task of communication is 
at all times spread between participants whereas in digital conversation the burden of 
communication is passed almost entirely from one to the other. One notable result of this is 
that it gives us good reason to think that communication in digital conversation is in many 
ways more difficult. I then argue that the difference in coordination in digital conversation 
has consequences for the nature of the cooperation we find in such interactions. I argue that 
these consequences of the different structures of face-to-face and digital conversation are 
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In this thesis I explore the intuition that despite being in many ways similar to the 
conversations we have face-to-face, the way that we experience digitally mediated written 
conversations is somehow different. When I think of the great conversations I’ve had I can 
recall very few I’ve had online that that have absorbed me in the way face-to-face 
conversation often can. It seems to be the case that face-to-face conversation has the 
potential to be more engrossing and often more satisfying, somehow, than its digital 
counterpart. In some senses this might seem to have obvious explanations. We might think 
that looking at a screen rather than another person provides an obvious experiential 
difference in itself. Perhaps we might think the lack of simultaneity in digital conversations 
creates with it a different type of experience. Another thought might be that the 
environments digital conversations take place in are often less conducive to personable or 
intimate interaction; as mentioned above we have a screen rather than a person in front of 
us, there is often more anonymity online and many of the spaces we have these 
conversations in are much more public with utterances being potentially read by others. I 
think it is likely these types of difference are all contributory in some ways to how we 
experience these two types of conversation differently. What I argue here, though, is that 
when we focus specifically on the structural differences and the distinctive sets of 
requirements placed on interlocutors in the two types of conversation, we see there are 
some much richer contrasts to be drawn that relate to the nature of the communication that 
takes place in these two types of conversation. For when we look at what is required of us in 
these two types of conversation not only are interlocutors in a digital conversation 
geographically detached but they are communicatively detached too.  
I start in Chapter 1 by providing an outline of what we might call a paradigm type of 
conversation. The cluster notion I propose entails that a paradigm type of conversation is a 





the interaction, contributions made to the discussion are interdependent, and participants 
are engaged in processes of continued perspective sharing and prediction. In Chapter 2 I 
draw on work from psycholinguistics and psychology to fill in some of the details as to what 
a face-to-face version of a paradigm type of conversation looks like. Following Herbert Clark 
in distinguishing between process-level coordination and content-level coordination I 
suggest that in order to coordinate in the way required to sustain such interactions 
interlocutors must engage in a particular type of process coordination. This process 
coordination also has consequences for the type of cooperation required of the participants. 
Considering this in terms of cooperation can help us to understand the relationship 
between coordination at the process level and coordination at the content level that occurs 
in face-to-face conversation. In Chapter 3 I start the comparison of face-to-face and digital 
conversation. This chapter looks specifically at spoken and written language and the focus 
is on some of the differences in acquisition, their respective historical roles and the 
available communication channels. I argue that although these differences may be in part 
contributory, they each are, to different degrees, surmountable. And considered alone these 
surface-level differences don’t seem to tell us much about why face-to-face and digital 
conversations differ. In Chapter 4 I argue the most striking difference between these two 
types of conversation is in the diverse nature of requirements placed on interlocutors in 
each. Recalling discussion of Chapter 2 I argue that whereas in face-to-face conversation the 
task of communication is at all times spread between participants, in digital conversation 
the burden of communication is passed in almost its entirety from one participant to the 
other. This, we should expect, makes communication in digital conversation a more difficult 
task. Not only this, though, the difference in coordination in digital conversation has 
consequences for the nature of the cooperation we find in these interactions. It is these two 
consequences - the difficulty of communication and the nature of the cooperation – that I 
take to be most relevant to considerations of why face-to-face conversation can often 
appear more engrossing and satisfying than its digital counterpart. In the final chapter I 
present a case study on the speech act of trolling. My purpose in this chapter is to suggest 
what I think to be the direction of research this type of study points us towards. There I 
examine in close detail a new type of linguistic behaviour that is made possible by the 
different nature of digital conversation. 
The first chapter is, in part, an attempt to characterise a certain type of interaction 
which I call a paradigm type of conversation. There are, we might think, many different 





Mitchell Green’s (1999, 2017) any type of interaction that has some pertinent line of inquiry 
can be considered to be a conversation. For my purposes of comparison of face-to-face and 
digital conversation, however, what I want to do is reduce the variables as much as possible 
to allow a closer comparison of like-for-like. So my primary motivation in this chapter is to 
suggest a narrow category of interaction that can be used later in the dissertation as a 
comparison class. Conversation as an object of study is motley and difficult to pin-down so 
what I propose here is a cluster notion of conversation in which some interaction might 
have more or less of some of the properties suggested. What I propose the paradigm type of 
conversation looks like is that it is a turn-taking exchange (which rules out from the 
paradigm case examples such as academic lectures, soliloquy or novels which Green accepts 
as types of conversation). This turn-taking exchange, I suggest, should also be much more 
synocratic in nature than it is autocratic. That is, the conversational participants must each 
have some degree of control over the direction of the conversation (in turn, this rules out 
from the paradigm some turn-taking activities such as cross-examinations or to a lesser 
extent job interviews). In Section 3 I then look at features that characterise more the 
experience of having a paradigm type of conversation. These are features such as the 
interdependence of contributions, the role of continued perspective sharing and of 
prediction. Having roughly characterised the type of conversation I wish to consider for the 
remainder of the dissertation, in the next chapter I begin the work of looking in more detail 
at some of the features of a face-to-face paradigm type of conversation. 
In the second chapter I sharpen this notion of a paradigm conversation by exploring 
some of the structural features of such an activity. Here we consider the implications of 
some of the features of face-to-to-face conversation. Spoken and signed languages are 
generally instantaneous and interlocutors can see and/or hear each other. The medium 
used is generally evanescent, simultaneous and unrecorded. And the control of the 
discussion rests with the interlocutors who have self-expression and self-determination. 
Drawing upon recent work in psycholinguistics that looks at timings in face-to-face 
conversation we begin to see some of the consequences of such features. For it is the case 
that in order to sustain such interactions participants are required to perform a rich set of 
communicative tasks that involve providing feedback, initiating repair sequences and 
predicting speech act types and turn-duration. Drawing upon Herbert Clark’s distinction 
between content and process coordination I argue that when we focus on the process 
coordination tasks involved in face-to-face conversation we begin to see a consistency of 





might differ vividly, the types of tasks required of the conversational participants in order 
for them to sustain their interactions we should expect stay roughly the same. I conclude 
this chapter by arguing that we can best understand how this coordination works by 
thinking about the type of cooperation required in order to meet these coordinative 
requirements. Using Paul Grice’s cooperative principle I argue that we can understand the 
close relationship between the process and content levels of conversational coordination by 
considering the preconditions that must be met in order to meet something like Grice’s 
cooperative principle. The result is that in order to sustain a face-to-face conversation 
conversational participants are continuously engaged in a form of cooperative behaviour. 
The third chapter starts the comparison of face-to-face and digital conversation. One 
of the most obvious points of contrast between face-to-face and written digital 
conversations is modal. Face-to-face conversation is usually conducted using spoken or 
signed languages, whereas the type of digital conversation I am interested in here is 
primarily written. In this chapter then I contrast spoken and written language to examine 
whether there is something specific to these modes which might help explain the 
differences in the two types of conversation. I look at differences in acquisition, in the 
historical roles of spoken and written language and at some of the different channels of 
communication available in the two modes. I argue that although such differences may be 
contributory as to why as to why face-to-face and digital conversations differ, these such 
differences alone don’t seem to be suitably explanatory. And indeed, we also have good 
reason to believe that to varying degrees each of these three differences are already in the 
process of being reconciled in the two modes.     
In the fourth chapter I address what I take to be the most interesting difference 
between face-to-face and digital conversation. Here I argue that when we pay attention to 
the differences in the types of process tasks first discussed in Chapter 2 we see that the 
requirements placed on interlocutors in face-to-face and digital conversations are 
interestingly distinct. We see similarity in some features such as the self-determination and 
self-expression available to interlocutors. This I argue gives us good reason to consider 
face-to-face and digital conversations to be suitably similar for comparison. However, when 
we consider some of the different features of digital conversation we see that whereas the 
modes used in face-to-face conversation are generally evanescent and recordless and the 
interactions instantaneous, in digital conversation utterances are recorded and permanent 





is that in digital conversation the need to carry out continuous communicative tasks is not 
as pressing as it is in face-to-face conversation. So whereas in face-to-face conversation the 
overall job of communication is continuously shared amongst  interlocutors, in digital 
conversation the burden of communication is, roughly speaking, passed from one to the 
other. I argue that this has interesting consequences for the type of cooperation we might 
think is required for sustaining digital conversation. I will suggest that it is this underlying 
difference which best explains why we might think face-to-face conversation can often seem 
more engrossing or satisfying.   
 The final chapter serves both as a case study and an example of the type of research 
that I think follows from paying attention to some of the differences in face-to-face and 
digital conversations. I do this by looking specifically at one particular phenomenon we find 
primarily in digital environments. ‘Trolling’ has become a term to denote a wide range of 
behaviour we find in internet communication, ranging from what appear to be harmless 
japes through to bullying, abuse and hate speech. In this chapter I will argue that by using 
tools from the philosophy of language and by considering trolling as a type of speech act, we 
can start to see some of the structural similarities between these seemingly disparate acts. 
Once these similarities become clearer, we can then understand better what trolling is and 




































A Paradigm Type of Conversation 
Despite being a foundational area for much of our theorising on language, the notion of 
‘conversation’ rarely has a concise definition attached when it occurs in the literature – the 
sense is, perhaps, that we all have a strong intuitive sense of what is meant by 
‘conversation’. So maybe the thought is that not much more needs to be said about what 
conversation is. We might think there are obvious paradigm cases of conversation in which 
interlocutors speak informally about what they did the previous evening, catch up with 
some gossip, discuss their plans for the summer, or argue about the merits of favourite 
films. These all seem to be uncontroversial examples of conversation. Though we might also 
think not all uses of language are what we would call conversations; we might wonder 
whether a novel or a TV series, for instance, are a type of conversation, or perhaps news 
bulletins, or the UK Weights and Measures Act 1985. It may be thought that these types of 
language use lack the interactivity we would traditionally expect of conversation. It may be 
that a novel or a TV series contains dialogue that appears conversational, but whether the 
novel itself, or a TV series itself is a conversation seems less clear. Prima facie, then, it might 
be thought that as these latter types of language use lack obvious interactivity (for example, 
when reading a novel the roles remain static, the author does the writing, the reader does 
the reading and in a TV series the roles are similarly static - actors and screenwriters do the 
talking and the viewer does the listening), then we have a simple method of delineating 
between conversational and non-conversational language use along the lines of the 
interactivity. On closer inspection, as will be discussed later, it isn’t quite that simple even 
with these types of case. Further to this, there are also types of language use that are 
interactive, yet possibly sit somewhere on the border of what might be thought of as 






 My suspicion is that one of the reasons we don’t have a settled definition of 
conversation of the type loved by philosophers – that is of a string of necessary and 
sufficient conditions that can help us delineate between conversational and non-
conversational language uses – is that conversation is, by its nature, simply too wild and 
sprawling, simply put; conversation can come in many different forms.1 As such, the balance 
between being too restrictive and overgenerating by introducing strict definitional criteria 
makes the point of distinction perhaps too fine to find. Conversation also traverses many 
different supposed disciplinary frontiers. As an activity it is linguistic, psychological and 
social. Even within philosophy one could analyse it within philosophies of (joint) action, of 
language, of mind or through social philosophy. So perhaps the interesting aspects of what 
we might call conversation are relative to our interests. Even though a precise definition of 
conversation may be out of reach, this needn’t entail we can’t at least attempt to consider it 
 
1 It would be remiss not to note here Mitchell Green’s conception of conversation (1999, 2017) as he 
does offer a neat way of determining what conversation is and he would include in his class of 
conversation such activities as reading a novel or watching a TV series. For example, he says that: 
“[W]hile what I’ve elsewhere (Green, 1999) called exchanges will involve a desultory sharing 
of information among interlocutors, conversations often have a teleological dimension: 
instead of just chatting, we frequently aim to answer a particular question or set of questions 
about what to do or what is the case.” (2017, p.1593) 
“I want to suggest that conversations are characteristically directed toward some end or 
other. From this teleological perspective, conversations emerge as projects that might be 
spread over many years, continents, or journal issues.” (2017, p.1594) 
“[So] let us say that whereas a verbal exchange is any sequence of speech acts, a 
conversation is a sequence of such acts ostensibly aimed at answering either a theoretical or 
practical question.” (2017, p.1595) 
Note, then, that for Green whenever some exchange has some teleological dimension (primarily 
conceived by Green as it having a question answering dimension) it then becomes conversational in 
nature. The boundaries of this notion of conversation, then, allows that a lecture, a novel, a poem, or 
a series of journal articles can be classed as ‘conversation’.  This notion of conversation is far too 
broad for my purposes here, though I have no principled objection to Green defining conversation in 
such a way. Green’s goals are different to my own here; he wishes to expand the work that can be 
done using Stalnaker’s CG-context model and so it is an expansive project. My aim, on the other hand, 
is restrictive in that I aspire towards an easier way to contrast face-to-face and online interactions. 
What I also hope will later become apparent is that the fundamental difference between Green’s 
notion of conversation and the conversation I discuss here and in subsequent chapters relates to the 
interdependent notions of content and process (much more on this in Ch.2). Green is content-
focused – it is the contents of some interaction that he takes to be salient to their nature. Whereas 
my paradigm type of conversation takes similarity of process-structure to be the fundamentally 
important notion. In terms of a project looking to contrast face-to-face and digital conversation, if we 
compare the content alone there need not be any interesting general difference. It is perfectly 
conceivable that the content of some digital conversation could have content identical to that of a 
face-to-face conversation, whereas when we concentrate on the processes involved we see some 
intrinsic contrasts. Green’s account is deserving of more attention than I have space for here and I 
would certainly have liked to say more to contrast my own notion of conversation and Green’s. 
However, I have taken the decision that to do so would add an an extra level of complexity that 






as a distinct type of activity, and this is why I take the approach of attempting to 
characterise it as a cluster notion. 
My overall project here is an attempt to understand some of the differences between 
traditional face-to-face interaction and the newer type of text-based digital interaction we 
find in online environments (from hereon in I will use the shorthand digital conversation to 
refer to these types of interaction).2 And working from the intuition that although much is 
similar between face-to-face and digital conversation, there is something different in the 
way we experience them. I want to set up a way of testing this intuition by way of a 
comparative study. In order to make this comparison, (and in particular make it a 
manageable task) I plan to restrict the types of interaction that will be looked at. What I 
consider here will be a narrow class of interactions and for the sake of this discussion I will 
call these ‘conversations’. As noted above, a precise definition of conversation is elusive and 
so what I present in this chapter is a cluster concept which I will call a paradigm type of 
face-to-face conversation.3 The general idea being that the more features of the cluster 
some exchange possesses, the closer to the paradigm it is. The resulting cluster notion will 
be described in greater detail in Chapter 2, and the task of Chapters 3 and 4 will be to 
contrast this paradigm case of conversation with what appear to be correlating text-based 
digital conversations.    
This cluster account of face-to-face conversation characterises them as linguistic 
exchanges that have properties such as turn-taking (§2.2), synocratic control (§2.3), 
interdependence of contribution (§3.1) and shared perspectives (§3.2). To enable a 
 
2 It’s worth emphasising at this point that I am contrasting face-to-face conversation with very 
specifically text-based digital conversation even if the shorthand ‘digital conversation’ is imprecise. 
Many of us living through the Covid-19 pandemic will have experienced a great deal of digital 
conversation that wasn’t text-based, for example through the use of video calling software such as 
Zoom. As I shall explain in Ch.3, I regard such conversations to be versions of face-to-face 
conversation even though strictly speaking they would be classed as ‘digital’.   
3 Perhaps it might be wondered at this stage why I don’t simply avoid the difficulty of attempting to 
define ‘conversation’ by instead differentiating between face-to-face language use and 
written/online language use. My overall project, though, is a comparative reflection and so I’m 
guided here by the desire to restrict the objects of the comparison rather than deal with the whole 
complex gamut of language use. This might lead to a further question asking why then I don’t restrict 
the objects of comparison further. The argument might go that perhaps by looking at smaller units of 
conversation such as individual speech acts and their uptake we might then have a yet more precise 
and much easier to define set of comparative objects. This is indeed a strategy I think worth 
pursuing and part of the work in Chapter 5 I take to be the beginning of a look at the types of speech 
act that arise in digital spaces and is the direction I envisage this whole thesis is directed towards. 
However, for present purposes I think there are some interesting contrasts that come from a 





conversation to have such properties requires that participants in a conversation will often, 
on one level, be engaged in some agreed direction of the content of the talk relating to some 
topic(s) or question(s).4 On another level, however, these participants are also necessarily 
highly-engaged in a series of often unconscious meta-tasks some of which require them to 
pay close and continuous attention to their interlocutor (as well as to themselves) in order 
to sustain the interaction. These meta-tasks involve, amongst others, prediction and 
interactive alignment (more on these features in Ch.2 §3.1). One result of the requirement 
to attend to such meta-tasks is that it marks these types of exchange as different to many 
other types of linguistic behaviour. It is these features that I take to be worth further 
attention as the characterisation of conversation develops. Not all of this work is done in 
this chapter, however. In Chapter 2 I sharpen this characterisation and present a more 
detailed look at some of the coordinative and cooperative aspects that underpin 
conversational exchanges. I will show how this correlates with some observations from 
linguistics, psychology, psycholinguistics, and conversation analysis. The primary purpose 
of these two chapters, then, is to develop a characterisation of this most basic form of 
human linguistic interaction for the purposes of comparison (in Chapters 3 & 4) to a newer 
form of similar-seeming conversations that are afforded to us by recent technological 
developments.  
The plan for this chapter is as follows; Section 1 is a brief outline of some thoughts 
on why I think such a restricted comparison class of conversation is required (§1.1) and I 
also give some of my reasoning as to why I think the universality and primacy of 
conversation should make us think it is an interesting topic in and of itself (§1.2). Section 2 
is a consideration of an intuitive way in which we might start to draw a line between 
conversational and non-conversational linguistic activity – I do this by considering how we 
might delineate between different types of exchange by using a simple infelicitous report 
test. Using this I begin the task of separating a few different types of interaction into 
categories according to some of their notable features. Doing this allows us to think about 
some of the different features of different types of exchanges. In the final section I draw 
upon observations from three theorists - Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Erving Goffman and 
Sandford Goldberg – all of whom touch upon a similar rough conception of the type of 
activity I consider to be a paradigm type of conversation. What each of them suggests points 
towards a type of activity in which the participants enter into, or create, something which, 
 





to put it crudely, is greater than the mere sum of its parts (§3.1). The idea being that a 
paradigm type of conversation is something like a unified activity. I suggest that what 
makes it seem so can be considered to be the result of some of the phenomena we 
experience in conversation of this type such as the sharing of perspectives (§3.2) and the 
continuous attention required of us and the joint-commitment this entails (§3.3).   
1 Why conversation?  
1.1 Development of a comparison class 
A tidy set of necessary and sufficient conditions to define conversation eludes me here and 
so what I present is a characterisation of the type of activity I have in mind. What I present 
here is best considered a cluster concept with a group of properties that might feature to 
different degrees in some activity. The idea being that the greater the degree of some 
property, the closer it is to a paradigm case of conversation (with respect to that property).  
This seems to be the most promising way to define such a broad activity. Anything more 
prescriptive risks being too restrictive because even some of the features we might think 
seem to be obvious properties of conversation, such as participants having a language in 
common, have counter-examples.5 Avoiding a strict definition also allows us to take 
seriously one of the concerns in John Searle’s critique of the field of ‘conversation analysis.’6  
One of Searle’s arguments is that it is unlikely that conversation analysis could ever 
be as fruitful as, for example, speech act theory due to the generally vague purposes of 
conversation. So whereas we can isolate and detail quite precisely different types of speech 
act and apply analyses of a particular type to different occurrences of that same speech act, 
we have no such way of doing similar with conversation. Searle’s point is ultimately a point 
about content. Whereas we can offer good explanations as to what the content of some 
particular speech act is or how it functions, stating what the content of conversation is in a 
similarly explanatory way is not possible. Generally conversations are composed of 
numerous different speech acts but equally there could be infinite possible contents. 
Whereas illocutionary acts such as asking a question, giving an order or asserting 
something have specific communicative roles which are generalisable, conversations are, in 
terms of content, heterogenous – considered as a whole they vary wildly from one to the 
next. And so in terms of content Searle appears to be correct about the limitations of a 
 






theory of conversation. Nevertheless, I will argue that we can characterise conversation in 
other ways – more specifically by looking at the relationship between the content and 
processes involved in conversational interactions - and in doing so we can find some 
interesting generalisations. This is no straightforward task, however, and so it will occupy 
the remainder of this chapter and the following chapter. What I do in these two chapters is 
build a characterisation of a particular type of interaction. Once we develop some such way 
of isolating a particular type of interaction as being conversation, this then allows us space 
to directly contrast it with other types of interaction. My specific purpose here, then, is to 
use it as a basis for comparison with the type of exchanges that have become prominent in 
recent years – text-based electronically mediated interactions.  
1.2 The universality of conversation 
Having given my aim for this chapter within the scope of the wider thesis it would be remiss 
to end a section entitled ‘Why conversation?’ without briefly noting that one of the major 
motivations behind the research in this thesis: conversation is interesting in and of itself. It 
is difficult to think of a human activity not rooted in biological necessity that is quite so 
widespread. 
Conversation is one of the universal aspects of human life; it is the cauldron of 
languages and central to how we acquire them. So even on this basis, it is worth paying 
attention to, as many have before; be it in the theorising of David Lewis, H. Paul Grice, or 
Robert Stalnaker who use conversation as the basis for some of their most profound 
insights, 7 to theorists such as linguist Charles J. Fillmore who wrote that “face to face 
 
7 Indeed, conversation as a topic has an indirectly rich history in recent philosophy of language. We 
need only think of the role conversation has to play in seminal work such as Lewis’s ‘Scorekeeping in 
a Language Game’ (1979) Grice’s ‘Logic and Conversation’ (1989c), as well as his ‘Further notes on 
Logic and Conversation’ (1989a), ‘Presuppositions and Conversational Implicature’ (1989d) and in 
sections of the ‘Retrospective Epilogue’ to his Studies in the Way of Words (1989e), or in 
Stalknaker’s ((1999 [1970]), (1999 [1974]), (2002), (2014))  work on assertion and the common 
ground, and the considerable debates that have followed them. I say indirectly rich history because 
although the theories that have developed in response to Lewis, Grice and Stalnaker provide great 
insights into some of the aspects we find in conversation, what conversation actually is rarely 
receives dedicated attention. That ‘conversation’ is used as a backdrop to some of the most 
interesting developments in recent philosophy of language history and yet there seems to be little 
time spent developing what we mean by ‘conversation’, might lead us to question whether there is 
some gap in our theorising. To be clear, the above point isn’t that theorists have been ignoring 
language uses that aren’t conversational, there have been many uses of examples of non-
conversational language use, such as written notes or voice recordings, to draw out some of the 
interesting aspects of language use (For example, (Predelli, 1998, 2011) (Carston, 2008, p.326) 
(Perry, 2003, p. 378) make use of written notes to make points about the referent of ‘I’, the literature 





conversation is the basic and primary use of language, all others being best described in 
terms of their manner of deviation from that base”.8 Fillmore’s point is developed by 
Herbert Clark over the course of his Using Language, for example he says “[f]ace-to-face 
conversation…is the principal setting that doesn’t require any special skill…[and the] basic 
setting for children’s acquisition of their first language.”9 And conversational language use 
is, as Stephen Levinson and Francisco Torreira note, “the prime ecological niche for 
language, the context in which language is learned, in which the cultural forms of language 
have evolved, and where the bulk of language use happens.”10 What I think unites these 
theorists is an understanding of the nature of language requires an understanding of 
conversation, and it is in that spirit that I proceed here. So regardless of the use to which I 
put the notion of conversation I work with later in the dissertation, and the wider 
theoretical positioning of such a study, this chapter and Chapter 2 are, I hope, interesting in 
and of themselves because they examine one of the most universal of human activities. 
2 A tentative boundary between conversation and non-conversation 
It seems natural to start a characterisation of conversation by considering some cases and 
thinking about whether they are conversations or not. So at this early stage I use a rough 
and intuitive tool to draw some lines marking out some guide as to what is and what isn’t a 
conversation. Let’s call this unsophisticated tool the infelicitous report test. The idea of the 
infelicitous report test is simple; if it seems infelicitous to report an activity as being a 
conversation, then let’s pause to consider why that might be the case.11 I start in Section 2.1 
by providing an example I take to be uncontroversially a conversational exchange and for 
the remainder of the chapter I use this example as a counter-point to show some of the 
differences we find with other types of language use such as novels, lectures, cross-
examinations, job interviews and scholarly exchanges through journal articles. Contrasting 
these types of exchange leads me to conclude that some of the important properties of the 
cluster notion of conversation are turn-taking (§2.2) and synocratic control (§2.3). In 
 
2013; Connolly, 2017; Romdenh-Romluc, 2002; Sidelle, 1991) all centre on voice recordings, and so 
are also examples of specifically non-conversational language uses being put to work to make points 
about the referents of indexicals such as ‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’.) 
8 (1981, p. 152)   
9 (1996, p.9) 
10 (Levinson & Torreira, 2015, p. 1) 
11 Of course, such appeals to ordinary language use have severe limitations, and there are good 
Gricean reasons to explain why it might sound infelicitous to describe, for example, a cross-
examination as being ‘a conversation’, this might seem perhaps insufficiently informative and so it 
would be far more informative to say ‘cross-examination’ when describing such occurrences (and so 





keeping with the idea that what is being described here is a cluster notion, these properties 
are best considered to be linear in nature; that is, particular exchanges may have more or 
less of the properties by matters of degree. So let’s start with an exchange that appears to 
have all of these features and is close to an ideal form of conversation (were there ever to be 
such a thing).  
2.1 A typical interactive synchronous conversation 
There certainly seem to be some types of interaction that we might comfortably consider to 
be conversations. Sadio and Brigitte discussing the news in a cafe, Amelia and Emmeline 
talking in the pub about how they are going to spend their weekend, or two colleagues 
talking about their new boss all seem to be uncontroversially the type of occurrence we 
might consider to be typical conversations. There is a topic of discussion (which may be 
fluid and ever-changing) and the interlocutors talk about it. It certainly wouldn’t seem 
infelicitous to call such interactions conversations, and although caution with such ‘tests’ is 
necessary, it would seem to me that these types of exchange seem to sit comfortably within 
the category of paradigm cases of conversation.   
An example of a typical extract from a conversation of this type might be such as the 
following example, transcribed originally by Anita Pomerantz.12  
(1) 
01 A: Just think of how many people would miss 
you. You would know who cared. 
02 B: Sure. I have a lot of friends who would come 
  to the funeral and say what an intelligent, 
  bright, witty, interesting person I was. 
03 A: They wouldn’t say that you were humble 
04 B: No. Humble, I’m not.13 
 
12 (1978, p. 89) 
13 I’ve selected this particular example from the conversation analysis literature partly because the 
transcription is straightforward compared to many examples from the field. The only conventions 





On the surface of (1) it seems that A and B both take turns to speak, the topic appears to be 
fluid, moving perhaps from death at 01 to funerals at 02 on to B’s self-aware lack of humility 
at 03 and 04. Without knowing anything about the context of (1) there seems no good prima 
facie reason to regard this extract as non-conversational. It is likely only an extract of a 
longer exchange, but it seems felicitous to say that (1) is a conversation between A and B. As 
such, I’ll use (1) as a reference point and by contrasting (1) with other examples we will 
also start to understand a little more of what is happening in (1). 
2.2 Turn-taking interactivity  
When compared to examples such as (1) we might think that it would seem less felicitous to 
say that Salka reading the novel Things Fall Apart by Chinua Achebe is a paradigm type of 
conversation, or that Paul Grice giving his William James lectures was a paradigm type of 
conversation.14 If Salka reported upon reading Things Fall Apart that she’d just had a 
conversation with Chinua Achebe one might think it would be infelicitous to describe 
reading a book as such, and so Salka’s utterance might be taken to be metaphorical speech 
of some sort.15 Similarly an attendee of one of Grice’s lectures who reported that she had 
‘had a conversation’ with Grice might be taken to mean she’d spoken directly with him. One 
reason for this seeming infelicity could, therefore, be that such statements are insufficiently 
informative, to describe a lecture as a conversation or the reading of a novel as such seems 
to miss some important details from the description. For some purposes though it may be 
that we can consider such activities to be conversations-of-sorts. For current purposes, 
however, what I take to be notable with these examples and cases such as (1) is the 
differences in the nature of the interactivity when contrasted with examples such as (1). 
  In (1), A and B both contribute directly to the discourse in a rapid to-and-fro. In the 
case of the novel or the lecture, however, Salka and Grice’s audience member don’t directly 
 
probably expect, italics reflect emphasis in the speech. In many conversation analysis transcriptions 
the convention of using 01, 02, 03, is used for every line (as opposed to every utterance as here), this 
gives the analyst a picture of the duration, which isn’t essential here, though I find the numbering as 
presented useful for referencing specific parts of the dialogue. 
14 Green’s certainly wouldn’t be quite so quick to disregard these types of activity from the class of 
conversation. For Green that these types of occurrence both have topics of discussion, and that topic 
is what is spoken (or written) about, and so these too might be considered conversations. 
15 Green (2017, p.1601) doesn’t take such use to necessarily be metaphorical, for example he says; 
“Antonio Damasio in Descartes’ Error reminds readers at numerous points in the text that he thinks 






make a contribution to the content of the exchange - Achebe and Grice ‘do all the talking’.16 
In the terms used by conversation analysts, the difference here is that in examples such as 
(1) participants are engaged in turn-taking whereas in the example of a novel or a lecture 
no such turn-taking is present. So in (1) the participants take turns to perform different 
roles, at 01 A speaks and B listens, at 02 the reverse is true. Whereas in attending a lecture 
or reading a book, the roles remain almost consistently static.17 In such activities one party 
almost permanently adopts the role of speaker/writer and another the role of 
listener/reader.  So what I suggest as an initial property of the type of interaction I am 
interested in here is that it will generally be interactive – that is, it will generally be a turn-
taking activity. Now of course we’ve all likely had conversations in which the great majority 
of one role is taken on by a particular participant – sometimes in a face-to-face exchange 
one person will very often ‘do all the talking’ as if they are delivering an academic lecture. 
When some particular conversation takes on such a dynamic, then perhaps it moves away 
from being a paradigm case of  conversation and its nature becomes closer to that of a novel 
or academic lecture, however unlike a novel or academic lecture, that the opportunity for 
discussion to return to a more balanced turn-taking enterprise allows us to consider it to be 
closer on the scale to a ‘conversation’ as I am conceiving it. So it isn’t necessarily the turn-
taking by itself that makes our paradigm type of activity ‘conversation’. As we shall see in 
§2.3 some linguistic activities are intrinsically turn-taking activities yet might not be best 
regarded as conversations (at least by using the infelicitous report test) and so what I 
suggest next is we look at who determines the shape and content of these turns. Specifically, 
I next want to suggest that an important characteristic of the type of activity I am regarding 
as a paradigm type of conversation is that the participants each have a degree of control 
over the direction of the discussion. That is, an ideal conversation operates like what we 
might call a synocracy.  
2.3 Synocracy  
In this section I want to highlight the role of mutual control between participants in a 
paradigm case of conversation. My sense is that in the case of a novel or a lecture the 
direction and topic of the activity is dictated almost entirely by the author or lecturer. If this 
 
16 Though perhaps it could be argued that upon reading a novel or listening to a lecture we are in a 
sense interacting with the writer/speaker, they have produced/are producing language for us to 
comprehend. And the interaction is in the comprehension. Further to this, it might be argued that 
any content that is audience-generated is a contribution to ‘the content of the exchange’. 
17 Though as pointed out to me by Rosanna Keefe, it could well be the case that one could perhaps 





is the case, we might therefore consider such activities to be generally quite autocratic in 
nature (with a novel often being more autocratic than a lecture due to its pre-determined 
state by the time a reader comes to it). Contrast this again with (1). In such turn-taking 
exchanges the direction of talk is more broadly dictated by the current speaker at any one 
time. As these roles switch during the course of such an exchange, we might expect that, 
broadly speaking, control over the direction of discussion is spread between the 
participants. In a sense, then, interactions such as (1) are synocratic in nature; they are 
collaboratively controlled. However, we shouldn’t be misled into thinking that it is turn-
taking itself which leads to such a synocracy. As we shall see in the remainder of this 
subsection, there are types of exchange which have similar turn-taking structures such as 
the above but seem to be much more autocratic in nature.     
2.3.1 Cross-examination 
It might seem odd to describe the experience of being cross-examined in court as having 
had ‘a conversation with a lawyer’, 18 but it is undoubtedly a turn-taking activity - perhaps 
even more rigidly so than examples such as (1).19  Take the following exchange from the 
Oklahoma City Bombing trial on 12 November 1997. 
 (2)  
01 Q. Did he tell you he had seen a pickup truck?  
02 A. Yes.  
03 Q. All right. Did he describe the pickup truck to you?  
04 A. Yes. He said it was a dark-colored –  
05 Q. Hold it a second. Did he describe it? Yes or no.20  
When comparing (2) and (1) there are some obvious similarities. In both examples each 
participant takes turns to respond to the previous participant’s contribution. In both 
examples the interaction proceeds synchronously; as one speaks the other listens and 
 
18 Though Green (1999) notes cross-examination as a type of conversation, he doesn’t include them 
in his (2017) taxonomy. 
19 More rigidly turn-taking in the sense that it would generally be against the purposes of the court if 
a cross-examiner were to not allow the cross-examinee opportunity to speak, and it would be 
unlikely a cross-examinee would be given opportunity to talk at length interrupted.  
20 This and many other similar examples can be found in Maj Britt Mosegaard Hansen’s (2008). This 





responds to what has been said. And in both examples there are (tacitly, at least) agreed 
directions of talk in that all participants appear to be addressing similar or related topics. 
There are some notable differences too though, most pertinently there are notable 
differences in control of the exchange.  
In (2) Questioner places strict restrictions on what Answerer can say. Take for 
example Answerer’s response at 04 to the question posed at 03. Ordinarily we might expect 
a question such as ‘Did he describe the truck to you?’ to carry an implicature along the lines 
of ‘if so, how did he describe it?’, and we see Answerer at 04 respond as if it does carry such 
pragmatic content. At 05, though, Questioner cancels the implicature and makes clear it is 
merely the polar question that should be answered. The cross-examiner at such a point 
appears to exert control on the direction of the exchange even to the point of directly 
shaping how Answerer can respond.21 22 In cases such as cross-examination, then, we 
perhaps see much more autocratic interactions than in cases such as (1).  
In (1) we might reasonably speculate that A and B have a much more evenly 
balanced control of the direction of conversation than Questioner and Answerer do in (2). It 
will of course be the case that in most conversations there are social pressures or 
expectations that bear upon what participants might feel they can contribute to an 
exchange, though when thinking of the idealised paradigm, we might expect that its nature 
is much more synocratic than autocratic. 23 The participants are each granted a degree of 
control of the direction of the conversation. In a cross-examination, however, one party to 
the exchange has a much greater degree of control of the content of the discussion than the 
other. That these interactions are initiated in such a way and conducted in the way that they 
are makes them intrinsically and profoundly authoritarian. There is no real symmetry of 
influence in cross-examination, the cross-examiner determines the direction of talk and the 
potential penalties of contempt of court and perjury place severe restrictions on how a 
cross-examinee can respond. What I suggest then is that exchanges such as cross-
 
21 See (Borg & Connolly, forthcoming) for further discussion of how this type of case is best 
considered in terms of linguistic liability.  
22 There are also other interesting dynamics in such interactions though, because even though prima 
facie the cross-examiner generally has control over what she can ask of the cross-examinee, this 
authority is also subject to an even greater authority – that of the court. Indeed, the cross-examiner 
is also limited in what she can discuss, she wouldn’t be given much chance to idly discuss the day’s 
weather with the cross-examinee, for example, if it was superfluous to the case.  
23 There is an interesting consequence of considering degrees of synocracy as an important aspect of 
conversation, as it will be the case that in some conversations not bound by the conventions or rigid 
power structures of, for example, a court, the dynamic is much more autocratic, sometimes by 





examinations drift further from the paradigm type of conversation on account of being 
autocratic in nature. In the paradigm type of conversation we should expect not only turn-
taking to be notable, but also that participants have some degree of control over the 
direction of the talk.24 Let’s now consider another example of a turn-taking exchange, 
though one which we might think contains a higher-degree of synocracy than a cross-
examination.  
2.3.2 Job interview 
Despite also being fundamentally a turn-taking exchange, we might also think it seems 
infelicitous to report that a job interview was a conversation (although perhaps to a lesser 
extent than we would a cross-examination). Generally speaking the interview room is less 
rigidly structured than the courtroom. And interviewees will have more opportunity to 
speak freely than those under oath and being cross-examined.25 It is also the case that one 
could imagine a job interview in which parts of the exchange between the interviewer(s) 
and interviewee could even have a similar character to exchanges such as (1). For example, 
participants in a job interview may discover they have a similar hobby and potentially 
discuss that as equals, and there may be elements of the job being interviewed for that 
allow for a looser discussion. Indeed some interviewers may purposely decide to structure 
an interview as being closer to an informal chat than a formal interview.26 However, even if 
the interviewer were to conduct the interview as such, and even if there are moments in an 
interview which seem to break from the hierarchical structures, we might think that it still 
doesn’t entail that in general such interactions are not much more autocratic in nature than 
examples such as (1). 
 
24 Another difference worth noting is that in (2) the Questioner isn’t speaking to Answerer alone, and 
nor is Answerer answering questions for Questioner alone. The proceedings of a court case are often 
public, and even if not public they are mostly played out in front of an audience of jurors, judges, 
legal representatives, defendants, plaintiff etc…  So (2) isn’t a private discussion between two 
interlocutors, it is a form of interactive public speech which is initiated for the formal purposes of 
the court. What I think marks this as significant is that it creates a conversational dynamic that often 
isn’t present in paradigm face-to-face conversations in which the audience is the interlocutors. 
25 Indeed, unlike in the courtroom we might expect a polar question in a job interview to carry many 
of the conventional implicatures we find in day to day conversation. A question such as ‘Have you 
had experience teaching?’ would likely be given as a request for specific details of such experience 
rather than a mere ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response.  
26 Though as is pointed out to me by Rosanna Keefe, some of the most informative interviews are in many 






We would probably expect that most often it will be the case that the interviewer in 
a job interview still has a position of power afforded to them by their role as interviewer 
and arbiter of whether or not to employ the interviewee. And although the penalties for the 
interviewee might not be thought to be as strong as in the case of a cross-examination, 
failure to satisfy the examiner could potentially carry the penalty of not getting the job. It 
appears then that what they can say is limited by what the interviewer expects or wants (or 
what the interviewee takes the interviewer to expect or want) 27 and so the stakes for the 
interviewee are high. For the interaction to be successful the interviewee will be required to 
submit to the expectations of the interviewer in a way that is not reciprocated.28 As such 
even though a job interview has a turn-taking structure and a greater degree of synocracy 
than, for example, a cross-examination, the control of the direction of the talk is generally 
dictated by the interviewer. As such, on a continuum we might think a job interview to be 
less conversational than examples such as (1), yet more conversational than examples such 
as (2).   
2.3.3 Simulations? 
I have suggested that what makes examples such as cross-examinations and job interviews 
different from examples such as (1) is rooted in the different degrees of synocracy. Though 
it is worth noting that beyond some of the most obvious differences, there are other 
contrasts we might wish to draw which are also rooted in this notion of synocracy. For 
example, we might think a fundamental difference lies in both of these types of interactive 
language use being generally formal and structured. That is, they both have a rigid set of 
 
27 It is worth noting that although less obviously formalised, these hierarchical structures exist in 
what we might also regard as day to day conversations. A seemingly informal chat between someone 
in a position of power over their interlocutor(s) can often have this type of character too, and often 
the less-powerful party to the conversation will have very little input as to the direction of 
discussion and will, in effect, be silenced in this regard. In such cases there may be social penalties, 
or penalties for their employment or career, for example. Although I don’t have space to elaborate on 
this point as much as I would like to, I think considering conversation in terms of synocracy can help 
us to understand some of the fundamental reasons as to why we should regard these types of 
interaction with suspicion. For without synocracy, I would argue perhaps they aren’t really 
conversations at all, or at least they are distant facsimiles of conversations. And indeed, a part of the 
injustices of such interactions is based on the power-broker not affording an interlocutor a 
genuinely conversational role in the interaction. I pick up this point again in Chapter 2 Section 4 
where I begin to refine the nature of the synocracy in conversation. 
28 Although there may be some cases in which this isn’t the case. It may well be that the interviewer 
is desperately keen on employing that particular person who they know has also been courted by 





goals29 and the direction of the talk is often that one party to the interaction asks questions, 
and the other party answers them. Or perhaps one party dictates the direction of discussion 
to such a degree that the dynamic is one of information extractor and information 
dispenser. All of these types of reason, I think, are related to the asymmetry of control in 
such interactions. In his ‘Retrospective Epilogue’ Grice considers such examples30 to be a 
“secondary range of cases” from the types of interaction he is considering. Grice suggests 
that in cross-examination, for example, “the common objectives are spurious, apparent 
rather than real; the joint enterprise is a simulation, rather than an instance of even the 
most minimal conversational cooperation”.31 Grice’s idea that what is happening in such 
cases is a ‘simulation’ touches on what I take to differentiate (1) and the other examples. 
Although a cross-examination or job-interview might appear on the surface to be of a 
similar type to examples such as (1), there is something fundamentally different about 
them. In Section 3 I begin to discuss in more detail what it might be that makes them 
different types of activities, and in Chapter 2 (§4.2.2) I sharpen further the notion of 
synocracy.  
2.4 Summary 
In this section I begin to characterise what a cluster notion of a paradigm conversation 
might look like by highlighting two features I suggest we might expect to be present (to 
some high degree) in a paradigm type of conversational exchange. These features are what I 
call turn-taking interactivity and synocracy. In Section 2.1 I present example (1) as being a 
typical conversational extract. In this example we see two people exchanging short turns 
that roughly follow on from the previous turn, it is in essence interactive and the roles of the 
participants switch continuously between speaker and hearer. We can hypothesise that the 
participants are relatively unrestricted in what they contribute, and there is an approximate 
balance between the contributors to the direction of the conversation. In (1), then, it seems 
that A and B each contribute to the activity as approximate equals to the progression of the 
discussion. This is in contrast, however, to some other types of linguistic activity. In Section 
2.2 we looked at two other types of linguistic activity – the reading of a novel and an 
 
29 For example, in a cross-examination this rigid goal will depend on who is doing the cross-
examining; be it, for example, a representative for the defence trying to show cause to regard her 
client as being not guilty. Or in a job interview, the goal is to determine a candidate’s suitability for a 
particular job.  
30 Although he names only cross-examination here, I take what he says to apply to cases such as job 
interviews. 





academic lecture. These types of activity are much less obviously interactive. In the case of a 
novel, on the one hand we have an author and on the other we have a reader. And in the 
case of an academic lecture we have the lecturer and the audience. In the case of a novel the 
roles remain entirely static - in most cases the reader has no bearing on the contributions of 
the author. In the case of a lecture the roles are not as strictly rigid; an audience member 
could directly contribute in some ways, but generally the lecturer directs almost all of the 
discussion and makes most of the contributions. From this I suggest that the paradigm type 
of conversation will be highly turn-taking in nature.  
 Whether an activity is a highly turn-taking activity or not is not enough to suggest it 
is a paradigm case of conversation, however. For it is the case that there are turn-taking 
linguistic activities that also seem to differ in some ways to examples such as (1). In Section 
2.3.1 I suggested that in the case of courtroom cross-examination we see a highly 
interactive exchange that is nonetheless quite different in some important senses to 
example (1). In the courtroom the cross-examiner is largely in control of the direction of the 
exchange, she asks the questions and can exert a degree of control over the manner in 
which they are answered. I argue there is a similar dynamic in examples such as a job 
interview, though to a lesser extent. In the job interview the interviewer largely directs the 
interviewee as to the topic to discuss, though the interviewee will more likely be given more 
freedom to answer in a way she sees fit. Indeed an interviewee might be given the 
opportunity to ask her own questions, and there may be sections of the interview which are 
much less rigidly structured than court dialogue ever is. What we can take from this, I 
suggest, is that in cases such as (1) the conversation is something like a synocratic 
endeavour. In a paradigm type of conversation the control of direction of the conversation 
rests to some degree with each of the participants. As such, on a cluster notion of 
conversation, the paradigm cases will be ones in which the activity is generally a turn-
taking interaction in which the control of the conversation is closer towards synocratic on a 
scale that ranges from synocracy to autocracy. What I want to consider next is how these 
features of turn-taking synocracy create the conditions for us to experience conversation as 
being something like a unified joint-activity. 
3 Conversation as unified activity 
In this section I consider how the turn-taking interactivity and synocratic nature of a 





Merleau-Ponty’s describes as “a being-shared-by-two”.32 I take Merleau-Ponty’s idea to be 
similar to Erving Goffman’s suggestion that when conversing conversational partners enter 
into an “unio mystico”,33 and I think that what this creates is something like what Sandford 
Goldberg’s describes as a co-authored piece of performance art using the spoken word.34 I 
want to emphasise that a paradigm type of conversation is best considered to be something 
like a unified action and that this unity is based in continuous and necessary perspective 
sharing and attention to the conversation. In order to do this, in Section 3.2 I consider 
another type of exchange (that of an exchange of scholarly journal articles) which seems to 
possess the turn-taking and synocracy of exchanges such as (1), but which we might still 
have reservations about adding to the class of paradigm conversations. I suggest, then, that 
such interactions lack the continuous attention of its interlocutors to the task of 
communication that characterise face-to-face conversations and that this is fundamentally 
significant for the type of activity we might consider it to be. 
This section comes with something of a promissory note, for although much of what 
I do here is descriptive and hypothetical, in Chapter 2 I offer what I take to be compelling 
evidence from psycholinguistics on the structural processes of conversation that indicate 
why the paradigm type of conversation has some of the characteristics it does. The overall 
aim here, then, is to ready us for the discussions of Chapter 2 where we look at the 
coordinative requirements of such an activity and consider how this is underpinned by a 
distinct and necessary form of coordination and cooperation.  
3.1 Interdependence of contribution 
Paradigm types of conversation in which we find a high degree of turn-taking and of 
synocracy have a character captured by Erving Goffman in his essay ‘Alienation from 
Interaction’.35 On the topic of conversation he says;  
As a main focus of attention talk is unique… for talk creates for the participant a 
world and a reality that has other participants in it. Joint spontaneous involvement 
is a unio mystico, a socialized trance… the individual must not only maintain proper 
involvement himself but also act so as to ensure that others will maintain theirs. 36  
 
32 (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, pp. 370–371) 
33 (Goffman, 1967, p.113) 
34 (2020) 
35 (Goffman, 1967)  






Many social encounters of the conversational type seem to share a fundamental 
requirement: the spontaneous involvement of the participants in an official focus of 
attention must be called forth and sustained.37  
What Goffman is getting at is that fundamentally conversation is an endeavour to which 
participants must give almost unceasing attention. Though it’s true that conversation can be 
conducted whilst eating or drinking or carrying out other habituated tasks, to participate in 
conversation is to be directing something like one’s attentional capacities38 to the task of the 
interaction. That there is, according to Goffman, an ‘official focus of attention’ seems to fit 
with Mitchell Green’s idea that conversation is an activity that is directed towards an 
inquiry or deliberation, and so we certainly have no need to exclude that this may be a 
fundamental aspect of most interactions. However, in many types of interaction there is also 
a more fundamental further focus required of the participants; that of continuously 
maintaining the interaction. For in many of these types of interaction, there is a sense in 
which participants must not only ensure that they themselves are sufficiently focused on 
the interaction, but also to make sure their conversational partners are similarly sufficiently 
focused. Disengagement in conversation is often obvious, and also contagious – if I notice 
my conversational partner’s eyes glaze over, my own attention can begin to waver. It is 
therefore essential for successful communication that participants remain focused on the 
communicative responsibilities of the task. And as I will argue in more depth in chapter 2, 
this level of required focus is indicative of how a particularly enjoyable conversation leads 
us into a ‘socialised trance’ or unio mystico. This also accords closely to something like the 
following description Maurice Merleau-Ponty ascribes to dialogue; 
Here there is a being-shared-by-two…We are, for each other, collaborators in perfect 
reciprocity: our perspectives slip into each other, we coexist through a single world. 
 
37  (Goffman, 1967, p.134) It’s probably worth noting that I don’t take the spontaneity Goffman refers 
to here as being the spontaneity of entering a conversation, for example one could call someone on 
the phone with the purpose of having a conversation, or arrange to meet them for that purpose, but 
the way it proceeds will, in most cases, be quite spontaneous.  
38 I’m aware ‘attentional capacities’ sounds quite woolly. I don’t have a precise definition of what I 
take this to be, though my hope is it becomes clear what I mean from the discussion around it. Maybe 
we could take it to be something such as described by William James in Chapter XI of his Principles of 
Psychology wherein attention “is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one 
out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, 
concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order 





I am freed from myself in the present dialogue, even though the other’s thoughts are 
certainly his own, since I do not form them, I nonetheless grasp them as soon as they 
are born or I even anticipate them. And even the objection raised by my interlocutor 
draws from me thoughts I did not know I possessed such that if I lend him thoughts, 
he makes me think in return.39    
Merleau-Ponty touches upon here the overall unity of the activity we find in certain 
types of interaction. By ‘being-shared-by-two’, Merleau-Ponty seems to be referring to 
something like Goffman’s unio mystic, but further to this he also seems to be drawing 
attention to the innate interdependence of between the contributions of each participant. So 
when he says that “even the objection raised by my interlocutor draws from me thoughts I 
did not know I possessed such that if I lend him thoughts, he makes me think in return.” 
Merleau-Ponty is alluding to the way in which in many exchanges, the contribution of A will 
very often provoke novel thoughts in B. B might then in turn respond in a way that has a 
similar effect on A and so on… So the contributions to this type of interaction is dependent 
not only on the interlocutors as individuals, but on the effects they have on each other.  
I take this idea to also chime with Goldberg’s idea of a conversation as being like a 
co-authored piece of performance art. He says; 
I have often thought that a truly great conversation is akin to a piece of performance 
art involving the spoken word in which each participant is a co-author. And I've 
often thought of the joy of conversations as at least in part the joys of co-
authorship.40 
Although Goldberg states that he is exaggerating for the purposes of vividness here, he 
touches upon something important which is that being in conversation can often be a 
positive experience. And part of this positivity relates to the fact that it co-authored or, we 
might say, highly collaborative at every stage. As such, for interactions of this type it seems 
there is an interdependence of participants that makes the conversation something like a 
unified thing. This feature of interdependence, together with the turn-taking synocracy 
discussed in Section 2 gives us good reason to think there is something sufficiently different 
between the types of exchange I consider here to be examples of paradigm conversations 
and types of linguistic activity that are further away from the paradigm (such as cross-
 
39 Merleau-Ponty (2012, pp. 370–371) 





examination, job interviews, novels or academic lectures). For if this reliance on the 
contribution of others for the formation of one’s own contributions is real, then it would 
entail that a conversation is not dependent in a trivial sense merely on, for example, the 
interlocutors A and B. That is to say, although it is trivially true that some particular 
conversation couldn’t exist without A and B, what is of interest is that it relies on the 
relationship of A to B (or perhaps more precisely put, it is the relationship of A’s 
contributions to B’s contributions). And this, I suggest, points us towards another of 
Merleau-Ponty’s observations – that in conversation participants continuously share 
perspectives. 
3.2 Shared perspectives 
When considering what type of exchanges sit closer to the paradigm type of conversation 
the interdependence of the contributions of the participants that comes from the turn-
taking synocratic nature of certain exchanges is important. However, there is something 
else about the character of these certain types of interaction that I think worth considering. 
Returning again to the passage from Merleau-Ponty in Section 3.1, another thing to note is 
the idea that during dialogue ‘perspectives slip into each other’. What I take Merleau-Ponty 
to be referring to is that during interactions of a certain type there will often be a 
requirement that interlocutors allow that their own thoughts be close to the thoughts of 
their interactive partner’s. In a sense this is what it is to properly and actively listen to 
someone speak. We might however think that this notion of perspective sharing is common 
in many sorts of language exchange. Let us consider next another type of exchange  - that of 
a series of journal articles written in response to each other.  41 42  These types of exchange 
involve turn-taking, synocracy and taken as a whole might be considered to be something 
like Goldberg’s co-authored piece, though they are, I suggest interestingly different to what I 
consider to be the paradigm types of conversation.   
 
41 I choose this example again because Mitchell Green categorises such an interaction as a type of 
conversation. 
42 The following exchange is one such example worth drawing attention to (chronologically ordered 
here) (Bach, 2006c; Cappelen & Lepore, 2006b; Bach, 2006b; Cappelen & Lepore, 2006a; Bach 
2006a). Although strictly speaking it starts with Bach (2006c) replying in a journal to (particularly a 
criticism of Bach in) Cappelen & Lepore’s book Insensitive Semantics (2005), the responses that 
follow it are all manuscripts. That they are published in journal or not doesn’t seem to be a 
significant difference. Arguably though, there are two different questions being discussed, one by 
Bach who suggests that Cappelen & Lepore’s semantic minimalism relies on a form of what he calls 
‘propositionalism’ and Cappelen & Lepore seem interested in discussing whether Bach’s radical 





Suppose we have a series of journal papers S and for simplicity’s sake let’s say each 
of the papers are written by one of the same two authors – Autorin and Escritora. These two 
authors write in response to each other on the topic of some particular question.43 Each 
paper in S may well be intelligible on its own, but if the format of S is that Autorin responds 
to Escritora’s points and vice versa then there is a sense in which what Autorin writes will, 
to some degree at least, have a direct bearing on what Escritora writes. And that which 
Escritora writes will have consequences for how Autorin responds. As such, in the case of S 
we appear to have a turn-taking exchange (unlike the example of a novel) with a degree of 
synocracy (unlike, say, a cross-examination) and also it has the type of interdependence of 
contributions that I suggest above is characteristic of paradigm types of conversation. But 
not only that, it appears, too that in order to respond to each other’s points, Autorin and 
Escritora must also at least attempt to share the perspectives of each other in the sense of 
trying to understand what they have written.44   
When Autorin is reading a reply from Escritora to a previous paper, she may well 
allow herself (or be required) to take on Escritora’s perspective to comprehend what 
Escritora might be saying. And the reverse might happen once Autorin’s reply is published 
and read by Escritora. But there is an aspect of perspective taking that does not occur in the 
case of S but which necessarily must happen in a paradigm type of conversation. For in face-
to-face interactions, this perspective sharing is a continuous and synchronous occurrence, 
and importantly it is done in the presence of an interlocutor as opposed to alone which has 
consequences for the way in which communication is coordinated (as will be detailed in 
Chapter 2). In cases like a series of journal articles, more often than not a reader will read 
an interlocutor’s contribution remotely, think about it remotely and, if they write a 
response, they will write it remotely.45 The influence that an interlocutor has on the 
direction of the exchange in such cases therefore ends when their ‘turn’ ends. Unless they 
send a further reply, they are no longer actively communicating with their interlocutor. And 
 
43 For Green S would be a conversation of type symmetrical inquiry – one of the two categories (along 
with symmetrical deliberation) into which most, though not all, of the types of exchange I regard as 
conversation would most likely be taxonomised. 
44 Put this way we might think that most types of language exchange involve perspective sharing, and 
this will be true even in cases such as the reading of a novel. However, in such cases as the novel, this 
perspective sharing is generally uni-directional. The reader takes on the specific perspective of the 
author, whereas most often the author will only at best take on the perspective of some hypothetical 
audience. 
45 By ‘remotely’ I specifically mean remotely from the other participant(s). So upon publication of 






in cases of face-to-face interaction this isn’t the case. Although turns to speak might end, 
participation in the interaction continues – that is, in a paradigm case of face-to-face 
conversation the job of communication is continuous whether a participant is speaking or 
not (and so the perspective sharing it entails is fluid and continuous). I don’t expect the 
importance of this point to be completely clear at this stage but I will argue in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 4 that this difference has consequences for the necessary psycholinguistic 
processes required to sustain face-to-face and digital conversations and that these 
consequences are therefore significant. To foreshadow the argument in those chapters 
slightly, there we will see that whereas in face-to-face conversation what I call the 
communicative load (that is, the burden of communication) is continuously shared between 
the participants, in digital conversation (much like in the case of S above) this 
communicative load is passed almost in its entirety from one participant to the other. For 
now though, let’s finish the work of this chapter by highlighting one more point from 
Merleau-Ponty’s characterisation of conversation that will play an important role when we 
look in Chapter 2 at the psycholinguistic conditions required for successful face-to-face 
communication.   
3.3  The role of prediction  
Merleau-Ponty notes that when we are involved in a face-to-face interaction, it is common 
that an interlocutor can grasp the thoughts of another ‘as soon as they are born’ or even 
‘anticipate them’. In Chapter 2 I highlight some of the medium-specific features of face-to-
face communication, for example speech is evanescent, as such this places upon 
interlocutors a set of restrictions – they must hear and process an utterance in real time. We 
will also see in Chapter 2 (§§2-3) how some of the consequences of these requirements 
have a profound effect on the types of cognitive tasks conversational participants must 
carry out in order to sustain a conversation. To be able to respond in a timely manner in a 
verbal face-to-face conversation, for example, requires that the listener make predictions as 
to what type of speech act their interlocutor is performing and also what the specific 
content of what they are saying might be before they have even said it. And in Ch.2 Section 3 
we look at some of the ways conversational partners interactively align during face-to-face 
conversation, which again mark it as a different type of activity to examples such as S. So 
what separates, for example, S and a face-to-face interaction is that although in many 
respects the interactions are the same, the demands placed on the interlocutors are 





exchange, Autorin and Escritora, both contribute to the exchange solitarily. They read alone, 
think alone and respond alone. Face-to-face interactions, on the other hand, require not 
only a continuous attention be paid to an interlocutor, but also that interlocutors predict 
what each other might be doing or saying.   
4  Summary 
In this chapter I have suggested a cluster of features of a type of interaction that I am calling 
a paradigm class of conversation. Such conversations are fundamentally turn-taking 
activities. Though turn-taking alone is not sufficient for an exchange to be regarded as a 
paradigm type of conversation. Exchanges such as a cross-examination or job interview are 
also turn-taking in nature but seem to have a different character to many day-to-day 
exchanges we might have. What I suggest is different in these types of cases is related to the 
control of the exchange. Cross-examinations are particularly autocratic in nature, for 
example, in that the cross-examiner is the one who directs the exchange. What I suggest, 
therefore, is a feature of paradigm types of conversation is that they be synocratic in nature 
– the control of the direction of the exchange is generally more evenly distributed. This 
turn-taking synocracy helps create some of the conditions for participants to enter into a 
conversational union of sorts with their interlocutors, (or in Goffman’s words, they enter an 
unio mystico). In order for this union to occur, the conversational partners must commit 
both to the topic under discussion, in the sense of giving it their attention, but they must 
also commit to the interaction itself. That is to say, parties to a conversation must not only 
be engaged in paying attention to what is being said by others, but they must also be also be 
engaged in predicting what others might say, or how they might respond. And they must 
also make sure others too are engaged with the task of the conversation. In the next 
chapter, then, we shall look at what unifies these features by looking at Herbert Clark’s 
work on the role of coordination in conversation, Paul Grice’s work on cooperation in 
conversation and then considering how observations from psycholinguistics can help us 












Conversational Requirements; Coordination and 
Cooperation 
In Chapter 1 I proposed a type of interaction that we might call a paradigm type of 
conversation. In this chapter, I suggest we can understand more about the nature of such 
conversations by considering some of the requirements placed on interlocutors in such 
interactions. When we look at the detail of the type of tasks participants must necessarily 
undertake in order for a conversation of this type to function, we start to see how highly 
coordinated conversation is. Using Herbert Clark’s work in his Using Language (1996) on 
coordination in conversation, and in particular his argument that conversational 
participants must coordinate at both the level of content and process, I suggest that when 
we focus on the process aspect of this coordination we can see that conversational 
participants are engaged in a rich set of continuous interactive tasks. In Section 3 I draw on 
recent psycholinguistic work on response speeds, language production latency and 
prediction to paint a more vivid picture of what some of these necessary tasks are. Finally in 
Section 4 I argue that in order for interlocutors to coordinate in such a way requires that for 
conversation to function, interlocutors must at the very least agree to cooperate with 
interlocutors at the process level. As such face-to-face conversations such as our paradigm 
type are necessarily highly cooperative.   
1 Basic features of paradigm conversation 
Having given an outline of some of what I take to be the nature of the paradigm cases of 
conversation in Chapter 1, it is worth beginning this exploration of some of the 
requirements of conversation by thinking about some of the most obvious surface-level 






  (i)  It has two or more participants; 
  (ii) It involves turn-taking exchanges; 
  (iii) It is conducted in a language shared by participants; 
Let’s briefly consider each of these features in turn. 
1.1 Two or more participants 
It may seem in some sense that it is possible to have a conversation with oneself either 
silently or out loud, and so we might wonder whether this is genuinely a requirement of 
conversation. Mitchell Green’s account of conversation is much more accommodating of 
different types of linguistic activity and so soliloquy for Green can be a form of 
“conversation with ourselves”.46 For my purposes of contrasting face-to-face and digital 
conversation, however, I specifically want to focus on how different parties to a 
conversation interact with each other and so the requirement for multiple participants is 
essential. Recall too the discussion in Chapter 1 (§3) and Goffman’s idea that conversational 
partners enter into a unio mystico, as such this would prima facie seem to entail that there is 
more than one participant (there being nothing particularly mystifying about the union of 
one). So what is primarily of interest to me here is how people interact with each other. And 
as discussion turns later to the nature of coordination and cooperation between 
interlocutors in a conversation it is important that there be more than one participant.47 
 
46 (Green, 2017, p. 1595). Even harking back to the infelicitous report test used in Chapter 1, there 
perhaps seems nothing unusual about saying “I had a conversation with myself”.  
47 It’s worth noting that what ‘two participants’ might mean is not completely clear. We might 
wonder about cases of the condition Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID). Some argue that such a 
condition is indicative of two individuals in one body (for example; (Gray Hardcastle & Flanagan, 
1999; Tye, 2005)), others argue that symptoms in such cases should be treated as resulting from 
internal conflicts of a unified self (for example; (Maiese, 2016)). Whatever position we take on this, 
however, if we were to generally regard such cases as being examples of two (or more) distinct 
personalities, reports of these dissociated personalities interacting directly with each other are not 
common. As the nomenclature would suggest, in cases of DID it almost certainly doesn’t occur, being 
as one of the most common aspects to the disorder is that one identity ‘takes over.’  This being the 
case we shouldn’t expect that two would directly interact. It’s also worth noting one recent study 
into a less extreme condition referred to as ‘multiplicity’. (Ribáry et al., 2017) explain this as being 
on a spectrum with DID. Different identities in cases of multiplicity are aware of each other, and 
usually have a central controlling host personality (a ‘system’). So this may suggest a potential for 
interaction between different identities. For current purposes, however, I just wish to consider cases 





1.2 Turn-taking exchanges 
The construction and organisation of turn-taking in the course of conversation is most 
notably discussed in the field that has become known as ‘conversation analysis’ following 
from the work of Harvey Sacks, Emanuel Schegloff & Gail Jefferson (1974) and Schegloff, 
Jefferson & Sacks (1977). For current purposes we don’t need to go into too much detail 
about some of the general properties Sacks et al. and conversation analysts take to be stable 
features of conversations regardless of context. Though it is worth noting a little on what 
Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson say;   
Conversation can accommodate a wide range of situations, interactions in which 
persons in varieties (or varieties of groups) of identities are operating; it can be 
sensitive to the various combinations; and it can be capable of dealing with a change 
of situation within a situation. Hence there must be some formal apparatus which is 
itself context-free, in such ways that it can, in local instances of its operation, be 
sensitive to and exhibit its sensitivity to various parameters of social reality in a 
local context. Some aspects of the organization of conversation must be expected to 
have this context-free, context-sensitive status; for, of course, conversation is a 
vehicle for interaction between parties with any potential identities, and with any 
potential familiarity. We have concluded that the organization of TURN-TAKING for 
conversation might be such a thing. That is, it appears to have an appropriate sort of 
general abstractness and local particularization potential.48 
So turn-taking, for the project of conversation analysis, is taken to be the basic component 
of conversational language use; it is a feature of conversation regardless of context. And as 
we shall see later in this chapter, the way in which turns in a conversation operate is 
insightful as to the type of activity it is. For this reason and for reasons outlined in Chapter 1 
(§2.2) I will take it as given that conversation depends essentially on turn-taking for its 
character.49  
 
48 (Sacks et al., 1974, pp.699-700) 
49 Or paradigm cases of conversation do at least. One might argue that an occasion in which one 
person speaks at length with no response from an interlocutor (be that informally in a one-sided 
conversation, or formally in a lecture etc…) might, in some sense, still appear to be a conversation of 
sorts. Recall Green’s conception of conversation. For any exchange categorised as asymmetrical 
didactic conversations in Green’s taxonomy, there is certainly no requirement for a turn-taking 
exchange to take place, just so long as there are inquiring or deliberative questions salient, there is 
an occurrence of conversation. To reiterate, I don’t here intend to make the point that conversation 





Turn-taking (as Sacks et al. note)50 is of course not unique to conversation; it is the 
basis for games, traffic management, or serving customers in a business, for example. It is 
even essential to some of the talk-exchanges I suggest are more distant from the ideal of a 
paradigm type of conversation discussed in Chapter 1 (recall a series of journal articles 
addressing each other are dependent on turns being exchanged, and cross-examinations 
and job interviews are formally and rigidly turn-taking enterprises). So we can’t hope to 
define conversation on this alone. However, that so much of what I argue in the remaining 
chapters will be dependent on how this turn-taking is deeply embedded into conversation it 
is worth making explicit the importance of turn-taking, and this is something I will also 
reflect in the terminology I use from here. 
1.2.1 A terminological point 
For the remainder of this thesis the notion of ‘turns’ will be an important defining feature of 
conversational participants. For although in the previous chapter I stick to the usual 
nomenclature of speaker/listener to define the roles of conversational participants, it 
doesn’t sit comfortably with the aim of this project to be a multimodal comparison. From 
here on I therefore use in-turner to denote a conversational participant who is actively 
speaking, signing, or writing (amongst many other things) and out-turner to denote a 
participant listening, seeing or reading (amongst many other things).51 Beyond not 
accounting for other modes of language (such as signed languages, which for my purposes 
will be structurally equal to any other paradigm types of conversation should they possess 
the requisite properties), it is also the case that describing a participant as a ‘listener’ also 
doesn’t do justice to the complexity and variation of tasks being performed by an out-turner 
in anticipation of becoming an in-turner. Switching to this terminology allows for easier 
comparison of like-for-like using different modes, but it also pays respect to an important 
point I want to continuously emphasise; interlocutors in a conversation are generally not 
performing simple roles of ‘speaking’ or ‘listening’, they are engaged in a much more 
 
be read as the point that there is an interesting sub-class of language use that has as an essential 
feature turn-taking – the paradigm cases of conversation. 
50 (1974, p. 696) 
51 As will be made clearer in Chapter 4 – this distinction between in-turn and out-turn is much less 
clear in the case of a writer/reader as in most cases there is no simultaneous joint-activity between 
in-turners and out-turners (at least, it isn’t simultaneous in terms of both participants being required 
to perform communicative duties). When the in-turner is writing, the out-turner is waiting, yet once 
the writing has finished the roles don’t swap cleanly. When the writer has finished (and sent their 
text to the out-turner), we might think they become out-turner, but at this point the text has most 





complex set of tasks (which we will look at in more detail in Section 3). One last 
terminological point to note is that the space in between conversational turns – that is, 
when the current in-turner stops speaking and before the out-turner becomes the in-turner 
– will be referred to as a turn interval. 
1.3 A shared language 
It seems obvious to say we can interact without using a language.52 Pre-linguistic infants 
and animals are capable of interacting without the use of what we might ordinarily call 
‘language’. Even once we acquire language we will routinely interact with others without 
using it, be it a shared glance with a friend in reaction to something someone else has said, 
or a colleague making an elaborate ‘moving a delicate piece of fine bone china towards the 
mouth with pinkie finger raised’53 gesture to ask if someone would like a cup of tea, or 
stumbling through a shop transaction in a place where the language is unfamiliar to the 
customer. We might wonder then whether these types of interaction are conversations. It 
might be thought that they involve two or more participants, turn-taking, a degree of 
synocracy and a type of perspective sharing (if only fleeting).  My intuition on examples 
such as these, however, is that they fall more closely under the category of a type of 
 
52 I use ‘language’ quite broadly here. It might be thought that such a statement assumes that there is 
some one language that, for example, all the speakers of English speak. On closer consideration, 
however, this is possibly a little too simplistic. For it seems to be the case that there isn’t one single 
version of English that all English speakers speak, there are regional dialects, pidgins and creoles. 
They may all be similar, but there is perhaps no singular language that we could point to and call 
Ideal English, for example. This point is touched upon by Paul Pietroski in his discussion of his 
notion of Slang in the precis of his Conjoining Meaning. (2018b) Pietroski uses this notion for several 
reasons but perhaps of interest here is how it accommodates the fact that there can be significant 
regional variation in syntax and semantics even within one broad ‘language’. Pietroski cites the 
example of ‘robin’ in British English which refers to a bird of the chat type, whereas ‘robin’ in 
American English denotes a type of thrush, or how ‘biscuits in the lift’ in British English would be 
expressed as ‘cookies in the elevator’ in American English. So what it is to be a speaker of English is 
perhaps best expressed as being someone who has acquired one of the numerous Slangs of the 
English Slang family. If this is correct, then reference to an intuitive sense of ‘a shared language’, as 
suggested in (1iii), doesn’t quite capture what is required of conversational participants. Their 
relationship to a shared language is much looser. Indeed, if we consider the speed of development of 
pidgin and creole languages, we can see how the barrier of not having a ‘shared language’ is 
overcome relatively easily even at the community-level. For discussion on pidgin and creoles, see for 
example (Bickerton, 1984) who discusses the growth from Hawaiian pidgin to Hawaiian creole over 
the course of a single generation, or (Lefebvre, 2004) for an overview of the features of pidgins and 
creoles (esp. pp.9-12). That such complex systems of communication develop within a generation (as 
opposed to the centuries it often takes other ‘languages’ to develop), seems to suggest that a 
problem such as a lack of shared ‘language’ is not one that happens for long, and where two groups 
may not be users of Slangs that are suitably similar, they will coordinate to resolve this problem by 
creating and developing a Slang based on the similarities they find. 
53 I was really hoping to find a name for this gesture that summed it up, but beyond ‘tea-sipping’ 





exchange Grice discusses early in Logic and Conversation – cases of “purposive… rational, 
behaviour”54 analogous to what he calls “talk exchanges”, but of which conversation is 
simply a special case.55 The claim that a conversation requires a shared language does meet 
with at least one very clear counter-example, however; the phenomenon of cross-signing. 
 Cross-signing occurs when Deaf sign-language users, generally from different 
countries and with no written or signed-language in common, are able to conduct 
conversations despite the absence of a common language. Although anecdotally this 
phenomenon has been known about for some time, it only became known as ‘cross-signing’ 
in 201356 and is only now starting to receive attention from linguists.57 Cross-signed 
conversations are certainly much more typically what we might call ‘conversational’ in 
content than, for example, attempting to buy some toothpaste on holiday when one doesn’t 
know the local language. Some of the examples cited in the literature are discussions of 
arrival times, differences in home countries and Deaf culture in different areas.  So in terms 
of the content of these interactions, they can go far beyond the simple transactional 
interactions in a shop. On the surface, then, this seems to cast doubt on the notion that 
conversation requires a shared language.58 If cross-signers are able to converse and don’t 
have a shared language, then the stipulation that a shared language is necessary for 
conversation seems too stringent. So we should note that although conversations will most 
often be conducted using a shared language, it is not essential. Or we might say, if there is 
no shared language between participants, then what is required is that interlocutors have 
the requisite abilities to interact.59 However we wish to classify this feature, though, is not of 
major consequence for the view developed here. What I take such examples to be 
illustrative of, however, is the difficulties we can meet when trying to define conversational 
features. For even features such as having a shared language, which we might expect to be a 
common feature across conversations isn’t necessary. 
 In summary then, at a most basic level our paradigm type of conversation must have 
at least two participants who take turns and most often they will use a shared language 
 
54 (1989b, p.28) 
55 Some of the famous examples Grice gives are of a person helping another to fix a car or mix the 
ingredients of a cake. 
56 In Bradford et al. (2013). 
57 (Zeshan, 2015, 2019; Byun, de Vos, Bradford, Zeshan, & Levinson, 2018) 
58 Or, in Pietroski’s terms (see fn.52) we might say here ‘knowledge of similar Slangs’. 
59 See (Levinson, 2006, pp.40-42) for more evidence that human interactive abilities are not 





(though this is not essential). In the next section we will look in more detail at some other 
features of the conversational environment and how these features require that 
conversational participants must engage in a set of highly coordinated tasks. 
2 Coordination in face-to-face conversation 
[L]anguage use requires continuous coordination. The participants have to 
coordinate not only on what they do but on when they do what they do. They 
accomplish that…by coordinating on the entry times, content and exit times 
of each phase of their actions on the assumption that the addressees’ 
processing of the current phase is expected to be complete roughly by the 
initiation of the next phase.      
       (Clark, 1996, p.91) 
Although he specifies only ‘language use’ in the above passage, Herbert Clark is discussing 
specifically language use in conversation.60 Clark’s insights into the role of coordination and 
some of the features of conversation form the basis of the type of view of conversation I 
develop here.  The first task then is to start to unpack the notion of ‘conversational 
coordination’.  
2.1 A simple structure of paradigm face-to-face conversation 
Suppose we have the following extract of a face-to-face conversation between A and B.  
(2) 
   01: A:  Do you know the way to San Jose? 
   02: B: No, I’ve been away too long. 
A rough chronological depiction of what A and B are up to at each turn (01, 02) is given in 
Table 1. 
  (3)  Table 161 
 
60 So for example, there would appear to be no such coordination required in language use such as 
letter writing.  
61 Note: during in-turn we may well also include a task group such as ‘respond to out-turner 






                                                                                                                                                                    
 
It might seem obvious that when A speaks B is listening and formulating a response, and 
vice-versa, but it is worth being explicit about the concurrence of these tasks as it will mark 
an important distinction between face-to-face and digital conversations that will be 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. The type of structure outlined in (3) is necessary for a 
successful conversational exchange be it face-to-face, on the telephone, or using video-call 
technology. Essential to their efficacy is that when the in-turner speaks or signs, the out-
turner attends to what they utter or sign. At any one time, then, all participants in a 
conversation will be fulfilling some specific coordinative role, their focus will be, in part, on 
the output of the in-turner and their role will dictate which set of other tasks they will need 
to be carrying out. As such, there is a strict symmetry of attention that all participants must 
direct towards what is being uttered/signed in the conversation. Without this coordination 
face-to-face communication would fail, this is due, in part, to some of the features of face-to-
face conversation noted by Clark. 
2.2 Clark’s features of conversation 
Clark62 adapts from his work with Susan Brennan63 10 features of face-to-face conversation. 
These can be separated into three groups – immediacy, medium and control. I will discuss 
each group in turn. 
2.2.1 Immediacy features 
 
62 (1996, pp. 9–11) 
63 (Clark & Brennan, 1991) 
01 02
Person
Making utterance Comprehending B's utterance
       Formulating response----------------------------------------->
Comprehending A's utterance Making utterance
       Formulating response------------------------------------ ---------->  












Clark notes that a face-to-face conversation generally has the following two features; 
Copresence:   the participants share the same physical environment. 
Instantaneity: the participants perceive each other’s actions with no 
perceptible delay. 
It will also have either one of or both of the following; 
Visibility:  the participants can see each other. 
Audibility:  the participants can hear each other. 
What Clark is discussing here are features of what he calls basic conversation.64 The idea of 
conversation being basic is similar to the idea suggested in Chapter 1 (§1.2) that the 
paradigm type of conversation is the conversation universal to human societies. To be able 
to participate in such conversation requires no special technology and any skills required 
are most often-developed without formal training (unlike writing skills or cross-examining 
skills, for example) or other forms of training (such as might be required for effectively 
giving speeches). The training most of us receive in how to have a conversation starts 
around the time we are born and we’re just left to learn on the job.65 So with this type of 
conversation in mind, the above features seem self-explanatory. 
For our purposes here we need not assume all the types of exchange we might 
regard as paradigm types of conversation have all of these features. Indeed, although they 
often will have all of them, it is certainly not necessary that they do. In terms of the types of 
activities I suggested in Chapter 1 might be considered paradigm cases of conversation, 
there is no obvious reason we should exclude a telephone or video call. As such we might 
think that copresence isn’t necessary for a paradigm type of conversation, nor visibility in 
the case of a telephone call, one or the other of these two properties will suffice in these 
respective cases. And anyone familiar with video-calling technology’s occasional defects 
might be familiar with the occasional perceptible delays using such media, and so 
instantaneity as described above might not be quite accurate. In some cases of spoken 
 
64 Following Fillmore’s description of conversation as being ‘basic’ (Chapter1, §1). 
65 It’s worth noting that development of awareness of turn-taking has been observed at 3 months 
(Hilbrink, Gattis, & Levinson, 2015), as well as sensitivity to interpersonal timings (Striano, Henning, 
& Stahl, 2006), and sensitivity to facial expressions (Striano & Liszkowski, 2005). (Moore & Meltzoff, 
1977) suggest that 12-21 day olds can mimic facial expressions.  So even though pre-linguistic 
humans are not fully conversational, they are developing the abilities to conversationally interact 





conversation one or more participants might not be able to see others (perhaps due to 
problems with eyesight, or the lighting, or not be facing them) and so visibility is not 
essential. In many signed conversations, too, it will likely be that interlocutors can’t hear 
each other and so audibility need not be a feature.  
2.2.2 Medium-specific features 
Clarke suggests in the second group that face-to-face conversation has the following three 
features; 
 Evanescence:  the medium fades quickly.  
 Recordlessness: there is (usually) no record or artefact of actions. 
 Simultaneity:  participants can produce and receive at once and 
simultaneously. 
The implications of this medium-specific group of features will be important when we 
consider the requirements placed on interlocutors in a paradigm type of conversation. For 
when we factor in these aspects of conversation, we start to understand some of the 
necessary requirements that need to be accounted for in order for conversation to function 
against this backdrop.  
 Whether it be a spoken or signed utterance, the visual and auditory properties of the 
language produced will disappear quickly.66 Once something is said, for example, its 
 
66 Though it is worth considering the role of working memory when considering quite how 
evanescent language is, for in some sense at least, it may be that some version of the language 
produced doesn’t fade quite as quickly as suggested here. Although the sounds or signs themselves 
might fade quickly, on one prominent theory of working memory, there is potentially at least a delay 
of 1.5-2 seconds before sounds fade from the phonological loop component of working memory, this 
is potentially even longer if we accept the existence of subvocal rehearsal. Alan Baddeley and 
Graham Hitch (1974) propose a multi-component model of working memory that consists of a 
controlling central executive mechanism and two “slave” systems – the phonological loop and the 
visuospatial sketchpad. These two slave systems are each concerned with the processing and storage 
of material from the relevant domains (as picked out by their respective names). The Baddeley-Hitch 
model has more recently been adapted to include a fourth component - the episodic buffer. See for 
example (Baddeley, 2000). This fourth component is taken to be multi-modal in that it is capable of 
integrating information from various sources such as the long-term memory, the phonological loop 
and the visuospatial sketchpad, yet it remains under the control of the central executive, which can 
draw upon this temporary information store as required. Baddeley suggests the phonological loop 
component of working memory consists of two sub-components: a phonological store and 
articulatory rehearsal/control process. (Baddeley, 1986, 1990, pp. 71–87, 2003) The phonological 
store holds speech-based information (If the linguistic input is, for example, written, then the 
articulatory control process converts the written string into a phonological code and place it into the 





existence as a piece of sound is almost instantaneously over. It is also the case that should 
an out-turner not hear or see a particular part of some utterance, then unless she is able to 
piece together a prediction from other parts of the in-turners utterance, then she will most 
often have no record of it to return to for clarification. In such a circumstance, then, to be 
able to recover this missing piece, the out-turner would need to initiate a process of repair 
whereby she requests the in-turner repeat or clarify the missed utterance. 67 Such resources 
are generally only to be used sparingly, however. It seems obvious to suggest that processes 
of repair could only really be used sparingly as overuse would lead to circuitous 
discussion.68  
So taken all together, what the medium-specific features above make clear is that in 
order for spoken/signed conversation to function, an out-turner is required to attend to the 
 
your eyes and try to remember the sequence.  8 4 9 2 0 7 2. Chances are you “vocalise” the numbers 
internally) and the assumption is that memories in here fade and become irretrievable at around 
1.5-2 seconds. This degradation, however, can be delayed by an articulatory rehearsal process in 
which the phonological information is rehearsed subvocally. The idea being that this rehearsal acts 
as something like a refresh of the information. (Criticism of the notion of subvocal rehearsal, and in 
turn the phonological loop, can be found in Nairne (2002). One of the arguments Baddeley puts 
forward for the existence of the phonological loop can be found in (Gathercole & Baddeley, 1993). 
They suggest that how we can return to a correct interpretation of a garden path sentence is 
indicative of its existence. The example they use is:  
(X1)  i.  I saw that gasoline can explode.  
ii. And a brand new can it was too. 
Let’s say that Susan utters (X1) to Alan. The assumption is that when Alan hears (X1i), he will 
initially process ‘can’ as a verb and ‘that’ as a conjunction. Let’s call this Interpretation 1. Once he 
hears (X1ii), though, it will likely become clear that Interpretation 1 is incorrect. It should become 
clear that rather than ‘that’ being used as a conjunction in (X1i), it is actually being used as a 
pronoun. As such, ‘can’ will need reclassifying as a noun, and this reparsing would then make (X1i) 
and (X1ii) consistent (Interpretation 2). (For more on this, Baars (1988, pp. 93–95) provides an 
amusing and enlightening illustration of how such language processing occurs using a global 
workspace model.) One of the things this suggests, according to Gathercole and Baddeley, is that 
although most language processing occurs ‘online’ in real-time, the ability to deal with garden path 
sentences requires something more. In a spoken exchange in order to reprocess (X1ii), the listener 
would need access to a verbatim representation of the sentence (X1i). However, she is hindered in 
that the physical manifestation of (X1i) lasts not much longer than the time it takes the utterer to say 
it.  That she can do it, the idea goes, suggests that this verbatim representation is stored in her 
working memory. (I should note, although I do agree in principle with this type of example, this 
specific example only really works on paper – although we represent the two ‘that’s which create the 
supposed ambiguity in (X1) the same way in written English, in most cases the pronunciation is 
different. The conjunction is pronounced /ðət/ whereas the pronoun /ðat/ or /ðæt/. As such, I think 
it unlikely such ambiguity would arise in the case of (X1) were it a spoken example, and the force of 
this example is reduced if we treat it as a written example, for there is no requirement that we store 
anything in our working memory – we can simply reread the sentence.) 
67 Specifically, then, an other-initiated repair. (Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977). 
68  And, indeed, although repair is common, Enfield (2017, Ch.7) notes that on average such repair 
initiating expressions as ‘huh?’, ‘what?’ or ‘sorry…?’ occur approximately every 84 seconds in a 
conversation. As noted later, conversational turns average around 2secs, so this would be an average 





linguistic output of the in-turner just as the in-turner makes her utterances, but added to 
this as the in-turner makes those utterances she too must attend to the attentive state of the 
out-turner(s).  Clark describes this as follows;  
If Roger is to succeed in telling Nina something, he must make sure she is trying to 
attend to his sounds at the very instant he is articulating them. Executing behaviours 
to be attended to and attending to those behaviors, then are participatory acts: 
Roger cannot do his part without Nina doing hers, and vice versa.69 
Recall Chapter 1(§2); there it was suggested that interactivity and continuity of attention 
are some of the properties of the paradigm type of conversation being characterised, and 
now we see start to see some of the detail as to why this is so. The interactivity of such 
exchanges is not merely at the level of the most obvious structure of the exchange, by which 
I mean it is not interactive merely because each turn follows a prior one; this interactivity is 
continuous due to the medium-specific features of evanescence, and recordlessness (and 
simultaneity to a lesser extent). Therefore, as an utterance is being made the out-turner 
must be synchronised with the in-turner.  
Consider how participants in a cooperative game of throw and catch are required to 
synchronise their behaviours in order to successfully throw and catch a ball. To be 
optimally successful we might expect that the catcher makes clear to the thrower her 
readiness to catch, which the thrower then reads. The thrower then tosses the ball in the 
rough direction of the catcher giving cues in her bodily movements prior to the throw as to 
the approximate direction she intends the ball to travel. The catcher in order to be 
successful in catching the ball will need to read both the body language of the thrower and 
the flight of the ball and position herself and her hands accordingly. If successful, the roles 
then switch and the same thing plays out in reverse. All of this behaviour, I think, is 
continuous, synchronised and interactive. The various moves of each player are 
interdependent. And I think this is close in nature to what occurs in the paradigm type of 
conversation. An out-turner in a verbal conversation, for example, must be performing tasks 
relevant to the actual listening (for example, comprehending and contextualising, many 
more such tasks are discussed in Section 3), but she also needs to provide feedback to the 
in-turner; she must communicate that she is paying attention to the in-turner’s utterances 
 





in harmony with them occurring. And to ensure the communication is successful, the in-
turner must also pay heed to this feedback.  
The most economical of the responses an out-turner can use to communicate their 
continued attention is an eye gaze,70 but there are other methods we naturally might use be 
it a smile, a nod, or a thoughtful furrowed brow.71 72 Face-to-face conversation without this 
simultaneity of response can be disconcerting. For example, as most philosophers are 
acutely aware, sometimes the minutiae of some matter are not as interesting to anyone else 
as it is to the person elucidating it and talking about it to someone not remotely interested 
can induce a glassy-eyed vacancy. In such a discussion, the out-turner is likely (intentionally 
or not) sending feedback to the in-turner that her commitment to the tasks required of 
conversation has ceased – she is no longer listening. So often the cues we take as in-turners 
from our out-turn interlocutors guide us in how we proceed both with our turn, and how 
we approach our commitment to the interaction. And as Clark says, Roger can’t do his part 
without Nina doing hers, and vice versa. 
These medium-specific features, then, are salient to how we are required to 
interactively coordinate ourselves when participating in a conversation. The sounds or 
signs we receive will vanish almost instantly and without record. As out-turners, in many 
cases, we also need to communicate to the in-turner that we are engaged with what is being 
uttered. In Section 3 we look in much greater detail at some of the data on the type of 
comprehension tasks out-turners necessarily must perform due to these medium-specific 
features, but next let’s consider Clark’s final group of features – the control group. 
2.2.3 Control features 
The final group of features Clark discusses are the control group (specifically about who 
controls what). 
Extemporaneity:  The participants formulate and execute their actions 
extemporaneously, in realtime. 
 
70 Clark cites (Argyle & Cook, 1976) for evidence, we also see evidence of the role of mutual gaze in 
pre-schooler conversation in (Krantz, George, & Hursh, 1983), suggesting this is developed early. 
71 A note of caution however, what I always assumed to be a ‘thoughtful’ furrowed brow appears is 
also very often taken to express confusion. See (Domaneschi, Passarelli, & Chiorri, 2017, p. 294, 
particularly fig.2.) 
72 As we shall see in §3.1.5, when looking at interactive alignment, this process of interaction goes 





Self-determination:  The participants determine for themselves what actions to 
take when. 
Self-expression:  The participants take actions as themselves. 
Clark says of these:  
In face-to-face conversation, the participants are in full control. They speak for 
themselves, jointly determine who says what when, and formulate their utterances 
as they go. In other settings, the participants are restricted in what they can say 
when. The church, for example, determines the wording of many prayers and 
responses. In fictional settings, speakers and writers only make as if they are taking 
certain actions — Gielgud is only play-acting his role as Hamlet — and that alters 
what they do and how they are understood. And in mediated settings, there are 
really two communications.73 
I will discuss the features of self-determination and self-expression in more detail when 
looking again at synocracy in conversation in Section 4.2.2, but for now I want to focus most 
particularly on extemporaneity. Because it is this feature, together with the features of the 
medium-specific group (evanescence, recordlessness and simultaneity), that determines 
some of what is particularly unique about the paradigm cases of conversation. Later in the 
Using Language Clark states that (emphasis mine); 
Conversations… are purposive but unplanned. People achieve most of what they do 
by means of joint projects, both large and small, in which they establish and carry 
out joint purposes they are willing and able to commit to. To complete these, they 
have to work at the level of minimal joint projects,74 for it is with these that they 
 
73 (Clark, 1996, pp.10-11) 
74 One of Clark’s overall arguments is that fundamentally a conversation (and by extension language 
use more generally) is a series of projects interlocutors propose and complete collaboratively. These, 
then are joint projects. And for Clark these joint projects will generally take the form of adjacency 
pairs (See (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973) for initial discussion of adjacency pairs.) in their most basic 
form and stretch up to a whole conversation at its most complex. For example, a paradigmatic 
example of a basic type of joint project might be a question-answer pair such as (2) above, or (x2): 
(x2) 
   01: A:  How much? 
   02: B: No more than a fiver. 
What happens in (x2) is not simply the case of A says something and B understands it. At (x2-01), A 
proposes that B provides information to A, and at (x2-02) B takes up this proposal and completes the 
joint project by providing the information. So although it is essential for the successful completion of 
the joint project that B understands the meaning of A’s utterance, the joint project’s completion is 





negotiate broader purposes and complete extended joint projects. What emerges are 
sections and, ultimately, the entire conversation itself. Conversations look planned 
and goal-oriented only in retrospect. In reality, they are created opportunistically piece 
by piece as the participants negotiate joint purposes and then fulfill them. Let me call 
this the opportunistic view of conversation.75 
Later; 
[C]onversations are controlled jointly. Each turn is shaped by all the participants as 
they engineer the selection of the current speaker, and influence the course and 
length of each turn. 76 
And later; 
[A conversation will often look] orderly even though each step of the way was 
achieved locally and opportunistically… Much of the structure of conversations is 
really an emergent orderliness. Although the participants appear to follow rules in 
turn taking, they are merely trying to succeed in contributing to the conversation.77 
What Clark says above seems to be right, for although conversations might appear in 
hindsight to look as if they were planned and ordered, the way that they develop is 
opportunistic (and this too echoes Goffman’s description of conversation as spontaneous 
discussed in Chapter 1 §3.2). It is, in a sense, dependent on continuous reactions to the 
actions of others.78 And not only this, it is placed under the joint control of the participants. 
Recall in Chapter 1 the notion of perspective sharing and interdependence of contributions 
 
would be a type of minimal joint project, and in conversation interlocutors will embed, chain and 
sequence these minimal joint projects into extended joint projects (with the entirety of the 
conversation being a joint project composed of all these minimal and extended joint projects). 
75 (1996, p.319)  
76 (1996, p.331) 
77 (1996, p.351). This last point, too, chimes with some of what Searle says in his criticism of the 
project of conversation analysis (1992a). Searle argues that talk of ‘turn-taking rules’ is misguided 
because these so-called ‘rules’ are not constitutive rules. The argument being that what conversation 
analysts observe as ‘rules’ are not rules that conversational participants can or can’t follow, they 
must behave in the way that these supposed ‘rules’ would instruct them. And if interlocutors were 
adhering to rules, it doesn’t have any bearing on their conversational behaviour anyway. Emanuel 
Schegloff (1992) responds to Searle that it would be possible to replace ‘rule’ with ‘practice’. Searle’s 
response (1992b) is that the force of the problem remains – description of patterns is not the same 
as proving explanatory force.  
78 Recall too from chapter 1 Goldberg’s description of a great conversation as being akin to a piece of 
co-authored performance art. (Goldberg, 2020) For interlocutors to ‘author’ the conversation as they 





was also invoked to discuss how the contribution of A to a conversation might provoke 
novel and unexpected thoughts in B. So although both may enter the conversation with 
some sense of individual purpose - maybe to ask a particular question or to arrange some 
event – it is highly implausible that they will have considered and planned many of their 
utterances in advance (and almost imperceptible that they could have planned all of them). 
It is in the very nature of conversation that if Kim is responding to an utterance made by 
Thurston and Thurston to Kim, that unless they have some foresighted access to the precise 
future thoughts of each other, their responses will be extemporaneously developed. But not 
only will the responses be extemporaneous, they will most often also be reflective of the 
preceding talk of an interlocutor. Further to this, an interlocutor can only respond to these 
once they have been produced (or to be more precise, as they are being produced – for as 
we shall see, out-turners do usually have to predict at least some of what an in-turner is 
going to say in order to respond in a timely manner). Contrast this with the example of 
cross-examination first discussed in Chapter 1 (§2.3.1).  
(4)  
01 Q. Did he tell you he had seen a pickup truck?  
02 A. Yes.  
03 Q. All right. Did he describe the pickup truck to you?  
04 A. Yes. He said it was a dark-colored –  
05 Q. Hold it a second. Did he describe it? Yes or no.79  
On some level, an exchange such as (4) requires some degree of extemporaneity, for 
example at (4-05) Q’s contribution to the interaction is an interruption that responds 
directly to the way A at (4-04) responds to the question at (4-03). But we should expect that 
for the cross-examiner to be competently fulfilling their role as a cross-examiner, much of 
what they say will be planned to a much greater extent than in a paradigm case of 
conversation.  They will have a line of questioning prepared in order to extract the precise 
information they wish to from the cross-examinee. Not only this but, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, in scenarios such as the courtroom (or the job interview), by the very 
conventions of such institutions one party to the exchange is afforded autocratic control 
 





over the direction of discussion. As we see in the interruption at (4-05), in the above 
exchange A is not afforded much self-determination nor self-expression in the exchange.80 
Now of course in a trivial sense we might say A is afforded this, she could refuse to answer 
the questions, or she could even respond in a nonsensical manner, though to do so could 
result in penalty such as contempt of court (or in the case of a job interview – failure to be 
considered for the position). So although trivially speaking she is free to determine for 
herself what actions to take and free to express herself as she chooses, relative to most 
conversational types of interaction, these freedoms are severely restricted (and we shall see 
the importance of this in Section 4.2.2). As such, it is this set of features which start to help 
us see important differences between interactions such as a cross-examination and our 
paradigm cases of conversation. Generally conversations will be extemporaneous and the 
participants will determine their own actions and how to express themselves. 
2.2.4 Summary of Clark’s features of paradigm conversation 
The picture of face-to-face conversation we get then when we consider Clark’s features is 
one of a fast moving and interchanging series of concurrent tasks. Instantaneity and 
simultaneity make it so that such interaction is a continuous process of feedback whether a 
person is in the role of in-turner or out-turner. In the role of out-turner a participant must 
convey their commitment to the conversation and the in-turner must monitor this feedback. 
This is necessary due to the evanescence and recordlessness of the utterances produced. As 
such, conversation requires that as an in-turner is making an utterance an out-turner must 
attend to it in real time before it disappears (and so to not hear or see it as it occurs will 
mean that it fails to function as a tool of communication). Finally, the nature of conversation 
as being driven by its participants’ self-determined and self-expressed contributions means 
that responding contributions will need to reflect the direction set by the content of 
previous utterances. As the participants in a paradigm type of conversation are in joint 
control of the proceedings contributions will most often be formulated and executed 
extemporaneously. This extemporaneousness means, therefore, that conversation is 
opportunistic in nature. Now of course, there is something obvious that these features 
contribute to; that is the idea that a paradigm case of conversation is highly personalised to 
the conversational participants. More often than not, a conversation is conducted with a 
 
80 And indeed, one might argue that even the cross-examiner isn’t afforded this – the court itself has 
supreme authority over all of the interactions in a case and can halt the cross-examiner should a 





single audience - all members of which are the participants of the conversation. When this is 
the case, each turn of a conversation is generally directed towards, and for the benefit of, 
the other conversational participants, and how an in-turner presents an utterance will be 
based on the utterances and feedback of those other participants.81  
This all points towards the fact that face-to-face conversation is quick and highly 
improvised. As we see in more detail in Section 3, to sustain a conversation there’s a lot to 
do and very little time in which to do it. So the observations of Merleau-Ponty of 
conversation as a being-shared-by-two and of Goffman’s unio mystico, are, I suggest, in part 
explained by the requirements conversations place on interlocutors. If I were engaged in a 
conversation with you, then it is imperative that as you speak I must at the very minimum 
listen, let you know that I’m listening, and prepare to respond to what you say, and when I 
speak you do the same. We are both continuously attending to each other and using each 
other’s contributions as a means of helping us develop our own contributions to the 
conversation. And this explains, in part, how sometimes conversation can be so engrossing 
– to participate in one is cognitively demanding. The features of evanescence, 
recordlessness, instantaneity and extemporaneousness mean we must stay tuned-in to a 
conversation almost continuously.82  
2.3 Coordination: Process and content 
On what has been said so far, we might have some idea why Clark suggests that the features 
of face-to-face conversation require participants to engage with the overall task of the 
conversation at both the level of content and the level of processes. The content being the 
topics of the conversation, the processes being the tasks required in order to deal with the 
particular features of any face-to-face interaction. Although we can consider these levels of 
coordination in isolation, they are nonetheless necessarily dependent on each other. 
Without a topic (content) there is nothing to talk about in a sensible manner and so no way 
 
81 Contrast this again with some other types of interaction and often the audience dynamics are very 
different. In a cross-examination the primary audience is the court and not the cross-examinee. 
Think also perhaps of a TV chat show wherein the set-up is of two people in conversation with each 
other. Anyone who has watched these will know, however, that these types of conversation are 
played for the purposes of a watching audience. So although many of the features Clark notes of face-
to-face conversation might still hold, the conversation is being performed for the benefit of people 
not participating in the exchange.  
82 This also recalls something Merleau-Ponty suggests later; “I am freed from myself in the present 
dialogue…Only après coup – when I have withdrawn from the dialogue and I am remembering it – 
can I reintegrate it into my life, turn it into an episode of my private history, and only then does the 





of coordinating processes. Without coordination of process, there is no way to comprehend 
the topic of conversation (so at the most obvious level, if I don’t listen to your utterance, I of 
course won’t be able to respond to it).  
On Clark’s view, in order to do coordinate in such a way, interactants will enter into 
a series of joint projects which link to form extended joint projects, which in turn will 
compose the overall joint project we might call ‘a conversation’. To complete these joint 
projects we must coordinate at the level of content (that is to say, the participants must in 
some way have their focus of talk on the topic relating to some joint project), but in order to 
coordinate at the content level we must also coordinate at the level of the processes. In the 
next section, then, we shall look at some of the processes involved in face-to-face 
conversation, many of which are made necessary by the medium-specific features and 
control features of face-to-face interaction. The direction this is going in, then, will be to 
consider in Section 4 how this systematic coordination is reliant on an agent-led 
cooperation. That is to say, in order to achieve this level of coordination, speakers in a 
conversation must actively intend to cooperate with an interlocutor, even if just minimally 
at the level of process. And since coordination of process and content are co-dependent, the 
picture is one in which even if interlocutors are in disagreement at the level of content (in, 
for example, an argument), they are nevertheless engaged in a form of highly cooperative 
joint action. 
3 Coordinating processes 
For Clark, salient to understanding how language use works is understanding how 
interlocutors coordinate their behaviour in terms of content and processes.83 Clark takes 
‘content’ to refer to what participants intend to do and processes relates to the physical and 
mental systems recruited to carry out those intentions.84 Although Clark doesn’t state it 
explicitly, we might expect from this that in our paradigm cases of face-to-face conversation 
many of the types of processes undertaken will remain relatively stable both within a single 
conversation and even when moving from conversation to conversation. On the other hand, 
the specific content will vary greatly within a conversation and from conversation to 
conversation.  
 
83 (Clark, 1996, see Ch.3 and Ch.7) 
84 It is worth noting that coordination of content and process need not relate solely to language use, 
dance partners will coordinate in content and process, so too a group of people trying to move a 





In the role of out-turner or in-turner, much of what is required at the process level 
will remain the same whoever the participants are, and whatever they happen to be 
discussing.  Put simply; in a paradigm case of verbal conversation an in-turner is required to 
perform all the process tasks related broadly to speaking (vocalising, conveying meaning, 
giving cues as to turn length, checking for feedback etc…), and the out-turner is required to 
carry-out all of the tasks relating broadly to listening (comprehending, predicting, giving 
feedback, preparing to speak etc…). On the other hand, the content of a conversation will be 
highly specific to particular conversations and, indeed, will even be transient within a 
conversation as the joint projects and shared goals of a conversation continuously progress. 
The content, then, is dependent on the specific context of a particular conversation; the 
intentions of an individual, the shared intentions of the interlocutors and the common 
ground.85 So the content will vary significantly even within a single conversation and when 
moving from conversation to conversation. Now of course, these two levels of coordination 
are, as mentioned above, co-dependent - it isn’t possible to coordinate on one but not the 
other - but it is possible to consider them in isolation. My focus for the remainder of this 
dissertation, then, will primarily be on the coordination of processes – the things 
participants in our paradigm type of conversation are required to do in any such type of 
conversation. The co-dependence of these aspects of conversation will naturally mean that 
this isn’t to say that content doesn’t feature, it does, but rather the point is that in 
comparing the paradigm cases to other cases, the stability of processes across 
conversations make this a particularly interesting point of comparison. 
 
85 Of Clark’s two levels of coordination, the common ground is essential to understanding 
coordination of content. As my focus in this project is weighted towards coordination of process and 
the effects this has on content, I have chosen to avoid detailed discussion of the common ground. In a 
fuller account of paradigm conversational exchanges that placed equal emphasis on content and 
process, the common ground would be a key component. And indeed, the common ground would be 
worthy of its own dedicated chapter. It is worth recapitulating the basic idea for the sake of 
background consideration. Simply speaking, we might say that the common ground is the basic 
context that conversational exchanges take place within. So the conversational common ground is 
the relevant information that conversational partners draw upon when conversing; that is, it is the 
information they take to be shared. It has a rich history in recent philosophy through David Lewis’s 
talk of common knowledge and conversational scorekeeping ([1969] 2002; 1979), Schiffer’s on 
mutual knowledge (1972), Aumann’s common knowledge (1976), perhaps most famously in 
Stalnaker work on common ground (for example, 1978[1999]), and more recently in Bach’s broad 
context (2012), and the Stalnakerian common ground of von Fintel (2008), Green (2009; 2017) and 
Stokke (2018). It is also resonates through much of the work of psychology and psycholinguistics I 
draw upon in this and the following chapters, for example Clark and Brennan (1991), Clark (1996, 
Ch.4, Ch8), Pickering & Garrod (2004), Horton & Gerrig (2005, 2016), Enfield (2006), Richardson, 
Dale, & Kirkham (2007), Brown-Schmidt & Duff (2016). The common ground, then, is a major 
omission, though for the sake of clarity and brevity, one I think necessary for now. I will make 





In this section, then, I consider in more detail some of these stable process level 
tasks by looking at some recent work in psycholinguistics. We shall see that some of the 
consequences of Clark’s features of face-to-face conversation are that in paradigm cases of 
conversation participants are required to commit to a continuous and fast-moving set of 
necessary process tasks in order to sustain the conversation. In the following section I will 
hypothesise that the required commitment to such tasks gives us good grounds to consider 
the fundamental role of cooperation in these types of linguistic activity.  
3.1 Response speeds86 
3.1.1 The one second window 
The first interesting observation is what Gail Jefferson (1989) refers to as the “standard 
maximum silence” and which Nick Enfield (2017) refers to as the one second window.87 
Roughly speaking, this one second window is the approximate amount of silence afforded 
by the most recent speaker in-between conversational turns before they either prompt 
again and/or begin to attach meaning to the silence. Take the following example, for 
instance.  
  (5) 
01: R:  What about coming here on the way? 
02: (.)  
03: R: Or doesn’t that give you enough time? 
04: C:  Well no I'm supervising here.88 
Here (.) represents one second of silence. What we can see from this example is how R takes 
C’s silence at (5-02) to signify a dispreferred response to the question at (5-01), and so 
hypothesises why this might be the case at (5-03). 
 
86 I don’t critically appraise the ecological validity or methodology of the studies mentioned here. 
And although I present some of the headline figures and results, I don’t discuss the experiments in 
much depth. The specific timings themselves are not what I really take to be of interest, though they 
are astonishing, rather it is the overall picture of the type of commitments participants in our 
paradigm case of conversation must make in order for conversation to proceed in the manner it 
does. 
87 See Enfield (2017 Ch.1 & 4) and Levinson (2016, p. 9) for more on this.  





The type of occurrence such as seen in (5) leads some to hypothesise that responses 
taking longer than one second can signal some trouble in the interaction. Jefferson suggests 
one second as the average such time after studying 1000 examples in English. Clark89 
suggests this may be variable between languages, but a similar average time was observed 
in a study by Stivers et al. (2009) of 10 different languages. And more recently studies of the 
one second window in English suggest that this window is potentially even shorter, for 
example; 
In the absence of other vocal or visual cues, there is clearly a critical range for the 
effect of the inter-turn silence after requests: perceived willingness is consistently 
higher before 500 ms, begins to drop after 600 ms, and then clearly and significantly 
steps down from 700 to 800 ms. After 900 ms, in the absence of other cues, there 
appears to be a simple floor effect. (Roberts & Francis, 2013) 
This accords with results in Kendrick & Torreira (2015) which found that a gap of over 
700ms in telephone conversation indicated that at a dispreferred response (i.e. a rejection 
as opposed to acceptance) was more likely. Whatever the precise time may be before 
silence becomes a sign of unwillingness, it isn’t long. Whether this one second window is an 
innate feature of interactive language use, or rather an example of a wide-ranging 
conventional aspect to language is not certain, thought the former, we might expect, is most 
likely;90 what we can take from this, however, is that cross-linguistically it appears that 
there is an expected limit to response speeds, and this limit itself is important. The one 
second window imposes on interlocutors a time-limit in which to respond, and with that 
time limit comes added pressure to focus on the conversation because language production 
itself is subject to time-limitation.  
3.1.2 Language production latency 
Although up to a second might be afforded for to out-turners to respond, this usually this 
isn’t all taken. In a wide study of three corpora in different languages (Dutch, Swedish, 
Scottish English), Heldner & Edlund (2010) observed that 55–59% of all turn intervals were 
either not noticeable gaps, or were overlaps.91 Stivers et al. (2009) also found that mode 
 
89 (1996, pp.268-269). Clark refers to it as the one second limit.   
90  Cf; “Clearly, something generalized about human perceptual processing generates an observable-
reportable phenomenon of silence as indicative of trouble in conversation.” (Roberts, Margutti, & 
Takano, 2011, p. 350) 
91 (Heldner & Edlund, 2010, p. 563). By ‘overlaps’ they refer to a response starting before the in-





average response speeds of around 0-200 ms occur across all 10 languages (with varied 
distributions for different languages).92 If the average response speed is around 200 ms, 
then on average interactants respond to a previous turn at close to the limit of human 
reaction speed.93  Although this 200 ms is fast, it is even more notable when contrasted with 
observations of the latency involved with speech planning. For example, in meta-analysis of 
studies that look at timed picture naming, Indefrey & Levelt (2004) and Indefrey (2011) 
suggest planning a single word takes approximately 600 ms when participants are 
primed.94 Bates et al. (2003), which looked at timed picture naming across seven languages, 
suggests this increases to 1000 ms without priming. Also using picture naming as a basis 
Griffin & Bock, (2000) and Schnur, Costa, & Caramazza, (2006) suggest the planning of a 
simple clause sentence (such as ‘the girl jumps’ or ‘the man sneezes’) takes approximately 
1500 ms. And one last headline figure to mention, Levinson (2016) notes that average turn 
duration is approximately 2000 ms. What we shall see next, then, is that in order for 
interlocutors in a paradigm case of conversation to respond in the way they typically do, the 
processes required for comprehension and production must overlap.  
3.1.3 Prediction and overlap 






approximately 200ms as per (Walker & Trimboli, 1982), since then, however, following Heldner’s 
own (2011) research, he has suggested approximately 120ms is about the length of acoustic silence 
required before a gap is noticed. 
92 It should be noted that Stivers et al. used video to compile the data and it was allowed that a 
gesture such as a nod or the inhalation of breath in preparation to speak was considered the start of 
the next turn.  
93 For context on quite how fast this is, IAAF guidelines for a 100m race don’t deem a false-start to be 
one in which the sprinter leaves their block before the starter pistol fires, but rather if they leave 
within 100ms of the starter pistol firing. Enfield (2017) notes that 200ms is about the time it takes to 
blink an eye, Levinson (2016) that this is the about the time it takes to utter a syllable. 
94 In Indefrey & Levelt (2004, see Table 3), they estimate the breakdown of this 600 ms as follows: 
Conceptual preparation 175 ms; Lemma retrieval 75 ms; Phonological code retrieval 80 ms; 





 (6) Table 2 
1 2 3 4 5 
Avg turn  
Avg response 
time 
Planning (single word 
primed) 
Available speech before 
planning Overlap 
2000 ms 200 ms 
600 ms 1600 ms 400 ms 
Planning (simple clause 
sentence) 
Available speech before 
planning Overlap 
1500 ms 700 ms 1300 ms 
Table showing average turn duration (1) and average response duration (2) in comparison to 
planning (3) with resultant duration of speech available to out-turner before commencement of 
planning begins (4), and amount of time out-turner planning overlaps with current in-turner’s 
speech (5)  
 
What we see from Table 2, then, is that based on an average turn duration and average 
response time, even the out-turner’s planning of a single word response will need to begin 
400 ms before the in-turner completes her turn, and this rises to 1300 ms in order to 
prepare a simple single clause sentence. This leads some to propose the early-planning 
hypothesis (for example, Barthel & Levinson, 2020; Levinson & Torreira, 2015) – speakers 
need to start planning their response as early as possible. One such example of this view can 
be found in Pickering & Garrod (2013). There it is proposed that language production and 
understanding in face-to-face conversations are tightly linked; “[interlocutors] do not 
simply transmit messages to each other in turn but rather negotiate the form and meaning 
of expressions they use by inter-weaving their contributions.”95 Pickering and Garrod 
illustrate this interweaving using the following example;96  
(7) 
  01: A:  I’m afraid I burnt the kitchen ceiling. 
  02: B: But have you… 
  03: A: burned myself? Fortunately not.  
 
95 (2013, p.330). It is worth mentioning that Pickering and Garrod take this is interweaving approach 
to also work at the level of the individual. They base this on Susan Hurley’s Shared Circuits Model 
(2008) and her rejection of the separation of what she calls “the classical sandwich” (2001), in which 
perception and action are the bread and cognition the filling. Hurley argues that perception and 
action are mutually and symmetrically interdependent.  





 So B begins to ask a question (7-02), but A interrupts (7-03) to both complete and 
answer the question. In this example, then, B alone doesn’t individually encode in sound the 
question ‘But have you burned [yourself]?’, it is, rather, jointly encoded by B and A over the 
course of (7-02/03). This is an example of what Clark (1996, p.238) classifies as a 
midutterance action in which we see a collaborative completion. One of Clark’s own 
examples of this is (8), wherein Herb is wondering where another umbrella might be.  
(8)  
  01: Herb: Where’s the other – 
  02: Eve: On the back shelf. 
  03: Herb: Good.  
This example differs slightly in that Eve at (8-03) doesn’t encode in sound the remainder of 
Herb’s question, though what she does do is answer it in a way acceptable to Herb at (8-03), 
and so it is taken by both that they took Herb to be asking; ‘Where’s the other umbrella?’. 
Cases such as these, then, illustrate what we might expect if we accept the early planning 
hypothesis – a part of the role of an out-turner is to predict what the in-turner is going to 
utter. 
3.1.4 Prediction and perspective aligning 
When we consider together the overlaps in exchanges such as (7) and (8) and the difference 
in response speeds in relation to language production latency, then we see evidence of how 
prediction is essential for the functioning of face-to-face conversation. The time constraints 
of the one second window, how long it takes to produce an utterance, and how quickly 
interlocutors respond on average make it seem likely that out-turners must try to predict 
what an interlocutor might say, or the speech act they might be performing, as very often 
they won’t have a complete utterance to respond to. Not only must an out-turner predict 
what the in-turner will say, they must also predict when they will finish saying it.97 What 
this seems to suggest, then, is that one of the key groups of cognitive tasks an out-turner is 
required to complete is centred around not simply listening to what an in-turner has 
uttered (though this is essential), but also to using what has been uttered to forecast what 
an interlocutor is going to utter, and when they will finish uttering it. This, then, perhaps 
 





seems to overlap somewhat with what Merleau-Ponty was referring to (see Ch. 1, §3) when 
talking about perspective sharing. 98  
There seems to be an aspect to paradigm conversations in which both the out-turner 
and in-turner must all be arriving at the same (or similar) thoughts at the same time. These 
thoughts may be initiated by the in-turner in the way they begin their utterance, but we 
might expect that for the out-turner to respond in a timely manner, she too must (try to, at 
least) take the perspective of the in-turner. And this needn’t simply be a case of prediction 
on a turn-by-turn basis – that is as A starts an utterance, B starts the processes of prediction 
during that particular turn – it may be that this prediction overlaps into other turns. So A 
might start an utterance, which also involves prediction of how she will complete her own 
turn,99 and based on what she is uttering she might also be making predictions as to how B 
might respond to her before B even begins to respond. This is the type of idea Pickering and 
Garrod (2013) propose - that conversational partners use forward models as a means of 
predicting beyond a mere turn-by-turn basis; 
[W]e propose that speakers use forward models to predict aspects of their upcoming 
utterances and listeners covertly imitate speakers and then use forward models 
based on their own potential utterances to predict what the speakers are likely to 
say. The account helps explain the rapidity of production and comprehension and 
the remarkable fluency of dialogue”100 
Although whether or not interlocutors begin such predictions as early as Pickering and 
Garrod hypothesise is correct, it still appears from the other data that at the very least out-
turner prediction often must begin before the in-turner has completed a turn. So we might 
think out-turners must attempt to at least match their perspective with that of the in-turner. 
Put in this way, it might sound more like an out-turner is the conversational participant 
with the burden of making perspectives align, but the task of prediction is not an enterprise 
undertaken by the out-turner alone. The in-turner has a part to play too, and they must also 
make sure to align with an out-turner just as the out-turner aligns with them, and one of the 
ways of doing this is suggested by some of the research into interactive alignment.     
 
98 And also recall; “I am freed from myself in the present dialogue, even though the other’s thoughts 
are certainly his own, since I do not form them, I nonetheless grasp them as soon as they are born or 
I even anticipate them.” (2012, pp.370-371). 
99 Because, of course, we very often have not planned a whole utterance in advance of making it, but 
rather we prepare just how we will start it. 





3.1.5 Interactive alignment 
The notion of interactive alignment stems from studies showing that interacting groups will 
align in a number of different ways, both behaviourally and cognitively. For example, as 
conversation progresses eye-movements, hand positions, facial expressions and word 
choices of interlocutors will often become aligned.  As Marlou Rasenberg, Asli Özyürek, & 
Mark Dingemanse (forthcoming) note; 
In social interactions, speakers coordinate their actions in an effort to incrementally 
and interactively reach their communicative goals. A pervasive component of such 
joint actions is cross-participant repetition of communicative behavior. Work across 
a wide range of fields shows that when people are engaged in interaction, their 
behaviors may grow to be in tune with each other at several levels: from body 
postures and eye gaze, to words and gestures. (Rasenberg, Özyürek, & Dingemanse, 
forthcoming) 
And when we think about it, this is not unexpected, as Dijksterhuis & Bargh note; 
 [W]e have an innate tendency to imitate. We whisper to someone who is 
whispering, we start to speak much louder when others do so. We scratch our head 
upon seeing someone else scratch their head. We walk slower in the presence of the 
elderly, we cycle faster after we have seen a cycling race on TV”101  
We can postulate that this is a powerful tool when trying to establish commonality during 
interaction. Simon Garrod and Martin Pickering (2004) address why it is that conversation 
is so “easy” and argue that studies into interactive alignment show that it’s easy precisely 
because participants in a conversation interactively align. So during an interaction in which 
participants align in various ways, the eventual outcome of this is an alignment of their 
linguistic representations. They also present evidence that interactive alignment processes 
occur automatically and suggest that “the interactive nature of a dialogue supports 
interactive alignment of linguistic representations.”  Further to this, they also note that: 
[P]eople align their representations at different linguistic levels at the same time. 
They do this by making use of each others’ choices of words, sounds, grammatical 
forms, and meanings. Additionally, alignment at one level leads to more alignment at 
 





other levels… Conversations succeed, not because of complex reasoning, but rather 
because of alignment at seemingly disparate linguistic levels.    
       (Garrod & Pickering, 2004, p. 9) 
The key point to note here is that alignment at one level leads to more alignment at other 
levels.  
On interactive alignment Deborah Tollefsen and colleagues (2012)102 state that “it 
has now become evident that when individuals engage in a joint activity such as 
conversation or joint problem solving they become aligned at a variety of different 
levels.”103 They also refer to alignment as “the dynamic ‘matching’ between the behavioral 
or cognitive states of two or more people. Gestures, eye gaze, word choice, and various 
other behavioral features may become coordinated in human interaction.”  So although 
Garrod and Pickering focus primarily on the different linguistic levels, we might suppose 
that as conversational partners align at the behavioural level and the linguistic level, this 
might lead to alignments of other cognitive processes. Indeed, they suggest later in the same 
paper that “the alignment of representations has the effect of distributing the processing 
load between the interlocutors because each reuses information computed by the other.”104 
If all this is true, then, it would seem to suggest that in a paradigm type of conversation not 
only is an out-turner required to predict what the in-turner will say, the in-turner and out-
turner will often align in other ways to make this predictive job easier. But not only does 
this make the predictive job easier, there is evidence, too, that synchronising with an 
interlocutor also gives participants a sense that the interaction is smooth and harmonious. 
For example, Kerry Marsh and colleagues (2009) review studies that look at the role 
of synchrony between interactants and how subjects reported this synchrony made them 
 
102 See also Tollefsen et al. (2013) 
103 (2012, p. 386) 
104 It is this distributing of the processing load that occurs through alignment that then raises the 
question of what type of system is at work here – so if this is the case, there is perhaps a question of 





feel.105 In one of the studies106 participants working in pairs were assigned either an easy or 
difficult task in which they were asked to bodily synchronise with each other. They report 
that participants responded in a way that suggested; “[e]asy coordination condition 
interactions were viewed as significantly friendlier, smoother, and more harmonious and 
these effects were not reduced when mood effects were partialed out.”107 That is, when 
participants found it easier to synchronise their bodily movements, they reported that this 
made them feel as if they more closely interacted with their experimental partner. And it 
isn’t merely explained by the fact that that they succeeded in performing the experimental 
task. Other studies they looked at used distraction tasks not related to bodily synchrony 
whilst still testing for the same phenomenon. They note;  
One striking feature of the bodily synchrony studies is that…the tasks typically did 
not involve an interpersonal goal. Yet even in situations where an unintentional 
interpersonal pull toward synchrony might be at odds with (distract from) the 
purported experimental goal (e.g., memorizing words), individuals spontaneously 
coordinated their incidental movements with another individual. The ease of doing 
so was associated with greater feelings of connectedness—a feeling of readily being 
a team with the other person.108 
Based on such studies, then it seems that not only do processes of alignment and 
synchronisation between interlocutors make the necessary predictive tasks of conversation 
easier, they also make participants feel more positive about the interaction. This becomes 
particularly pertinent for the discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 on the contrast between face-
to-face and digital conversation, but for now let us return to consider how interlocutors 
help each other with the tasks of prediction. 
3.1.6 Prediction and perspective sharing 
 
105 I use only one example here for ease of reference, but the correlation between synchrony and 
prosocial attitudes is well observed. See for example meta-analysis of 42 different studies found in 
(Mogan, Fischer, & Bulbulia, 2017) and analysis of 60 studies found in (Rennung & Göritz, 2016). 
Evidence exists too that in cases of disputation, synchrony also decreases, see for example (Paxton & 
Dale, 2013). There is evidence too that even observing synchrony of a dyad from the outside can 
make participation more desirable for the observer (Marques-Quinteiro, Mata, Simão, Gaspar, & 
Farias, 2019). And (Reddish, Tong, Jong, & Whitehouse, 2019) finds that synchrony increased 
reports of joint-agency. 
106 (Marsh et al., 2007) 
107 (Marsh et al., 2009, p.330) 





In-turners too, it seems, play a role in providing an out-turner with cues and clues as to the 
things they are going to utter, such as making clear the type of speech act apparent to the 
out-turner early into a turn. For example, it was observed by Sicoli et al. (2015) in a study 
across 10 different languages that even speakers of languages that do not include speech act 
indicating particles at the beginning of an utterance, speakers will, for example, boost the 
pitch at the beginning of a question. And based on an electroencephalogram (EEG) study, 
(Gisladottir, Chwilla, & Levinson, 2015) suggest that “speech act recognition begins very 
early in the incoming turn, starting already from 200 milliseconds after first word onset 
when the utterance has only been partially processed.”109 110 We might hypothesise then, 
that by making clear to an out-turner early on that, for example, a question is forthcoming; 
this helps the out-turner narrow down the scope of what will be uttered and potential 
responses. The out-turner might also assist by providing particularly salient content early 
into a turn.  For example, Bögels, Magyari, & Levinson (2015) show the efficacy of doing 
this. They used an EEG to look, in part, at the timing of production planning in response to 
questions such as the following; 
 (9)  
Early:  Which character, also called 007, appears in the famous movies? 
  Late: Which character from the famous movies, is also called 007? 
So ‘007’ here represents the information the testers deemed necessary for participants to 
answer the question. Based on observations from the EEG, they found that in preparing to 
respond to questions such as those in (9); 
[E]ffects started already around 500 ms after the onset of the information that 
enables participants to retrieve the answer. This indicates that interlocutors started 
production planning within half a second of hearing the critical information 
necessary to start answer preparation.111 
 
109 For context, see again fn.51, there it was noted that uttering a syllable takes approximately 
200ms.   
110 There is evidence, too, that the use of gestures accompanying questions also improves response 
speeds, for example Holler, Kendrick, & Levinson (2017). Indeed, the consideration of how such 
multi-modal language components as gesture, facial expression and linguistic output align to 
generally produce faster responses is interesting. See for example, (Holler & Levinson, 2019). 





It is in the interest of the proceeding of a conversation, then, that an in-turner provides the 
out-turner with as much information as possible early in a turn to help the out-turner(s) 
predict the type and content of the utterance they are making. This inter-weaving, or 
perspective sharing, then, appears to be essential for conversation to function in the way 
that it does. And as Stephen Levinson notes; 
As far as we know, the overall system employed in conversation is strongly 
universal, with only slight variations in timing, and it contrasts with other more 
specialized speech exchange systems such as those employed in classrooms, 
courtrooms, presidential press briefings, etc., which tend to be culture-specific. 
(Levinson, 2016) 
3.2 Levinson’s preconditions 
In light of the above data, we have a clearer idea of the processes involved in conversation 
and the timescales these process tasks must be performed within. It seems obvious, to me at 
least, that for paradigm types of conversation to function as they do, that whether in the 
role of out-turner or in-turner conversational participants must remain continually active – 
participants must devote their attention to the conversation continuously. So even if prima 
facie it might appear that there is a neat division of the roles in a conversation – for 
example, a speaker and a listener in a verbal conversation wherein the speaker is active and 
the listener passively listens - this is far from the case. Very often the role of listener in a 
verbal conversation is much richer than merely receiving and processing information, they 
also have a number of further requirements to fulfil in order to be able to respond in a 
timely manner. In summary of these tasks, then, Levinson suggests the following 
preconditions would need to exist in a conversation between A and B and where A is the in-
turner, to enable B to respond within the average 200ms timescale: 
(10) 
(i) B must attempt to predict the speech act (detect whether A's utterance is 
a question, offer, request, etc.) as early as possible, because this is what B will 
respond to;  
(ii) B should at once begin to formulate a response, going through all the 
stages of conceptualization, word retrieval, syntactic construction, 





(iii) meanwhile, B should use the unfolding syntax and semantics of A's turn 
to estimate its likely duration, listening for prosodic cues to closure;  
(iv) as soon as those cues are detected B should launch the response. 112 
We might expect, then, that these preconditions (or at least something like them) are 
general for all of our cases of paradigm conversation. 
Contrast this with some of the other cases discussed in Chapter 1. In cases such as 
the courtroom or job interview, we have no reason to expect there is anything resembling 
the one second window (though this would be an empirical matter), if there is no pressure 
to answer within such a short time-frame, then there is no requirement for prediction on 
the part of the interviewee, for example. In the case of an academic lecture, there is no 
requirement at all on the listener to respond. And as such Levinson’s preconditions need 
not hold. That is not to say they wouldn’t to some degree. It may well be that language 
processing requires something like prediction of speech act to help understand an 
utterance (and so would meet (10i)). Though if one member of the audience fails to do this, 
there will be no consequence for the lecture itself. Whether an attendee understands a 
lecture is of minor significance for the lecture as a whole. This isn’t to say that listening to a 
lecture might be less cognitively demanding, it may well be more difficult. An attendee 
might, for example, need to do such as draw upon previous knowledge, consider where the 
teachings of the lecture fit in with a wider picture, take notes etc… The notable contrast 
between the lecture and our paradigm type of conversation, though, is there is no 
requirement that a lecture attendee do any of these things, whereas in conversation, it is 
very often minimally required for the conversation to proceed that an out-turner be 
engaged in a set of required tasks. 
3.3 Summary of processes 
In this section, then, we have looked at some of the types of process tasks interlocutors in 
our paradigm type of conversation must complete. The evanescence and recordlessness of 
the medium, and the time constraints imposed on interlocutors mean that in order to 
respond in a timely manner, out-turners must start planning their turn before the in-turner 
finishes their turn. So it is the case that the out-turner must predict the type of speech act 
being performed and predict how and when it will finish. To assist in this the in-turner must 
 





also give cues and clues to the out-turner. One hypothesis as to how this occurs is that 
interlocutors interactively align in various ways across different communication channels. 
So in a paradigm type of conversation, interlocutors necessarily must coordinate at the level 
of process in an interdependent way. I want to argue next that underlying this coordination 
is a type of cooperation. That is to say, in order for conversation to succeed and proceed it 
requires that conversational participants mutually (and tacitly) agree to cooperate with 
each other to fulfil the roles expected of them. So even if conversational participants are in 
disagreement at the level of content, they must still cooperate at the level of process, and as 
such paradigm cases of conversation will be essentially cooperative. 
4 Cooperation and coordination of process 
Paul Grice famously makes cooperation central to his account of conversation. Though using 
the distinction between process and content discussed so far, most would probably 
interpret Grice as referring to cooperation at the content level. In this section, however, I 
want to suggest that the interdependent nature of content and process levels in 
conversation can help us understand a little better the cooperative principle. More precisely 
I will argue that we can understand better some of the tasks a conversational participant 
must undertake to enable them to adhere to the cooperative principle. So we shall see the 
influence of cooperation of process on the coordination of content. Which leads me to 
suggest that at the very least a paradigm case of conversation is essentially cooperative at 
the level of process, and that this cooperation at the level of process is influential, too, at the 
level of content. And so even in a case of disagreement, a paradigm case of conversation is is 
in some sense intrinsically cooperative. My aim here, then, is to bridge the notion of 
coordination suggested above, and the type of cooperation that underpins the Gricean 
account. Space precludes introducing a fully-fledged theory of cooperation at this stage, and 
so the notion of cooperation I work with here will remain intuitive.  
As a starting point I am considering that the coordination discussed above is a 
systematic set of tasks necessary for the functioning of conversation. Cooperation on the 
other hand, I take to be the tacit agreement that interlocutors will commit to the 
coordinative tasks required of them in order to sustain the conversation - that is, 
interlocutors cooperate to meet a general shared goal of sustaining the conversation. 
Importantly, this need not be cooperation in the sense of being in agreement at the level of 
content. So although it might be seem unusual to describe two people vehemently 





cooperating so long as they are at least carrying out something like Levinson’s 
preconditions (11).113 Instead what I suggest is that they cooperate primarily at the level of 
the process – they cooperate in their agreement to coordinate the processes required of 
them in order to sustain the interaction.114 That is to say, in a paradigm case of conversation 
participants share a goal of maintaining the conversation and work together to achieve that 
goal for as long as they wish the interaction to continue, and in doing so they are 
cooperating in a deep and interesting way.115 
4.1 Coordination without cooperation 
Coordination can occur without cooperation. Two machines sending and receiving data are 
coordinated to an extent, though machines don’t appear to be the type of thing that have 
goals. I can coordinate my body by hopping from one foot to another. Or to put to a different 
use an example Searle116 gives; in the UK cars drive on the left-hand side. Assuming 
everyone in the UK adheres to the rule to drive on the left-hand side, then all drivers in the 
UK are coordinated. They systematically align to drive on the left-hand side, to drive around 
roundabouts in a clockwise direction, and to overtake on the right. There are also other 
ways they coordinate. They agree to stop for traffic at a junction, observe traffic lights, use 
indicators etc… But although they coordinate such a way, it doesn’t follow that they require 
a shared goal and are acting together to achieve it. At a certain level of abstraction they 
might have the same goals with regards to following the rules of the road. Driver A and 
Driver B might both adhere to the rules so as to avoid trouble with the police, for example. 
But Driver A and Driver B aren’t cooperating to meet this goal, they are simply two 
 
113 Of course, there will be some disagreements in which interlocutors are no longer listening to 
what the other has to say, or perhaps predicting what they might say but getting it wrong. These 
cases no longer seem to appear to be a paradigm case, perspectives are no longer being shared and 
such interactions can take the form of two people airing grievances regardless of the previous 
interactant’s contributions.  
114 And the close relationship of content and process will entail that in these cases most often the 
cooperation at the level of process will also translate into cooperation at the level of content, indeed 
it would appear that cooperation at the level of content would require cooperation at the level of 
process. 
115 This definition of cooperation is close to Raimo Tuomela’s Basic Thesis of Cooperation: “Two or 
more actors cooperate in the full sense if and only if they share a collective (or joint) goal and act 
together to achieve the goal.” Of this he says: “The present thesis must be understood broadly 
enough to be compatible with the claim that not all cooperation needs be acting towards a collective 
end-state. This is because there can be full-blown cooperation which only involves shared activity, a 
collective action-goal, but does not purport to lead to a shared collective end or purpose at all.” 
(Tuomela, 2000, p.12) This seems true of conversation, it may well be that there is no shared 
collective end, indeed often there won’t be one beyond ‘have a nice conversation’ or something 
similar.  





individuals with the same individual goals. But there are perhaps cases where it might not 
look quite as clear.  
Suppose two drivers Dot and Dash both have the same goal ‘don’t crash’. For it to be 
safe for Dot to drive on the left-hand side also requires that if Dash is coming in the other 
direction that Dash too is adhering to the left-hand side rule, if not then their goals will be 
compromised. So in a sense at the moment their journeys intersect, it is in the interests of 
Dot and Dash that they both have the goal ‘don’t crash’. So suppose Dot and Dash both share 
the goal ‘don’t crash’, and both pass each on the road by driving on the left-hand side. In a 
sense it might seem that they have acted together to achieve a shared goal, and Dot and 
Dash don’t crash. So perhaps it would appear Dot and Dash have cooperated to avoid 
crashing into each other. But even if we were to call this a case of cooperation, it differs in 
some respects from the type of cooperation we see in a paradigm case of conversation. For 
although Dot and Dash do cooperate, there is no requirement that they do. They could have 
very different goals and still not crash into each other.117 118 What I want to suggest of 
conversational cooperation, however, is that for conversation to function the participants 
must necessarily cooperate and that at the most basic level, conversational participants 
must share the same simple goal. That is, for a conversation to function, it requires that each 
participant must at least have the shared goal of wishing for the conversation to proceed. If 
any participant does not share this goal, then the conversation will cease to function as a 
conversation.119 
 
117 If we were to go further into aligning the intuitive notion of cooperation I work with here to a 
developed theoretical notion, it might be possible to say a little more on the distinction Tuomela 
draws between ‘I-mode’ and ‘we-mode’ cooperation, or ‘full cooperation’ and ‘cooperation as 
coordination’. (See Tuomela, 2005; Tuomela 2011, pp.66-69 for a summary). If we wished to denote 
the example of Dot and Dash as cooperative, it might be deemed an ‘I-mode’ cooperative act. Both 
Dot and Dash have goals that are met by driving on the left-hand side, and by doing this both played 
their part in avoiding crashing and so meeting each other’s goal. But this, really, is incidental. That 
their goals align and are acted upon does not give us the stronger notion of ‘we-cooperation’, it is not 
that Dot and Dash worked towards the goal together, their goals are merely (and fleetingly) 
contingent.  
118 As Rosanna Keefe points out to me, with Lewisian co-ordination problems solved by conventions, arguably 
there are always shared goals. 
119 Although I don’t have space to develop this beyond the level of a suggestion, it strikes me that we 
could also relate this notion of cooperation at the level of process to something Searle (1992) says on 
the role of shared intentionality in his criticism of conversation analysis. “I believe that a recognition 
of shared intentionality and its implications is one of the basic concepts we need in order to 
understand how conversations work”. Elsewhere Searle (1990) says of shared intentions; “Ask 
yourself what you must take for granted in order that you can ever have or act on collective 





4.2.1 Symmetry of processes 
Recall earlier it was noted that paradigm cases of conversation are in some senses 
symmetrical. We are now in a position to understand a little more about the notion of 
symmetry in process coordination. Let’s consider again the following example discussed in 
Chapter 1 (§2.1). 
 (11) 
01 A: Just think of how many people would miss 
you. You would know who cared. 
02 B: Sure. I have a lot of friends who would come 
 
awarenesses of you as an agent like themselves, and that these awarenesses coalesce in a sense of us 
as possible or actual collective agents. And these conditions hold even for total strangers…my stance 
toward others with whom I am engaged in collective behavior is that of their being conscious agents 
in a cooperative activity, without my needing or having a special belief to that effect… The 
biologically primitive sense of the other person as a candidate for shared intentionality is a 
necessary condition of all collective behaviour and hence of all conversation.” (pp.414-415) It is 
perhaps worth considering the notion of a shared goal to cooperate on sustaining a conversation to 
be a form of shared intentionality. This too could be adapted to work on two levels mirroring the 
Clarkian notions of content and process and can help understand the link between these two 
coordinative levels.  So the shared intentionality is directed at a higher-level in terms an adherence 
to something like carrying out the process required for conversation to function. We could say then 
that it is thus directed at maintaining the interaction. On a secondary level is the type of 
intentionality Searle possibly has in mind (and something like Green’s Stalknakarian expansion 
project has at its core) – the general question (or questions) that the discussion is directed towards. 
These two levels of intentionality are essential for the continuation of the discussion and should one 
participant withdraw from either, they will withdraw from both. Suppose Verity and Mia are in 
conversation and Mia realises she needs to go for a bus. Mia might start to disengage from the higher 
level of process-intentionality, she no longer will wish to continue the conversation and the shared 
intentional activity, which might in turn dictate how she responds at the content level, she might 
start to look at her watch, or mention she has a bus to catch. Conversely, something at the content 
level might make Verity no longer wish to participate in the shared intentional joint activity of the 
conversation, suppose a third-party Ros joins the conversation and Mia and Ros start to discuss a 
topic of little interest to Verity. Verity’s lack of interest towards the topic will disengage her from the 
content of the conversation, but it will also serve to disengage her from the processes that make 
interaction possible. That she loses her commitment at the content-level therefore will start to bear 
upon her ability (or intention) to maintain the higher-level shared intentionality. She might stop 
providing cues that she is engaged, she might stop all but the most basic form of listening (i.e. the 
words are heard in the sense that they are stored in working memory as phonological replica), and 






   to the funeral and say what an intelligent, 
   bright, witty, interesting person I was. 
03 A: They wouldn’t say that you were humble 
04 B: No. Humble, I’m not. 
One notable point of symmetry in (11) relates to previous discussions on turn-taking and 
the different roles of in-turner and out-turner; we can assume that when A is engaged in the 
tasks associated with being an in-turner, B is engaged in the tasks relevant to being an out-
turner. Considering that each new line as transcribed represents approximately one second 
of time, the whole exchange takes less than seven seconds. A and B are both contributing to 
the discussion, and as the time it takes to complete is short, then it also seems reasonable to 
assume that A and B are attentively engaged with their tasks. As noted in Section 2, the 
evanescence and recordlessness of the medium require that if the conversation is to 
proceed as it does, that in (11) both A and B are attentive to the process tasks required of 
them. So there is symmetry in their joint-commitment to the overall task of sustaining the 
conversation. This symmetry is not merely at the level of process either, for it also bears 
relation to the idea of conversation as a synocracy first discussed in Chapter 1 (§2.2). 
4.2.2 Symmetry of influence 
Suppose A and B are involved in a verbal conversation. If B is listening to what A utters then 
what A utters is, to some degree at least, influencing the direction of thought B will have, 
which in turn will dictate, to some degree, the potential content of B’s response. Similarly, 
when A is listening to what B utters, then what B says is, to some degree also, influencing 
the direction of thoughts A will have, which in turn will provide the scope for A’s 
response.120 This might seem to come into some conflict with the features of self-direction 
and self-expression discussed in (§2.2.3), a person about to take on the role of in-turner will 
be restricted to some degree on what they can say in response if they are to make their 
contribution sensible. However, the synocratic nature of a paradigm type of conversation 
would suggest that the interlocutors are still free to, for example, attempt to change the 
topic of conversation. So there is a symmetry of influence reflected in a synocratic exchange 
too. This symmetry relies on the conversational participants tacitly accepting their changing 
roles as in-turner and out-turner, the commitments each role entails and also accepting 
 





their interlocutors’. This acceptance, I suggest, is rooted in a willingness of participants to 
cooperate in the processes required of a conversation. However, we need to be cautious 
here because, as alluded to in Chapter 1 (§2.2), it is not always the case in face-to-face 
interaction that each participant will have the freedom to determine the direction of the 
conversation. That is, in some exchanges one of the participants might not have the same 
opportunity for self-determination or self-expression (in the non-trivial sense) as their 
interlocutor(s). Naturally we see this in formal and institutional examples such as cross-
examination or a job interview, but this can also be the case due to other factors relating to 
the social standing or role of interlocutors. 
So although the notion of symmetry I discuss above is primarily the symmetry of 
processes interlocutors tacitly agree to cooperate on, part of the task here is to consider a 
paradigm type of conversation. In such cases the synocratic nature of the exchange is such 
that participants should be able to self-determine and self-express, and this too requires a 
type of symmetry – a symmetry of influence. And so in an ideal conversation we should also 
expect that all the participants have the freedom to influence the direction or topic of the 
exchange should they wish to (and reciprocally, their conversational partners are free to 
accept or reject this). Now clearly there are some cases such as a job interview where this 
freedom is restricted to an extent; the interviewee will conventionally do most of the talking 
but will most often be doing so in response to the interviewer’s questions. So the 
interviewer holds a degree of autonomy on the general direction of the exchange, and 
therefore the dynamic is more asymmetrical than the paradigm case. In the case of cross-
examination, this freedom is even more restricted.  Recall the following extract from 
example (4). 
  (12) 
04 A. Yes. He said it was a dark-colored –  
05 Q. Hold it a second. Did he describe it? Yes or no 
Here A is restricted in self-expression by the cross-examiner, the balance of control of the 
exchange is heavily weighted towards the cross-examiner. The power and authority of the 
court makes it so the cross-examinee must answer questions in the way the cross-examiner 
determines. Though they will still be free, to some extent, to determine what their answer 





away from our paradigm cases. There will also be many examples where this balance is 
skewed even further.  
 Rachel McKinney (2016) uses the case of the Central Park Five to discuss what she 
terms extracted speech – speech that an agent is made to produce. In that racially charged 
1990 case, five black and latino teenagers were convicted of the rape and attempted murder 
of a 28-year-old white woman. The main evidence presented to the court was police video 
recordings of each of the five confessing to the crime in the interrogation room. All five 
recanted their confessions claiming they were false and wrongly obtained. After the 
emergence of new evidence the convictions were vacated in 2002. What McKinney argues is 
that the Central Park Five case shows how in some instances asymmetrical power dynamics 
in an exchange can, to use the terminology from Clark’s control features, remove entirely an 
agent’s self-determination and self-expression. Power dynamics, then, are important for 
considering conversation, and these relate to their effects on conversational participants’ 
self-determination and self-expression. The greater the asymmetry of influence the more 
autocratic the exchange becomes and recalling the argument of Chapter 1 (§2.2), therefore 
the further away we get from the paradigm type of conversation. So a job interview may 
seem closer to the paradigm case than, say, a cross-examination. In those cases, the job 
interviewee is typically free to say what they want in response to the interviewer’s 
questions, and so are only restricted in a limited sense. There appears to be a difference 
between the symmetry of cross-examination examples and extracted speech cases too. In a 
cross-examination, the control of the direction of talk is clearly with the cross-examiner, but 
the cross-examinee is not subordinated to the extent as we see in extracted speech cases 
wherein the person that the speech is extracted from has little control over the content of 
their contributions.  
So we might think that on a continuum that starts with the paradigm case of 
conversation, the more asymmetrical the control of the discussion becomes, then the 
further away from the paradigm we get. So next to the paradigm case might be a job 
interview, at a few stages of further removal we might have a cross-examination, and then 
much further away again we have cases of extracted speech. And at this distant remove, too, 
we would probably also want to consider other types of case where an injustice or power 





example cases where there is illocutionary silencing,121 or discursive injustice,122 would sit 
on the continuum closer to extracted speech than the paradigm case. A part of the injustice 
in such cases, we might say, are conversational injustices – a participant in an exchange is 
not afforded the status of a full conversational participant with the opportunity to self-
express, but rather they are given a subordinate status in which they are not free to 
influence the direction of talk to the same extent as other participants. We should be careful 
to distinguish these types of exchange with other exchanges in which there may be a power 
imbalance of sorts; but where there is a willing imbalance of power and which does not 
greatly impede on a speaker’s self-determination or self-expression.  
Consider interactions between a willing student and a teacher. Most often the 
teacher will be in a position of power relative to the student, and the student might defer to 
the teacher in a number of different ways. She might allow that what the teacher says on a 
matter of fact is to be taken to be true, or allow the teacher to speak more on some 
matter.123 But this need not entail that a student cedes all influence of the exchange to, for 
example, the teacher, she may still retain the right to ask questions of what the teacher says, 
for example. All I wish to highlight here, then, is that power-structures can impose 
restrictions on conversational participants that can suggest an exchange is distant in some 
respects to the paradigm case, however it need not necessarily be the case.  
4.3  Symmetry, synocracy and cooperation 
What I want to suggest now is that for the symmetry of the in-turner/out-turner 
relationship to develop, we might expect it requires that an in-turner adheres to something 
like Grice’s Cooperative Principle; 
(CP) 
 
121 For example (Langton, 1993) 
122 Kukla (2014) 
123 This being a type of asymmetrical socratic exchange noted in Green’s taxonomy (2017) of types of 
conversation. In such cases there is an agreement (tacit or explicit) that one participant leads the 
discussion and the other agrees to follow. Though picking up on this being ‘socratic’ it’s difficult to 
know how willing some of Plato’s Socrates’ interlocutors were, usually it appears it was simply a 





Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the 
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the 
talk exchange in which you are engaged.124  
Now of course Grice proposes this principle, along with the maxims that accompany it, 
primarily as a means of explaining the role of implicature in conversation, so it is most 
commonly viewed as cooperation at the level of content. But I don’t think it is too far of a 
stretch to use this principle as a means of understanding the relationship between the 
process-level tasks discussed above and the content-level cooperation of Grice’s CP. That is, 
I also think that with some modifications we can regard CP as being applicable to the 
processes involved in conversation.   
I want to start by picking up on Grice’s defence of CP as put forward in Strand Six of 
his ‘Retrospective Epilogue’,125 there Grice says the following; 
While the conversational maxims have on the whole been quite well received, the 
same cannot, I think, be said about my invocation of a supreme principle of 
conversational cooperation. One source of trouble has perhaps been that it has been 
felt that even in the talk exchanges of civilized people browbeating disputation and 
conversational sharp practice are far too common to be offenses against the 
fundamental dictates of conversational practice. Another source of discomfort has 
perhaps been the thought that, whether its tone is agreeable or disagreeable, much 
of our talk-exchange is too haphazard to be directed toward any end cooperative or 
otherwise. Chitchat goes nowhere, unless making the time pass is a journey.126  
He then goes on to offer three points of refinement of the notion of CP. It is the third of 
these, stated below, that particularly interests me here. 
[S]ince we are concerned as theorists only with concerted talking, we should 
recognize that within the dimension of voluntary exchanges (which are all that 
concern us) collaboration in achieving exchange of information or the institution of 
decisions may coexist with a high degree of reserve, hostility, and chicanery and 
 
124 (1989c, p. 26). Naturally if we are expecting the CP to hold, we might also expect something like 
the Grice’s maxims to be important too. To recap these suggest that a contribution to be just as 
informative as needed (quantity), not knowingly false or under supported (quality), relevant and not 
ambiguous, obscure or disorderly (manner).  
125 (1989e) 





with a high degree of diversity in the motivations underlying quite meagre common 
objectives.127  
So the idea here is that even in exchanges that seem to be confrontational, there is still some 
basic level of cooperation between the interlocutors even if their ultimate aims for the talk 
exchange differ vividly. Part of what Grice is maybe getting at here, even if he stops short of 
saying it explicitly, is that the structural nature of a conversational exchange is a necessary 
collaboration between the participants. They simply have to cooperate, otherwise the talk 
exchange can’t proceed as a communicative endeavour. So cooperation need not be 
cooperation in the sense of aiding each other in aims specific to a particular conversation, 
so, for example, my trying to convince you to do something and you complying. That would 
be cooperation of a sort, a cooperation specific to a particular conversation. But for current 
purposes the cooperation that I will apply CP to is specifically a process-level cooperation 
that applies across conversations. On this reading CP is simply a statement of background 
processes required to be completed in order for the conversation to proceed. Recall again 
that the content of a specific conversation is not what we’re interested in here, but rather 
the general processes involved. If that is our consideration, then CP shouldn’t seem 
controversial at all. The idea that two (or more) people involved in a language exchange 
(that genuinely functions as a conversation) need to cooperate to some degree, even if just 
to make the flow of the exchange sensible, seems almost trivially true. Though when we 
consider what this entails, it isn’t of mere trivial interest.   
I proceed now with the assumption that CP has use as a basis for understanding 
what makes something a paradigm conversational exchange in the first place, particularly in 
helping us grasp the inherent coordinative and cooperative aspects of a conversational 
exchange. For current purposes though, although CP is a starting point, it is not complete, or 
at least not explicitly. The primary focus of CP is on one specific part of a conversational 
exchange - the contribution of the in-turner at the time of their turn. To help with the 
current task though, we need also to think of the role of other participant(s) in a 
conversation; the out-turner(s).128  
 
127 (1989e, p. 369) It is worth pointing out Grice’s use of “we are concerned as theorists only with 
concerted talking” in the Retrospective Epilogue and that he notes that ‘voluntary exchanges’ are 
what he is interested in. As per the discussion in Chapter 1, (§2.3.3) about simulations, it is in 
passages like this that make me think Grice has in mind a similarly narrow conception of 
conversation as the paradigm case being used here. 
128 This follows to some extent from a point made by Clark about the maxims being “exhortations to 





4.4 Elements of the Cooperative Principle 
As it stands, CP acts as a principle we take an in-turner to be adhering to qua in-turner.  The 
element of a conversational exchange it doesn’t address explicitly is what an out-turner(s) 
need to do to allow them to fulfil CP once they become the in-turner. Grice does allude to 
the role of the out-turner to some degree, but only in so far as to say that the out-turner 
assumes the in-turner to be adhering to CP. But I think we can go further with this and 
develop a complementary principle that applies to the out-turner of a conversation. To start 
to do this let us now divide CP into three informational elements.129 So using Grice’s own 
wording, let’s say the three closely related informational elements of CP are:  
(13) 
a) what is required of a contribution;  
b) what stage the conversation is at;  
c) what the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange is. 
The first thing to note here is that each element contains distinct, though likely highly 
interlinked, information. To know (13a), one must probably first know (13b) and (13c). The 
requirements of a contribution will be dependent on the stage and direction or purpose of 
the exchange. If this is the case, then, in terms of processing, we should expect that (13b) 
and (13c) to be established before arriving at an understanding of what qualifies for (13a). 
So (13b) and (13c) would seem to be prior to (13a). Depending on our reading of (13c), it 
could be that the case of the relationship of (13b) and (13c) is less clear however. 
We could read (13c) in a quite rigid way. So a conversation about the weather 
simply has the purpose of broadly discussing the weather. If this were the case then it 
would seem (13c) is prior to (13b), to understand the stage of the conversation seems to 
require knowing the accepted purpose of the exchange. But this is quite an unappealing 
 
phrases it ,the focus is on what the in-turner must do, though on my reading it seems not to be an 
exhortation to a speaker, but rather what an addressee will assume the speaker is adhering to. 
129 I’m almost certain this goes beyond what Grice was thinking with the Cooperative Principle, I 
don’t think he viewed it as containing three elements, and if we do wish to break it down into 
smaller elements I’m open to the idea that there may well be better ways of doing it. I also don’t 
intend this to be taken as reflective of the psychological reality, that is, I don’t expect that any 
participant in a conversation considers each of these points individually before making a 
conversational contribution. This is only intended to be illustrative of the types of immediately 
salient information changing during a single turn. So what I really want to show with this breakdown 
is that meeting CP requires being aware of the different dynamic facts of a conversation. I’ll get to 





reading of (13c), for it doesn’t account for the rapidly changing scope of content in a 
conversation. Think again about (11). 
(11) 
01 A: Just think of how many people would miss 
you. You would know who cared. 
02 B: Sure. I have a lot of friends who would come 
   to the funeral and say what an intelligent, 
   bright, witty, interesting person I was. 
03 A: They wouldn’t say that you were humble 
04 B: No. Humble, I’m not. 
It seems difficult to pinpoint a single purpose or direction this talk exchange has. The first 
two turns seem to be directed roughly towards death or funerals, with some change of 
subject occurring in 02, whereas the second two turns address traits of one of the 
interlocutors. So, based on (11) at least, it seems that this purpose or direction is subject to 
revision as the conversation progresses. If this is the case, then reading (13c) as prior to 
(13b) in the way suggested previously is unsatisfactory. 
A rigid reading of (13c) doesn’t represent what occurs in many conversations. So we 
need to allow that (13c) be dynamic in the sense that it is frequently changing throughout 
the course of a conversation. This being the case, we might then wonder how (13b) and 
(13c) relate. To know what stage a conversation is at would seem to require at least some 
grasp of the direction and purpose of an exchange, and knowing the direction and purpose 
of an exchange would also presumably require an understanding of what stage the 
conversation is at. Why keep (13b) and (13c) apart then we might wonder. One reason we 
might want to do so is that although (13b) and (13c) are co-dependent, they could also 
potentially each change at different points in a conversation. If we imagine that (13c), very 
roughly, picks out something like the current topic or theme of the conversation, and (13b) 
approximately picks out something like the progression of talk on that particular theme, 
then (13c) is generally likely to progress more slowly than (13b). Looking again at (11). At 





this theme, though the progression on the topic they make within 02 means that by 03 the 
topic has changed to being specifically about B. On its own I don’t take this to be quite 
enough alone to suggest that (13b) and (13c) are genuinely distinct, however if we consider 
the type of thing these three elements pick out, the difference becomes clearer.  
4.5 Dynamic facts 
What (13a), (13b) and (13c) ultimately are is a set of dynamic facts about a particular 
exchange.130 In many cases these particular facts would only hold at the point an in-turner 
begins her turn. Each new turn would, most likely; modify what is required of the following 
contribution; alter what stage the conversation is at; and, even if only subtly, change the 
purpose or direction of the talk exchange. So although an in-turner’s turn may be adhering 
to CP, the facts that CP relies on will alter during her turn. This alteration, though, becomes 
relevant not to the in-turner, but rather to the next person to take on the role of in-turner. 
As such, an out-turner, to enable herself to adhere to CP on her transition to in-turner, must 
be alert to any changes made to the facts underpinning CP that are enacted by the in-turner 
during her turn. So being able to fulfil CP when becoming in-turner requires that the 
conversational participant, when taking on the role of out-turner, is required to carry out 
the types of tasks discussed in Section 3. Notable about all of these elements and the 
dynamic facts relating to them, then, is they all relate to the content-level of a conversation. 
They are facts about some particular conversation. Recall in Section 4.3 I suggested that we 
can use CP to understand a little more about the interaction at the process-level and 
content-level, let us now do this by considering the types of process an out-turner must 
engage with in order to meet CP. 
4.6 Meeting the cooperative principle 
If we consider the requirements created by the evanescence and recordlessness of face-to-
face conversation, then an out-turner in a conversation such as (11) would need to listen to 
the in-turner just as the in-turner is making her utterances. She is required to process what 
the in-turner is uttering in relation to the conversation itself in order to establish any 
alterations to dynamic facts such as (13c) - what the accepted purpose or direction of the 
talk exchange is. From this, or in-line with this, the out-turner must also determine what the 
in-turner’s utterance does to dynamic fact (13b) – so at what stage does some utterance put 
the conversation. Further to this, in order to carry out (13a) when becoming in-turner, she 
 





must then also determine what scope remains within which to offer a reply that contributes 
to the conversation based on the updated facts of (13b) and (13c). Once this scope is 
established, she will also need to determine the direction she then wishes to take the 
conversation in.131 
 But as we know by now, and taking a verbal exchange as an example, the listener in 
must also do a lot more than listen, the listener must also start the process of preparing to 
speak which also involves its own set of sub-processes such as conceptualization, word 
retrieval, syntactic construction, phonological encoding, before reaching the stage of 
articulation. Typically, all of these cognitive tasks are being carried out in real time. That is, 
they are carried out concurrently as someone else is speaking or signing, not when they 
have finished their turn. As such, the complication is that being able to adhere to CP 
requires the out-turner not only to process what the in-turner is uttering as she utters it, 
but in order to respond in a timely manner, the out-turner need also predict what the in-
turner is going to be saying in the rest of her turn too. So even if conversational participants 
are disagreeing in terms of the content of what they are saying, they are still coordinating in 
the sense of keeping the conversation going, which requires they both keep track of the 
dynamic facts of the conversation as they alter. In light of this, and with Levinson’s 
preconditions (10) in mind, we might then suggest that in order for CP to be adhered to, a 
conversational participant must also engage in something like the following: 
Precondition to the Cooperative Principle (PCP): 
In the role of out-turner, concurrently with the in-turner producing an 
utterance; a conversational participant must predict alterations to the 
purpose or direction of the language exchange, the stage the exchange will be 
at following the present turn, and begin the set of sub-processes in 
preparation to produce an utterance.132   
Once PCP has been met, then when the out-turner transitions to in-turner, the new in-
turner would be in a position to adhere to CP. We should note that the dynamic facts 
 
131 Now of course, as in our paradigm case of conversation all participants are free to self-determine 
and self-express, they are also free to not adhere to CP in the sense discussed here. They may choose 
to start the conversation on a completely new path unrelated to previous discussion. Naturally this 
relies on the other interlocutors accepting this change of direction, and it is not something that can 
be readily deployed. In the great majority of turns this won’t happen.  
132 Implicit in here too is that in face-to-face conversation, when in the role of out-turner there is 





predicted by the out-turner are still subject to change until the end of the in-turner’s turn, 
and so may require some revision if the speaker says something that further alters one of 
the dynamic facts required for adhering to CP. 
 What I hope PCP makes clearer is the role the process-level tasks have in helping to 
determine and formulate the content required to meet CP. In the role of out-turner there 
are prediction and production tasks required and these are dependent on the dynamic 
nature of the informational elements of CP. For it is those contents that the process tasks will 
track. As discussed in Section 3, there is a much richer set of process tasks required for 
conversation to proceed than merely those presented in PCP, and I argued that the high 
degree of coordination at that process level is indicative of a highly cooperative activity (at 
least in terms of process). So all I want to suggest here is that PCP should be viewed as a 
postulate of how these rich process tasks interface with the content of some conversation. 
Interlocutors coordinate and cooperate at the process level to sustain conversation, and if 
cooperation is contagious, then we might expect the necessary cooperation at the process 
level also makes cooperation at the content level more likely (if not guaranteed). So the 
cooperation at the process-level can in turn promote at least some cooperation at the 
content level.  
4.7 Cooperation and content; a conjecture 
There is good reason, then, to think is that paradigm conversations have cooperation built 
into them. That’s not to say they will be agreeable exchanges in all instances, that’s clearly 
not the case. However, we might wonder if this in-built necessary cooperation is significant. 
This is only conjecture really at this stage, but I wish to plant the seeds for some of the 
discussion in Chapter 4. We might wonder whether the intrinsic cooperative nature of 
conversation is actually a key defining aspect to conversation and its cooperative nature 
explains why conversation has been such a powerful and uniting part of human sociality. 
For most of us, I imagine, understand how effective conversation can be for resolving 
differences. Sitting down in someone’s presence is very often the best method of sorting out 
disputes, apologising for mistakes, or trying to rebuild a relationship. It doesn’t always 
work, of course, sometimes it simply isn’t enough. But what we might wonder is whether 
the deep level of cooperation at the process level of conversation might make us more 
receptive to cooperate in other ways. If two people in conflict are able to cooperate to 






I have argued that taking the paradigm case of conversations sketched in Chapter 1 we can 
start to see some general features of such interactions, and that these features suggest the 
paradigm cases of conversation are intrinsically highly-cooperative activities. For 
conversation to function in the ecology it does wherein the medium is evanescent and goes 
unrecorded, and contributions are made extemporaneously and opportunistically in 
response to the contributions of others requires a high level of coordination. This 
coordination has two components as pointed out by Clark – process and content. As content 
will vary to a large degree from conversation to conversation, I focused the rest of the 
chapter primarily on process coordination (though these levels of coordination are 
interdependent). After discussing some of the recent work from psychology, 
psycholinguistics, linguistics and sociology on conversational response speeds, language 
production and interactive alignment, I argue that coordinating at the level of process is 
highly cognitively demanding and requires a significant commitment from conversational 
participants. This being the case, I suggest that essential to cases of paradigm conversation 
is an agreement by interlocutors to cooperate in sustaining the interaction. That is, 
paradigm conversations are highly and continuously cooperative at the level of process and 
thus are essentially highly cooperative activities. In the next chapter, then, I begin the task 













The Written-Spoken Distinction 
In Chapter 1 we looked at what we might call a paradigm type of conversation, and in 
Chapter 2 we looked at some of the processes that participants in such conversations are 
required to perform in order to sustain those conversations. We saw how some of the 
features of face-to-face conversation, such as the evanescence, recordlessness and 
simultaneity of the medium, and the instantaneous and extemporaneous nature of 
contributions, interact to create a particular set of demands on interlocutors. These features 
coupled with the rapid response speeds we typically see in face-to-face conversation give us 
a picture of a paradigm case of face-to-face conversation as being a fast, synchronous and 
intricately coordinated joint action. I then argued that this coordination is indicative of a 
deep and sustained cooperation on the part of interlocutors.  In order to sustain a 
conversation, conversational participants must continuously share the goal of sustaining 
the interaction, and work together to achieve it. In this chapter I begin the task (to be 
continued in Chapter 4) of considering how much of this model applies to cases of digital 
conversation - the types of which we typically find mediated by technology such as mobile 
phones and computers. The point of the comparison is based on the following intuition; 
despite the spread and availability of digital conversation in many of our lives, the quality of 
these conversations and the satisfaction we derive from them is, very often, inferior when 
contrasted with face-to-face conversations. To put it another way, considering again Erving 
Goffman’s description of conversation noted in Chapter 1, it seems that digital conversation 





And so it seems that although very similar in some ways, face-to-face and digital 
conversation are notably different.133  
 What I consider in this chapter is whether there is something particular about the 
modalities themselves that might help us to understand why the above intuitive point might 
hold (and I do this by focusing specifically on the differences between speaking and 
writing). The overall question being asked here is whether or not differences in digital and 
face-to-face interactions might have some explanation in what I will call the ‘surface-level’ 
differences between the modalities used. Section 1 is a broad discussion on the emergence 
of writing as a conversational mode. I suggest that these digital conversations can have 
many of the features of a paradigm type of conversation (such as discussed in Chapter 1). I 
also make the point that we should pay attention to this form of conversation because 
despite its relative youth as a widespread conversational mode, we have good reason to 
expect it is no passing phase – written digital conversation appears to be here to stay. 
Following this I briefly discuss some of the phenomena that we might associate with digital 
conversation before considering this again in relation to the intuition that these 
conversations are oftentimes somehow less satisfying. In Section 2 I look at what I call the 
surface level differences. There I contrast writing and speaking in terms of their acquisitional 
differences, the differences in their historical roles, and the differences in what I call the 
communicative bandwidth. I argue that it may well be the case that all of these differences 
play some part in explaining the current differences between face-to-face and digital 
conversation, though it is not inconceivable that some of these differences can be wholly or 
in-part reconciled. That digital conversation is so new in our communicative lives makes it 
conceivable that in time such differences may become less-pronounced, and so I argue they 
are not explanatorily sufficient alone to explain the intuitive idea that face-to-face and 
digital conversation are importantly different.  
1 Written digital conversation 
The internet and mobile phones have transformed the possibilities we have to communicate 
with each other. In the fourth quarter of 2019, the internet had 4.1 billion users,134 social 
 
133 Which is certainly not to say we can’t have good quality and deeply satisfying digital 







media platform Facebook had 1.6 billion active daily users,135 and as of June 2017 there 
were 5 billion unique mobile phone subscribers in the world.136 According to Internet Live 
Stats, in 1 second on average 8,855 tweets are sent, 1,657 Tumblr posts are made, and 2.8 
million emails are sent.137 One thing that is particularly interesting about this is the mode of 
language much of this new type of communication uses - writing. Although writing has been 
used for communication since at least the Bronze Age, literacy itself has only become 
widespread in the past hundred years.138 And up until recent technological developments, 
writing was, in comparison to speaking, not a common modality used for everyday social 
interaction.  
1.1 Paradigm digital conversations 
What I refer to by digital conversation relates to the types of exchanges that take place using 
online services and platforms in which people can exchange (usually quite short) written 
messages with each other. So for example SMS139 and its derivatives such as Twitter,140 
Weibo141 and WhatsApp,142 and other social media sites such as Facebook, Instagram, 
WeChat and QQ. Other examples could include message boards in which users post 
responses to each other, real-time chat rooms wherein users meet in a virtual ‘room’ and 
exchange messages quasi-synchronously and instant messenger services such as Facebook 
messenger. These types of digital conversations will mostly be conducted online, or be 







138 For example (Mira d’Ercole, van Zanden, Baten, Rijpma, & Timmer, 2014) estimate that in 1820 
less than 20% of the global population were literate, and most of those who were literate were 
concentrated in Western Europe. According to (Roser & Ortiz-Ospina, 2020), global literacy didn’t 
rise above 50% until 1950.  
139 ‘SMS’ stands for short messaging service and was the standardised service used by most mobile 
networks during the growth of text messaging, a single message is capped at 160 characters and 
originally this restriction was apparent to the writer of such messages. As technology developed, 
though, mobile networks have allowed concatenation of what are still individual packets of 160-
character messages and phone manufacturers have integrated internet-reliant messaging clients 
such as iMessage which allow for longer messages.  
140 A service in which users post character limited messages (called ‘Tweets’, originally 140 
characters, changed to 280 in 2017) either directly (though usually publicly) to another user, or to 
their ‘followers’. The 140-character limit originally was used to allow users to post Tweets using 
SMS.  
141 A similar service to Twitter popular in China due to a ban on Twitter. 
142 An encrypted messaging service similar to SMS text messaging but with no character limits and 





widespread use of written language as a mode of conversation is new, it has only been 
happening on anything we might call a significant scale since the mid to late 1990s. 
Arguably this timescale is even shorter and probably only truly emerges as significant in the 
mid-2000s with the arrival of Web 2.0. For many of us social media is an ubiquitous feature 
of life and so we are engaged in or observing digital conversations routinely as part of our 
communicative lives.  
It is certainly the case that we can have digital conversations. And these digital 
conversations appear to have some of the features of face-to-face conversations; there are 
usually two or more participants, a shared language and turns are taken. And just like in our 
paradigm type of conversation there is often a synocratic symmetry of influence in many 
such exchanges; I am free to self-express and self-determine, so is my interlocutor, and we 
can both contribute or control the direction of the conversation. In digital conversation we 
can enter the same kinds of joint-projects and perform many of the same types of speech 
act; I can make a request, which you can accept or decline. The topics of a digital 
conversation can be as varied and fleeting as in a paradigm case of face-to-face conversation 
and we can enter into them with close friends or with complete strangers. Indeed there are 
many features of such conversations that we might think make writing ideal as a 
conversational mode. We might expect that the ability to easily find interlocutors with 
similar interests would be conducive to good conversations. That very many of us are 
continuously connected allows that if we feel in need of searching out conversation we can. 
And there is a degree of greater freedom available - we can choose much more easily who 
and when to interact with, and the choice of interlocutors isn’t impeded by geographical 
location. And so there are some close similarities to our paradigm type of conversation, and 
some ways in which we might think digital conversation provides even better conditions for 
entering into such conversation.  
1.2 Conversation written down 
Speaking and writing have generally operated within very different spheres of social life. As 
recently as 1989, linguist MAK Halliday observed that “[w]ritten language, never was, and 
never has been, conversation written down.”143 Although Halliday’s point wasn’t that 
written language couldn’t be used for conversation,144 it is of course true for almost all of 
 
143 (1989, p.41).  






our linguistic history it has only rarely been used as such. Writing has many uses, but rarely 
has it been used for conversation. There are exceptions to this, we might think of notes 
being passed back and forth a classroom when the teacher’s back is turned, for example, or 
a series of letters in between correspondents, but generally it is true that writing has never 
been conversation written down. So it is interesting that in recent years we have adopted 
written language to perform a new role as a mode of conversation. This doesn’t seem to be a 
mere passing moment either. If we presume hyperconnectivity – the instant availability of 
interlocutors for communication anytime and anywhere145 - is here to stay, then we should 
expect written digital conversation is too. For although the use of text for digital 
conversation was most likely necessary when the technology was rudimentary, the 
bandwidth and technology available would very easily allow us to revert to other modalities 
should we so wish. As technologies have developed the environments in which we have 
digital conversations have become more multimedia by incorporating pictures, emoji, gifs 
and videos, yet we don’t appear to be abandoning the use of the written mode, so we might 
think that written digital conversation is here to stay.  
1.3 Digital conversational phenomena 
Emerging out of these developments have been a number of interesting phenomena many 
familiar with the online world may have observed. For example, the permanence of writing 
and the often-public nature of this new form of conversation has resulted in the 
involvement of unintended or unexpected audiences in discussions and we see frequent 
failures of communication (for example, without explicit signposting jokes, irony and 
sarcasm on the internet can often fail). And so there are interesting consequences for how 
we consider the boundary between what is said and what is implicated and how we hold 
people liable for what they have uttered.146 The emergence of this type of phenomena is 
amplified by how easy it is to remove an extract of text from one context and present it in a 
new context – a joke made to a friend might not translate well to a larger, disparate 
audience. We also see arbitrary limitations placed on utterances – so this could be actual 
word or character limits such as Twitter’s 280 characters, or even limitations set by an 
utterer aware that often their utterance will be placed in some environment where there is 
a stream of other comments vying for attention.  
 
145 (Quan-haase & Wellman, 2005) 





Another thing we might have noticed is the proliferation of dishonest behaviour (not 
that this is new, of course, but rather its scale and success are what is novel). So the spread 
of digital conversation has coincided with, for example, the rise of trolling and trolling 
behaviour (more on this in Chapter 5) and the spread of ‘fake news’.147 It is also now the 
case that non-human conversational participants such as so called ‘bots’ and AIs becoming 
part of our conversational lives. And our social spaces have become open to the spread of 
targeted attacks and advertising by governments and their agencies, corporate interests 
and activists. Mixed in with all of this we also see emergence of new types of speech act, for 
example retweeting,148 hashtags,149 and the topic of Chapter 5 - the act of trolling. So despite 
the similarities with face-to-face conversation at the level of an individual conversation, 
there are some larger-scale phenomenological differences that arise from it. In this chapter 
and the next my focus is on how individual digital conversations contrast with face-to-face 
conversations, and so I save the task of discussing these particular socio-linguistic 
phenomena for Chapter 5. Let’s now finish this section by returning to the intuition that 
there is something importantly distinct between spoken and digital conversation. 
1.4 Two types of conversation? 
Of most interest to me in this chapter and the following chapter is the difference in how 
face-to-face and digital conversation makes us feel – how we experience them. Intuitively it 
appears to me that face-to-face conversation is quite different to its written counterpart. As 
Goldberg (2020) observes, most people when asked to think of the most satisfying 
conversation they have had recently will probably recall a spoken conversation. This isn’t to 
say digital conversations can’t be satisfying and engrossing in much the way spoken 
conversations can often be, they certainly can, but rather it seems that they very often 
aren’t. This despite the fact that we can easily find communities and groups with similar 
interests, we have a much wider range of potential conversational partners and with 
hyperconnectivity we often have available to us a potential interlocutor at precisely the 
point when we might feel the desire to have a conversation with someone.  
 
147 For more on fake news see for example (Pepp, Michaelson, & Sterken, 2019a) for an explanation 
of how the particularities of digital communication give us good reason to consider the notion of 
‘fake news’ to be a genuinely new phenomenon. Also see Habgood-Coote (2019) for an argument as 
to why we should stop talking about it and Pepp, Michaelson, & Sterken’s response to Habgood-
Coote (2019b). 
148 The reposting of an utterance made by another. See (Marsili, forthcoming) 





2 Surface level differences  
In this section I consider three of the most obvious differences between spoken and written 
modes of language. These are differences in acquisition (§2.1), traditional communicative 
roles (§2.2) and, finally, the differing availability of different communicative channels 
(§2.3). What I conclude when looking at each of these differences is that considered alone 
they don’t give us much insight into any interesting differences there might be between 
face-to-face and digital conversations. In fact, I will argue, the first two of these differences 
need not be particularly consequential for there seems to be no particular reason why the 
consequences of these differences can’t be in some way reconciled. The difference in 
communicative channels is not quite as straightforward and indeed it is in small part 
contributory to the more significant differences discussed in Chapter 4. However, taken 
alone we also have reason to think that this difference too is theoretically (to some extent at 
least) reconcilable as digital conversation matures. 
2.1 Acquisitional differences 
We acquire spoken language through conversation. But learning to write is not itself 
learned in conversation it is learned much more painstakingly in a very different 
environment. When learning to write we learn to associate graphemes with sounds and 
then learn how to combine those graphemes with others to make words. We must then 
learn of the idiosyncrasies of these constructions and the formal rules. In learning to speak 
or sign, though, we ultimately learn how to have a conversation,150 learning a first spoken 
language is almost always done through immersion. Sure we have to learn how to mimic 
sounds, and how to construct words and sentences out of these sounds, but not in the same 
granular way in which we learn to write. And so perhaps the thought might be that there is 
something here that can help us explain why spoken and digital conversations differ, 
perhaps related to the fact that spoken language is acquired in conversation and written 
language isn’t. Indeed, spoken language is a direct product of conversation whereas written 
language isn’t. So we might think, perhaps, this might go some way to explaining the 
difference between spoken and digital conversation. A linguistic-evolutionary argument for 
this might be something like the following; spoken and signed language is acquired in 
 
150 Though on the way to this we might start simply by naming objects, expressing desires, or asking 





conversation to allow people to converse, and so we should expect that it has evolved to 
perform this role better than other modes.  
Another conjecture this might lead us to is related to competency and fluency 
discrepancies between the modes. Although, of course, levels of articulacy with spoken 
language varies from person to person, the method of acquisition means that almost 
everyone has been practicing spoken language for a number of years longer and, in a great 
number of cases, we might expect that proficiency with the spoken mode of language is 
higher than with the written mode. Most of homo sapiens were illiterate, yet most would 
have had proficiency with a spoken language.  And we might expect that it will only be a 
small percentage of highly educated people who are equally proficient at writing as they are 
at speaking. And so the acquisitional differences might also seem to have potential 
consequences for our proficiency. An argument arising from this might be that because we 
acquire the modes in such different ways, which we might expect results in greater 
proficiency in one mode over the other, then we might expect that conversation will be 
better in the mode with which most are more proficient. 
 We might think, then, these acquisitional differences and the subsequent potential 
proficiency discrepancies they cause, may form part of the reason why digital conversation 
is often experienced differently when compared to face-to-face conversation. It certainly 
could be the case that being as we acquire one mode through conversation (and to enable 
us to converse), then that is the mode we perform best in. And so when we converse using 
that particular mode, we are simply better at conversing than in the mode not acquired 
through and for the purposes of conversation. However, we should also consider that this 
could be merely contingent. It may be that these differences amount to nothing. That we 
learn spoken or signed languages first could simply be explained as being a physiological 
necessity with no bearing on the suitability of other modes for conversation. A 1 year old 
simply doesn’t have the fine motor skills required to hold a pen, but she might be able to 
gesture or mimic sounds. And so it could be argued that it is potentially incidental that we 
learn to speak or sign first. It may be the case that having learned to name objects, express 
desires, and request help one of the first types of linguistic activity we need to master is 
something like conversation. If this is the case, then perhaps we just need to do it in any way 
possible, and as writing simply isn’t possible in infancy, we simply use a mode we can use. 
And in terms of proficiency, although it seems difficult to imagine that the way we acquire 





between the modes might balance further over time. As digital conversation becomes more 
common, deeply established and understood better by the people using it,151 then any 
proficiency discrepancy could potentially decrease enough so as to render this point 
redundant.  
 This all said, it’s difficult to say with any great certainty whether acquisitional 
differences result in the fact that very often digital conversation doesn’t seem to be as 
immersive as face-to-face conversation. These differences may be contributory - it may be 
that because spoken and signed languages are developed in conversation in order to be able 
to have conversations, then they are somehow naturally more suited. But on the other hand, 
this may simply be explained as being contingent. We might simply acquire the different 
modes in the way that we do out of necessity, and this has no direct bearing on their 
suitability for conversation. So this alone certainly doesn’t seem to be explanatory enough 
to tell us why face-to-face conversation is so often more immersive. So let’s next consider 
another point of difference – the different historical roles of the modes – and consider 
whether this might help us to explain the difference. 
2.2 Traditional roles of written language and spoken language  
In broad terms, historically written language was probably most commonly found in formal 
institutions - be they governments, courts or churches. At least this is the way in which 
written examples of language have best survived. As such, literacy tended to be most 
prevalent in educated elites; be they rulers, clergy, lawmakers or scholars. And as 
mentioned earlier, literacy itself was historically very low until very recently.152 Writing was 
used to lay down the laws of gods and monarchs, or the fiction or treatises of scholarly 
people for the consumption by other similarly well-educated people. In the Europe of the 
 
151 In a 2016 survey, for example, the Pew Research Center found the following changes in 
percentages of adults using social media between 2005 and 2016 (2005 figure appears first). 7% - 
86% of 18-29-year olds, 7% - 80% of 30-49-year olds and 4% - 64% of 50-64 years olds use at least 
one social media site. Even accounting for the fact that some of these may not necessarily be text 
based services and so may be centred primarily on media such as photographs, and also that not all 
people will use the services frequently, this still seems to suggest over a period of 11 years highly 
significant growth. Now it may be that this is the peak of its growth, and social media is only one 
means of out of range conversation, but even if it does level out the point still stands that as this type 
of conversation becomes firmly established, we might expect people become more proficient.  
152 Although Claus Wilcke’s (2000) study of archaeological findings on the spread literacy levels with 
one of the earliest known cuneiform script in southern Mesopotamia suggests although kings, 
priests, conjurors, doctors and soothsayers wrote most frequently and claimed it as a special 
knowledge, literacy was possibly widespread throughout Mesopotamian society. Though this, of 





middle ages written language was even quite literally a different language, being as the 
convention was to write in Latin rather than in the local spoken tongue. Since the invention 
of the printing press the scope of writing’s role increased to include more books and 
newspapers, for example. But even though there was more writing, it still remained up until 
very recently the mode of language of authority, be it as laws, scriptures, books, exams, 
public notices, newspapers, treatises, tests, licences, advertisements, signs and, most 
authoritatively, philosophical treatises.153 It has been, in general, a formal and standardised 
mode of language not available to everyone and often it’s rules of construction are much 
more strictly monitored and policed. The theories of grammar from the late 1800s and early 
1900s that Saussure was reacting to were theories of written language that gave writing an 
exalted status. We might then wonder whether a mode with such a history is suitable for 
conversational purposes. None of these traditional functions or characteristics of formality, 
elitism and authority make it sound like the kind of medium one would choose as being 
ideal for a shared joint collaboration such as conversation. Spoken language, on the other 
hand, has a much more egalitarian background. 
Now although spoken language has also certainly played some of the roles above, 
and many laws and judgements written down for posterity will have been transcriptions of 
spoken language. However, one obvious traditional role for spoken language not shared by 
writing is of being the mode of the masses. It is the most common, most used, furthest 
spread and easiest to acquire. You don’t have to have been born at a particular point in 
history, to wealthy enough parents in a wealthy enough society to learn to speak. And 
unless spoken under oath or in some other formal capacity, most often spoken language is 
informal, and unless it is happens to be recorded, its evanescence means that a spoken 
utterance exists only for as long as it is being uttered.  
Clearly these roles are no longer quite so distinct, whereas writing retains its formal 
roles it also has expanded into being a mode of conversation. We might then wonder 
whether a mode that has had such a formal and institutional traditional role could be 
suitable for the much less formal activity of conversation. So the thought might perhaps be 
that written language has developed in the way it has to fulfil the roles required of it, and if 
it is now being employed to perform a very different role, perhaps it is less suitable as a 
mode for conversation in some way. So we might say that writing developed from spoken 
 
153 To reiterate, I am of course speaking very generally. There will have been examples of writing 





language to perform a different functional role (so for example, its persistence is useful for 
laws etc… as opposed to the evanescence of spoken language), though it is inadequate as a 
substitute for spoken language in conversation. As with the discussion of acquisitional 
differences above, this could plausibly be the case, but there’s certainly nothing that makes 
it essentially so. 
If these historical differences are simply functional, then we should keep in mind 
that functions can and do change. And in some sense the function has already changed – 
writing is being used conversationally. Written language still retains its job description of 
old as being the mode of formality, but it has added to it a modern function as a tool for 
conversation. This, in turn, has also lessened some of the previously strict formal rules 
governing writing. It is commonplace to use abbreviations and grammatically incomplete 
sentences in digital conversation, for example. So as the functional role of writing is 
expanding and because this expansion has only started happening very recently, then there 
seems no strong reason to expect that as the role of writing changes that any differences 
that might be a result of historical roles couldn’t also change.   
2.3 Communicative bandwidth 
One final point of difference we might consider, then, relates to the rich channels of 
communication available in a face-to-face conversation. Consider, for example, the prosodic 
and paralinguistic features, which operate above the level of individual phonemes in spoken 
language. Prosodic features of spoken language include intonation, rhythm, pausing and 
pitch. Generally, such prosodic features will operate over whole utterances, or sequences of 
words grouped into prosodic phrases within utterances and refine or be used to alter 
meaning. These features certainly seem to be important and very useful features of spoken 
language. Or at least, they are helpful tools of expression. Similarly, paralinguistic features 
can also have comparable repercussions for what is meant by an utterance. These are 
features such as tempo, volume and timbre or they could be gestures or facial expressions. 
These types of feature can give contextual clues about speakers such as their health or 
emotional state, and even provide sociolinguistic cues such as accent and pronunciation.154 
 
154 This has some positive and negative connotations. It could be advantageous in establishing a 
common ground - noting an interlocutor’s accent might help one to establish commonality of 
knowledge. Hearing that someone is from the same country, for example, might allow for 
presuppositions about cultural or political knowledge to be considered common ground. In some 
ways though, maybe written language has some egalitarian advantages over spoken language in this 
regard. So perhaps we might consider the role of accents and pronunciation play in implicit biases. 





Some of these prosodic and paralinguistic features have useful functional roles beyond 
meaning, but we might wonder what the loss of such a rich method of modifying meaning 
entails. So perhaps we might think that the loss of these meaning-modification features in 
digital conversation may go some way to explain some phenomenological issues frequently 
notable in online conversation, such as failure to detect irony or jokes, or incorrect 
ambiguity resolution.  This may again lead to questions similar to those raised previously 
about how well digital conversation can cope with being used conversationally when 
contrasted with spoken or signed language. 
 There are a number of examples we might consider that illustrate quite how 
powerful such features are, but swearing is a good case to consider. Note how many written 
words it takes Dostoevsky to describe what is effectively a dialogue between six people in 
his A Writer’s Diary (1873) in which only one word is spoken six different times in six 
different ways.  
One Sunday, quite late in the evening, I happened to be walking some fifteen paces 
away from a group of six drunken tradesmen; suddenly I realized that it was 
possible to express all thoughts, sensations, and even entire, profound propositions 
using only this one noun which, besides, has very few syllables. One of the lads first 
pronounces this noun sharply and forcefully to express his scornful dismissal of 
something they had been discussing earlier. Another replies by repeating this same 
noun, but now in quite a different tone and sense-specifically, in the sense that he 
thoroughly doubts the expediency of the first lad's denial. A third one becomes 
indignant at what the first has said; sharply and excitedly, he gets into the 
discussion, shouting out this same noun, but now in the sense of disparagement and 
abuse. The second fellow again interrupts, angry at the third, who's offended him, 
and stops him as if to say: "Why do you have to stick your oar in, chum? We've been 
having quite a discussion here; what d'you mean by getting on to our Filka!" And this 
whole notion he expressed by using this same forbidden word, this same 
 
background (private vs. state funded), and region of origin. All things being equal, one might expect 
such biases to be less likely to occur where pronunciation styles and accents are removed. Of course 
there may be a correlate issue if someone’s written proficiency, or their adherence to the strict rules 
governing writing at least, are not regarded to be “proper”, in such cases then those biases may still 
occur. Theoretically though, if a person privately educated and a person educated at a state funded 
school had similar writing abilities, then there would be no way, unless it is made explicit, to 
differentiate between their educational background. In Chapter 4 Section 3 we shall look at another 
way in which the removal of some of the communicative bandwidth could also create better 





monosyllabic name of a certain object, and raised his hand to take the third fellow by 
the shoulder. But then, suddenly, the fourth lad, the youngest of the group, who had 
kept silent to this point but who probably had found the solution to the original 
problem that had caused the dispute, raised his arm and shouted. . . . "Eureka!" you 
might think. "I've got it! I've got it!" No, it wasn't eureka, and he hadn't got it. He only 
went on repeating this same noun, not found in the dictionary; just one word, only a 
single word, but with delight, with a scream of rapture, and, it seems, a little too 
exuberantly, because the sixth, a morose fellow and the eldest of them, didn't like 
the sound of it and at once put a stop to the youngster's delight by turning to him 
and repeating in a gloomy, didactic bass . . . that same noun which isn't mentioned in 
the presence of ladies and which clearly and accurately signified: "What're you 
bawling about?" And so, without having said anything else at all, they repeated this 
same little word of theirs six times in succession and understood one another 
completely.” ([1876]1993, Ch. 13 ‘Little Pictures’)  
Presumably upon hearing the dialogue described above a listener might for themselves 
glean much of the shades of meaning described at length by Dostoevsky because they have 
access to the way in which this word has been said. And although Dostoevsky is a vivid 
writer who wants his reader to imagine the scene in the way that he saw it occur, it still 
seems to be the case that without access to the prosodic and paralinguistic features 
available in using the spoken word, using the written word to do justice to the shaded 
meanings this noun takes on in the discourse is a difficult task.155 As such, it seems to be the 
case that currently we have a rich set of communicative tools in face-to-face conversations 
that aren’t as obviously available in digital conversation. 
 Digital conversation is a recent development though; as such, we can’t expect that it 
would have ways of replicating prosody or paralinguistic features when these were not 
needed previously.156 So where prosody relates to conventions, the convention may simply 
 
155 Another example in this same spirit can be found in the TV series The Wire. In Season 1 Episode 4, 
detectives Bunk and McNulty carry out a three-and-a-half-minute crime scene investigation uttering 
only very differently expressed variations of the word ‘fuck’. 
156 Though there is some evidence of prosody in reading comprehension. For example, Janet Fodor 
proposes the Implicit Prosody Hypothesis: “In silent reading, a default prosodic contour is projected 
onto the stimulus, and it may influence syntactic ambiguity resolution. Other things being equal, the 
parser favors the syntactic analysis associated with the most natural (default) prosodic contour for 
the construction.” (Fodor, 2002); See also (Fodor, 1998; Kentner, 2012; Kentner & Vasishth, 2016), 
for examples. This does certainly seem to be the case. Pay attention to how you read, for example; 





not have been replicated in written language yet. Again though, that’s not to say it couldn’t 
be, and we can already see examples of this happening, some of which are not even 
particularly recent. Punctuation such as question marks and exclamation marks, for 
example, replace prosodic inflections from spoken language. If I want to really emphasise an 
expression to mirror how I would verbally emphasise it I can do so. More recently we see 
the increased use of emoticons and emoji157 that can be used to display some of the things 
previously expressed prosodically or paralinguistically which can make clear when a writer 
is joking, for example. It’s even now possible TO SHOUT in a sense should you so wish.  
Now there may be some features of spoken language that we might find it difficult to 
imagine can be translated to written language. For example, we might wonder how it could 
ever be possible to translate the musicality of a human voice into writing.158 So this surface-
level difference perhaps cuts a little deeper than the previous two. And recall in Chapter 2 
(§3.1.5) the discussion of interactive alignment. There it was suggested that interlocutors 
make use of different channels of communication in order to align communicatively, and 
some of these alignments will occur prosodically or paralinguistically. So there could well 
be some loss of what we might call communicative bandwidth. Though this itself need not 
be necessarily problematic. It is very possible to have a paradigm type of conversation on a 
telephone where some paralinguistic features are removed. So too there seems to be no 
problem for users of a sign language who don’t have the specific prosodic features noted 
above to call upon. 159 So again, although communicative bandwidth is going to form an 
important part of the overall picture of the difference between face-to-face and digital 
conversations, this surface-level feature alone doesn’t explain why it is that face-to-face 
conversation is so often much more immersive and enjoyable. 
3 Summary 
In this chapter we looked at a few possible ways we might explain the difference in 
phenomena we find when contrasting a face-to-face and digital conversation. As there is 
 
157 Emoticons use standard typographic characters to make vaguely facial-looking displays, there are 
many such examples; :) for a smiley face, :( for a sad face, to make it clearer one is joking a winking 
face such as ;) might be used,  if you ever need to digitally blow a raspberry at someone there is :P, 
and if a shrug is all you can muster at this, then ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ could be one way of expressing it. Emoji 
work in similar ways though are graphical in form and can be used to express such diverse ideas as 
‘having a haircut’ to ‘wearing a suit and levitating’ (genuinely!) to simply giving an a-ok gesture. (See 
https://emojipedia.org/ for other examples. 
158 Thanks to James Lewis for introducing me to thinking about musicality in conversation. 






one very notable obvious difference – they both use different modalities, it was suggested 
that it perhaps follows that it might be helpful to consider the difference between speaking 
and writing. We then looked at how this distinction between modes can be understood in 
terms of what I call surface-level differences; acquisitional differences, traditional function 
differences and the different communicative bandwidths available. These differences do all 
potentially help us to understand why face-to-face conversation is often more satisfying, 
though as I hope to convince you in the following chapter, there are some much deeper 
fundamental differences that tell us a lot more. And indeed considering the relative youth of 
digital conversation, we can foresee how such differences as outlined in this chapter might 
be overcome or negated in some ways. In Chapter 4, I discuss a difference that although 
related to these surface-level differences, is not one that will resolve in time. I will argue we 
can best understand the difference by considering that the most fundamental contrast 
between the modes as arising from the different ways in which we are required to 











Two Types of Conversation: Face-to-Face and Digital 
In the previous chapter it was argued that there may be a number of contributory surface-
level differences that explain why so often written digital conversation (from here 
shortened to digital conversation) is not as satisfying or engrossing as spoken conversations 
often are. However, it was also argued that each of these surface-level differences are 
theoretically surmountable. The direction of investigation in this chapter remains the same 
as it was in Chapter 3 – that is, I am occupied by wondering why it might be that face-to-face 
conversation seems to be better suited to entering something like, using Goffman’s term, an 
unio mystico with a conversational partner. In this chapter, however, we return to themes 
first discussed in Chapter 2 relating to the necessary tasks that participants in a face-to-face 
conversation must attend to in order to sustain a conversation. These differences, I argue 
here, are much more fundamental than the differences discussed in Chapter 3 and as such 
don’t seem to be as potentially reconcilable in the same way.  
The core of the argument here, then, is that when we compare how interlocutors in 
face-to-face and digital conversations coordinate at the process level, we see a distinct 
contrast in the tasks required of interlocutors. Importantly, these differences have 
interesting consequences. In face-to-face conversation, the requirements of the media entail 
that interlocutors must work concurrently to ensure the success of communication. In doing 
this, face-to-face interactants continuously share the communicative load between them. In 
digital conversation, however, participants are operating in isolation from each other both 
geographically and temporally. The result of this is that rather than a continuous sharing of 
the communicative load, the burden of process coordination is passed from one participant 





First, I argue that the difference in process coordination entails that despite the 
absence of rigid response speeds and the requirement of continuous attention in digital 
conversation, the burdens of process coordination make the tasks of comprehension and 
language production more difficult, generally, than they are in face-to-face conversation. 
Second, I argue that we might expect that the greater synchrony of face-to-face conversation 
when compared to digital conversation has the consequence of making it appear to 
interlocutors to be more harmonious. This argument recalls the discussions of interactive 
alignment in Chapter 2 (§3.1.5) and specifically experimental results showing greater levels 
of perceived harmony and friendliness are reported in synchronous activity. Third, I argue 
that what this all suggests is that the way in which we cooperate in face-to-face 
conversation is interestingly different than it is in digital conversation. The basis for this 
recalls the argument made in Chapter 2 that the intricate and continuous nature of the 
process tasks in conversation was indicative of a deep cooperation between conversational 
participants, and as it seems in digital conversation this is not required, then we have good 
reason to think the nature of the cooperation in the two types of conversation is different. 
So it is for these three reasons that face-to-face and digital conversation are different in 
nature and why we might think face-to-face conversation is more conducive to the type of 
interaction that is a being-shared-by-one such as described by Merleau-Ponty (see Ch.1 
§3.1).  I conclude the chapter on a different note by considering some of the benefits of 
these contrasting aspects of digital conversation. 
1 Coordination in digital conversation 
Using the Clark’s discussion of features of face-to-face conversation from Chapter 2 (§2.2) 
as a basis, in this section the features of face-to-face and digital conversations are 
contrasted. By doing this what becomes clear is that the restrictions placed on interlocutors 
due to the nature of the media used for face-to-face interaction - features such as the 
evanescence and recordlessness of speech - and the intricate rapid coordination at the 
process level this entails, doesn’t exist in digital conversation. In fact, coordinating at the 
process level is very different in digital conversation, and as we see in Section 2, the burden 
of this coordination rests almost completely with only one participant at any one time. In 
digital conversation, there is no requirement to attend in real time to an interlocutor as they 
are making an utterance, there is no requirement to predict how an in-turner160 will 
 
160 Recall from chapter 2, it was suggested that ‘in-turner’ be used to denote the conversational role 
usually termed ‘speaker’ and ‘out-turner’ be used to refer to the role traditionally defined as 





complete her utterance and there is no pressure to respond within a certain time (or even if 
there is, it is almost certainly longer than the one second window discussed in Ch.2 §3.1.1 
allows). So there is no requirement to do anything concurrently with our conversational 
partner in digital conversation, and as is discussed in Section 3, this has some interesting 
consequences. For now, though, let’s begin to look at the different features of the two modes 
by considering a simple structure of digital conversation in contrast to face-to-face 
conversation. 
1.1 A simple chronological structure of digital conversation 
Recall in Chapter 2 (§2.1), Table 1 was offered to represent the concurrence of the required 
tasks placed on in-turners and out-turners. 
  (1)  
     
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                           
In Table 3 we see a representation of the chronology of the required tasks in digital 
conversation (I divide turn 02 into sub-turns to show more clearly how the same tasks 
shown in Table 1 become spread out). 
  (2)  
 
that both of these roles are much richer than that of merely speaking or listening (or signing and 
seeing or writing and reading).    
01 02
Person
Making utterance Comprehending B's utterance
       Formulating response----------------------------------------->
Comprehending A's utterance Making utterance
       Formulating response------------------------------------ ---------->  















                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
As we can see from Table 3, once the in-turner completes a turn she no longer has any 
necessary tasks to perform (02-a & 02-b). Of course there may be some tasks such as 
checking for a response, but beyond that there are few requirements placed on the out-
turner. Now of course, this isn’t to say she can’t attend in some way to the conversation. At 
02, A could be considering what B might potentially utter in response, she might reread 
some other parts of the conversation, or she may be considering what she herself might 
want to say later. Importantly, though, there is no requirement to do so. The synchrony and 
symmetry of attention to the conversation is no longer necessarily present as it is in face-to-
face conversation. Whereas in face-to-face interaction at any one time during a conversation 
the participants must be fulfilling some specific coordinative role essential for the 
conversation to function, in digital conversation the necessary tasks are left to the in-turner 
to perform alone. And note too that the absence of synchrony also moves the 
comprehension of utterance from being part of the role of the out-turner to being part of 
the role of the in-turner – it is only once the previous in-turner has finished her turn that 
the new in-turner receives the most recent contribution to the conversation. So the in-
turner has all the work to do and the out-turner no longer has any responsibilities towards 
the maintenance of the conversation.161 To help us think about this further, let’s revisit 
again Clark’s groups of features of face-to-face conversation first discussed in Chapter 2 
(§2.2). 
 
161 Beyond, perhaps, checking for a reply, though in many instances this may be automated for them 
by way of, for example, notifications. Notifications work by sending a message to an interlocutor 
informing them a response has been made. 
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Reading B's utterance
Reading A's utterance     Making utterance
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1.2 Clark’s features of conversation 
I present these features with only short commentary on the immediacy and medium-
specific groups of features as it is here we see the greatest contrast between face-to-face 
and digital conversation. But it is the consequences of the difference in these features 
between face-to-face and digital conversation that are of most interest for the present 
chapter, and the discussion of this will be taken up in Section 2. I say more on the control 
features group as here the differences are less pronounced and indeed it is the parallels in 
this group that allow us to see the similarities between digital conversation and the type of 
paradigm type of face-to-face conversation discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.   
1.2.1 Immediacy features 
Recall the following features of face-to-face conversation taken from Clark (as discussed in 
Ch.2 §2.2); 
Copresence:   the participants share the same physical environment. 
Instantaneity: the participants perceive each other’s actions with no 
perceptible delay. 
Visibility:  the participants can see each other. 
Audibility:  the participants can hear each other.162 
It was argued in Chapter 2 that not all of these features need necessarily be present in a 
face-to-face conversation, though very often most will be, and it will always be the case that 
at least some of them are present. Yet in most cases of digital conversation, none of the 
immediacy group features apply. Naturally, in a digital conversation most interlocutors will 
be remote from each other and so it follows they won’t be copresent. As interlocutors in a 
digital conversation don’t share the same physical environment, this has limiting effects on 
the things they can use to communicate with each other; that is, they can’t use the 
environment and shared knowledge of the environment to aid communication.163 Note too, 
that the absence of instantaneity in digital conversation entails that interlocutors also can’t 
use the immediate reactions of an interlocutor to gauge communicative success or uptake of 
speech acts in real time in the way that is possible in face-to-face conversation. And as is 
 
162 (Clark, 1996, p.9) 
163 Thinking in terms of the common ground, then, we might say that the available common ground 





almost always the case, in digital conversation interlocutors usually won’t see or hear each 
other, and so, as discussed in Chapter 3 (§2.3), the communicative bandwidth is 
comparatively reduced with the absence of many of the gestural, prosodic and 
paralinguistic features available to face-to-face interactants. Without these features of the 
immediacy group, then, in a digital conversation between Eliza and Parry what is available 
to the interlocutors is a relatively impoverished set of communicative tools. So, for example, 
Eliza might only directly have access to Parry’s username, Parry’s avatar164 and Parry’s 
previous written utterances (and vice versa).165 We shall return to consider some of the 
consequences of the absence of such features later, but next let’s think again about the 
medium-specific features of digital conversation in contrast to face-to-face conversation. 
1.2.2 Medium-specific features 
Recall the features of this group when applied to face-to-face conversation; 
 Evanescence:  the medium fades quickly.  
 Recordlessness: there is (usually) no record of actions. 
Simultaneity: participants can produce and receive at once and 
simultaneously.166 
In almost all examples of face-to-face conversation this set of features will all be present; 
however all of the features of this group will be generally absent in digital conversation. 
Almost all written utterances persist and will be recorded (be it on data servers or on the 
devices of the interlocutors). Once a digital utterance is written and sent, it can be read and 
reread at any time and as many times as desired by the recipient(s).167 And although, 
theoretically, participants can produce and receive at once and simultaneously, the lack of 
instantaneity and the narrowing of communicative bandwidth noted in Chapter 3 (§2.3), 
also entails that there will be at least some delay in these responses being received. So in 
 
164 Usually a pictorial representation of a person online.  
165 Of course Eliza and Parry might be familiar acquaintances and have a rich common ground of 
shared knowledge they can draw upon too. 
166 (Clark, 1996, p.9) 
167 There are some exceptions, apps such as Snapchat found initial appeal in that messages sent on 
the platform could be made to ‘self-destruct’ 10 second after being sent, and the app includes 
features that made it difficult for the receiver to create duplicates of messages. Though Snapchat is 
primarily used to send photos and videos, it is also possible to send written messages. Other social 






some sense it appears that in digital conversation interlocutors are freed from the 
constraints imposed by the media used for face-to-face conversations. It is notable, 
however, that this freedom of response-speed constraints is also a freedom from having to 
necessarily commit continuously to a digital conversation. Due to the permanence and 
recordedness of written language, in a digital conversation there is no requirement to attend 
to an utterance just as it is being produced (and indeed this is generally not possible). A 
response could take hours and so often it will be the case that we are not required to 
dedicate attention to the task of the conversation in the way we are required to in face-to-
face conversation, or if we do, then it need only be merely intermittent attention.  
Recall the following passage from Clark (first presented in Ch. 2 §2.2) that typifies 
some of the necessary requirements of face-to-face conversation; 
If Roger is to succeed in telling Nina something, he must make sure she is trying to 
attend to his sounds at the very instant he is articulating them. Executing behaviours 
to be attended to and attending to those behaviors, then, are participatory acts: 
Roger cannot do his part without Nina doing hers, and vice versa.168 
An important feature of face-to-face conversations is that interlocutors are as (roughly, at 
least) committed to the conversation as each other, and at the same time as each other. 
Building on the description of a paradigm type of conversation as an interactive and 
synchronous activity suggested first in Chapter 1 (§2), in Chapter 2(§2.3) I argued that 
these features of face-to-face conversation give us reason to see that the continuous 
interactivity we find in face-to-face conversation is not merely a result of each turn 
following another. Rather, the interactivity of face-to-face conversation is continuous due to 
the medium-specific features of evanescence and recordlessness, and so interlocutors must 
enter into an interactive synchrony, with each conversational participant performing the 
necessary tasks required to fulfil their respective roles. It is required for the continuation 
and success (in terms of communication, if not interpersonal harmony) of face-to-face 
conversation that Roger and Nina are both fulfilling their roles concurrently. Yet the 
absence of these medium-specific features from digital conversation make it so that the 
interactivity of digital conversation is different in character. It is interactive in that one turn 
follows another, but there are no requirements of synchrony or continued attention. And so 
what we might think this entails is that the nature of the necessary commitments to the 
 





conversation interlocutors must make in digital conversation is different. This need not 
always the case of course. Although strict synchrony might not be possible, participants in a 
digital conversation could theoretically remain equally focused on a digital conversation as 
face-to-face interlocutors. They might wait patiently for a reply, attempt to predict what an 
interlocutor might say, read a response as it is received and then immediately and rapidly 
respond. The important difference, however, is that there is no requirement to do so in a 
digital conversation whereas in face-to-face conversation such coordination and 
commitment is essential. 
The upshot of this is that the nature of process coordination in digital conversation 
is quite different to that which we find in cases of face-to-face conversation. There is no 
need for an out-turner to attend to an in-turner as the in-turner makes her utterance, and 
there is no pressure or requirement to respond immediately. This isn’t to say there is no 
coordination of processes in digital conversation, there is, but as we shall see in Section 2.3, 
the burden of this coordination need rest only with one of the participants at any one time 
and we might suppose this has interesting consequences for the type of activity digital 
conversation is. Next, though, let’s recall Clark’s final group of features – the control 
features.  
1.2.3 Control features 
Recall this group relates to the control participants have in a face-to-face conversation. 
Extemporaneity: The participants formulate and execute their actions 
extemporaneously, in real time. 
Self-determination:  The participants determine for themselves what actions to 
take and when. 
Self-expression:  The participants take actions as themselves.169 
Unlike the features of the previous two groups, the set of control features is quite similar in 
both face-to-face and digital conversations.170 Before looking at each feature in turn, it is 
worth noting first that each of these control features are perhaps best considered not as 
binary notions, but as spectral notions. So in the case of a feature such as copresence (from 
 
169 (Clark, 1996, p.10) 
170 We should expect this to be the case too, recalling the discussion of Chapter 2 §4.2.2 the types of 





the immediacy features group), for example, we could state some simple principle that 
allows us to give a binary answer to a question of whether interlocutors are copresent or 
not. Naturally, there will be a few examples where interlocutors are at the borderline of 
copresence, but generally speaking it seems right to say that most interlocutors in a face-to-
face conversation will be copresent and in digital conversation this most often won’t be the 
case. However, in the control category of features the differences are perhaps better 
considered a matter of degree and with the exception of extemporaneousness (although 
both types of conversation still have this to some degree), the specifics of which type of 
conversation has more or less of the features will be relative to the specific conversations 
being contrasted (as opposed to the more general type of conversation being contrasted).  
Let us for now consider extemporaneousness to be a matter of degree. This being 
the case, in many cases of digital conversation there will be some degree of 
extemporaneousness; for example, we might respond to our interlocutor’s utterances as 
soon as we receive them, and we will use our interlocutor’s utterances as a guide for our 
response to them. And even if we don’t respond instantly, this wouldn’t preclude the 
response itself being any less extemporaneous. Though in another sense we might argue 
that digital conversation is less extemporaneous than its face-to-face correlate. The 
permanence and recordedness of written utterances and the leniency of expected response 
times give a writer much greater scope to plan how she might respond to an interlocutor’s 
utterance. As will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.3, when composing a contribution 
an in-turner might write, reread, rewrite and edit an utterance before she eventually sends 
it to an out-turner. Recall that face-to-face time-constraints and coordination requires that 
utterances are produced almost as soon as they are initially planned (see again Levinson’s 
preconditions, Chapter 2, or present chapter §1.4).171 As such, we might think that face-to-
face conversation is often more extemporaneous than its written counterpart, however this 
need not necessarily be the case, and many digital conversations will involve at least some 
degree of extemporaneousness.172  
 
171 Though of course it should be noted too that in a trivial sense all utterances are at least to some 
degree planned. Even in face-to-face conversation as described in Chapter 2 there are planning 
stages in preparation for a turn. Think again about the Precondition to the Cooperative Principle 
(PCP) discussed in Ch.2. It could be argued that fulfilling such a precondition is a form of planning. 
Hence why it is best to consider extemporaneousness to be a matter of degree. 
172 It is worth noting that it is possible to contribute something we might consider to be a planned 
utterance to a face-to-face conversation. Think of the conversational participant offering up a well-





 The differences in the role of self-determination and self-expression in the two types 
of conversation is murkier still. In terms of self-determination, the absence of the one 
second window in digital conversation and the various pressures of response it entails 
allows that participants in a digital conversation are able to consider more carefully what 
they want to do and when they want to do it. In digital conversation an in-turner is often 
afforded the opportunity to draft, redraft and edit her contribution to a conversation. As 
such, we might therefore think that writers are given opportunity to consider more 
carefully what they wish to do or say. So perhaps it is the case that, in some senses at least, 
digital conversation offers an even greater degree of self-determination. Though in another 
sense we might think there are limitations placed on this by the particularities of the social 
media platform being used. So for example, this might be in the form of character limits, 
such as found on Twitter,173 which place restrictions on the length of an utterance. There 
might also be limitations placed on the content of an utterance. For example, most social 
media platforms have community standards guidelines and to be in breach of them can 
result in a post being deleted or even an account being suspended or deleted. There might 
also be technology-imposed restrictions, for example not having access to a mobile signal, 
the internet or an electronic device. So it won’t always be the case that participants in a 
digital conversation are able to self-determine their actions. What I think this suggests, 
then, is that although there are some granular differences, there is no striking difference 
between the two types of conversation in terms of self-determination. This is similarly the 
case for the final feature in this group – self-expression. 
There are some examples where we might consider there is a greater degree of self-
expression in digital conversation; perhaps we might consider anonymous media wherein 
there may be few social penalties for saying things one might not say in a face-to-face 
conversation.174 It could be that in such a situation a conversational participant might 
believe herself to be afforded greater freedom to take actions as herself. Even if a user is not 
completely anonymous in the sense of using a pseudonym that is difficult to link to the 
contributor’s life beyond the electronic media they are engaging with, there can still also be 
 
173 There are, of course ways around such limits, one could make clear a tweet is part of a series, for 
example by including ‘(1/6)’ or similar to indicate it will be in six parts.  
174 Indeed, this may not even need to be anonymous, although anonymity (or relative anonymity at 
least) may be a disinhibiting factor, there are potentially other factors such as described by John 
Suler (2004) who suggests the existence of an ‘Online Disinhibition Effect’ created out of a mix of 
anonymity, invisibility, the minimisation of authority, “solipsistic introjection”, “dissociative 





a relative level of anonymity in some sense.175 For example, a user might use her own name 
and picture as an avatar, but be a member of an online community with no connections to 
her life beyond the website. Though self-expression might be restricted by other features of 
the media being used. The recordedness and permanence of written language might have a 
stifling effect on the types of actions conversational participants might take. It may make 
some conversational participants more cautious in what they utter. And that a digital 
conversation will very often be more public than a face-face conversation (and so may have 
greater the potential for unintended audiences to see an utterance) could also impose 
similar restrictions. Though again, as with self-determination, these are speculative 
differences, and ultimately none are convincing enough that we should think there is a 
profound difference in relation to self-expression between the two types of conversation.  
Clearly, then, there are some differences between the two types of conversation 
relating to the control group. However, unlike in the case of the immediacy or media-
specific groups, the differences aren’t ones of absence of a feature (such as copresence’s 
absence in digital conversation) or that one has a feature contradictory to the other (such as 
evanescence in face-to-face vs. permanence in digital conversation), the differences are 
linear. That is to say, the control features are present in both types of conversation, though 
how they are instantiated may differ in certain of the specifics between the modalities. 
These, then, don’t seem to be essential differences in the way many of the previously 
discussed features were. And indeed, we should expect that how these features apply in any 
particular conversation, be it face-to-face or written, might vary in comparison to another 
particular conversation. For example, context might place impositions on the amount of 
self-determination participants have in a particular conversation. We might think of a case 
in which disgruntled colleagues are in an office discussing their workload within earshot of 
a tyrannical boss, those conversational partners might not have the same level of self-
determination as similarly frustrated co-workers meeting after work away from the office.  
And as discussed in Chapter 2 Section4.3, power dynamics will vary from one conversation 
to the next, and so too we would expect the levels of self-determination and self-expression 
will fluctuate accordingly.  
What I think the comparison of control features highlights, then, is that despite its 
differences digital conversation does share important similarities with face-to-face 
 
175 See Goldberg (2013) for discussion on how assertions made anonymously affects the 





conversation. Excepting some finer-grained contrasts, the features of the control group will 
often apply similarly in cases of digital conversation and face-to-face conversation. For 
current purposes this is a good thing, for it is the similarities in this group that allow us to 
say that both face-to-face conversation and digital conversation play similar communicative 
and social roles – both of these types of interaction seem to be conversation in the 
restricted sense I use in Chapter 1. In paradigm cases of either we might expect that the 
participants of the conversation have some degree of control on the direction of the 
conversation and it is this synocratic structure that differentiates these types of interaction 
from the more autocratic types of linguistic activity such as the academic lectures, job 
interviews, and novels discussed in Chapter 1. For the purposes of this chapter, then, we 
need not say much more about the control features, for the overall aim here is to 
characterise the significant differences between the two types of conversation.  
1.3 Summary of contrast between Clark’s features in face-to-face and digital conversation 
It was argued in Chapter 2 that the requirements placed on participants in a face-to-face 
conversation are a direct result of a combination of some of the features of face-to-face 
conversation Clark highlights. And so from the discussion above, it seems there are some 
important differences between face-to-face and digital conversation emerging out of these 
differences. Interlocutors in a digital conversation are not copresent and perceiving each 
other’s actions with no perceptible delay. Digital conversational partners most often won’t 
be able to see or hear each other, with the implications for the communicative bandwidth 
that entails (see Chapter 3 Section 2.3). As digital conversational utterances are generally 
persistent and recorded, then it is also the case that there are no requirements placed on 
out-turners to attend to the utterance of the in-turner just at the moment she is making it.  
As was also argued in Chapter 2, the requirement to attend to each other 
concurrently in a face-to-face conversation entails that conversational partners must 
engage in an intricate set of process coordination tasks. This intricate series of tasks are 
also most often carried out under the time-constraints looked at in Chapter 2 (§3). Most 
pertinently, participants in a face-to-face conversation are constrained by the requirement 
to answer within a time limit lest the meaning of their response be adjusted by an 
unconventional delay (sometimes conceived as ‘the one second window’). Added to this, 
average response speeds in face-to-face conversation are estimated to be approximately 
200 ms (Ch. 2 §3.1.1). So when we consider too the latency we find with language 





conversation some of the primary tasks out-turners must engage with relate to prediction. 
So, as discussed in Chapter 2 (§3.1.4, §3.1.6) they must predict speech act type, remaining 
content and turn duration.  
One major consequence that emerges from the different features of face-to-face and 
digital conversation is that in digital conversation correlative time constraints no longer 
necessarily apply. As such, there is also no requirement to predict what an interlocutor will 
utter. Now recall in Chapter 2 (§3.1.6), there it was argued that prediction, and the 
requirement to predict, are indicative of the continued perspective sharing required for 
face-to-face conversation to proceed. We might expect, therefore, that this difference has 
consequences for the type of perspective sharing we find in digital conversation. For if the 
time constraints in digital conversation are not as rigid, so too the requirement for 
prediction is diminished. One consequence of this diminishment of the role of prediction, 
we might expect, is that the nature of perspective sharing in digital conversation is different. 
So it appears the nature of digital conversation both at the process level and in how 
interlocutors share perspectives, is notably different to that of face-to-face conversation. 
Many of the necessary process tasks discussed in Chapter 2 (§3) are simply not required in 
digital conversation. And we can see how this differs if we consider again the preconditions 
Stephen Levinson suggests hold for each turn of a face-to-face conversation.  
1.4 Levinson’s preconditions  
Recall Chapter 2 (§3.2), there I presented Levinson’s suggestion for the preconditions that 
exist in a conversation between A and B to enable out-turner B to respond to in-turner A 
within the average 200 ms timescale: 
 (3) 
(i) B must attempt to predict the speech act (detect whether A's utterance is 
a question, offer, request, etc.) as early as possible, because this is what B will 
respond to;  
(ii) B should at once begin to formulate a response, going through all the 
stages of conceptualization, word retrieval, syntactic construction, 
phonological encoding, articulation;  
(iii) meanwhile, B should use the unfolding syntax and semantics of A's turn 





(iv) as soon as those cues are detected B should launch the response. 176 
Notable from this, then, is that very little of what we might think must hold for face-to-face 
conversation to function need hold for digital conversation. And even where it does exist, it 
is distinct in nature due to the different response-speed time constraints. 
 Consider (3i), in almost all digital conversations an utterance will be received by an 
out-turner in its completed form.177 Assuming it is written clearly enough, then there should 
be no need to predict the speech act in the way that Levinson intends here, it should be 
derivable from the complete utterance. Though it is worth noting here a point of ambiguity 
with the expression ‘predict’, for it can be taken to be synonymous with a few notions, in 
particular it is synonymous with ‘forecast’ but also with ‘calculate’. This is worth 
mentioning as it will often be the case that a speech act will not accord precisely to what is 
said178 by an utterance. Consider cases of indirect speech acts such as the following famous 
example from Searle (1975); 
  (4) Can you reach the salt? 
What is said by (4) is an interrogative, however, in most contexts we would interpret (4) as 
a request (to pass the salt). Perhaps then, there may be a question about what it is that 
occurs when (4) is taken to be a request and not an interrogative – specifically we might 
wonder if it is a form of prediction. If we take ‘predict’ to be synonymous with ‘calculate’ 
then this is perhaps a case that could be made. It seems right to say that we can calculate 
from (4) that despite its form it is meant not as a question but rather as a request, and in 
this sense we might say it is a ‘prediction’. However, it seems clear to me that Levinson is 
using ‘predict’ as being synonymous with something like ‘forecast’. That is, ‘prediction’ used 
here is meant in the sense of being an estimate of some future occurrence. As such, even 
though in both face-to-face and digital conversation interlocutors might be required to 
calculate a speech act (or an implicature) based on what has been said, it is only in face-to-
face conversation that participants will also often be required to forecast a speech act based 
on what will be said. And I argue next that this seems to be an important difference.  
 
176 (Levinson, 2016, p. 7) 
177 Of course, an in-turner might break her utterance up into smaller chunks, perhaps ending one 
chunk with an ellipsis. Though in such cases there is still no particular requirement that an out-
turner predict what might come next (though naturally they could do this). 
178 ‘What is said’ here is used in the Gricean sense as being something like the conventional meaning 





We might argue that deriving indirect speech acts or implicatures in both types of 
conversation is a similarly perspective-sharing practice – that is, we might think that in 
order to infer what is meant by some utterance beyond what is said by it we might need to 
consider, to some degree, the perspective of an interlocutor. And this may well be the 
case.179 However, when we consider that in face-to-face conversation an out-turner is often 
required to perform this task during the in-turner’s production of an utterance, the 
perspective sharing becomes concurrent – an in-turner must attempt to share the 
perspective of her interlocutor, just at the moment the in-turner has this perspective. I take 
this to be significant, but as it stands there is a worry that this might seem arbitrary – we 
might not think a temporal gap has any bearing on the nature of perspective sharing. When 
we look at the burdens of process coordination in Section 2.3 I hope to persuade you that 
this is significant, particularly when considered in relation to trying to understand the 
difference in the way we experience the two types of conversation. But now let’s return to 
Levinson’s preconditions. 
 We should expect that (3ii) does still hold to some degree, though it will be different 
in nature. The absence of conventional time-constraints allows that there is no pressure to 
begin ‘at once’ the processes of response formulation. A recipient of a written utterance is 
afforded time to read and reread it, and typically it is only when she chooses to respond that 
she would need to begin the tasks associated with (3ii). And again, as we see when looking 
at the burdens of language production in Section 2.3.3, these tasks will differ in nature due 
to the relatively solitary nature of production found in digital conversation. Let’s now 
consider briefly the final two preconditions. 
It will most often be the case that the prediction tasks of (3iii) are simply not 
applicable to digital conversation. Generally, a turn ends when an interlocutor sends her 
utterance to the other participant(s), and so it is unlikely participants need to predict turn-
endings to ensure they can launch their own response at an appropriate time. And finally, as 
there is generally no necessary pressure to respond in a timely manner, (3iv) need not take 
the form suggested by Levinson. 
The purpose of considering these preconditions again is to draw the contrast further 
as to the different types of process task we might expect are required of a digital 
conversation when compared to a face-to-face conversation. Now we may find examples of 
 
179 Though I think when we consider the burdens of comprehension in §2.3 this gives us reason to 





digital conversation where these preconditions might hold in a form closer to Levinson’s, 
but recall from Chapter 2 (§§3.2-3.3) these preconditions we should expect to hold for most, 
if not all, face-to-face conversations and such examples in digital conversation are outliers. 
Remember, too, that based on an average turn duration of 2000 ms and an average turn 
interval of 200 ms, then if something like Levinson’s preconditions are required for a 
response in face-to-face conversation, they will often be carried out within 2200 ms. Clearly, 
in digital conversation, it will be rare that responses will begin so rapidly.   
We might think the upshot of these differences is that it frees up cognitive space for 
participants in a digital conversation to attend more closely to what an interlocutor is trying 
to communicate. The idea being something like; more time to consider an interlocutor’s 
utterance provides greater opportunity for understanding it. If participants in a digital 
conversation don’t have to carry out concurrent comprehension and production tasks, it 
would perhaps follow that they can devote more energy and time to these tasks 
individually. And as participants in digital conversation aren’t constrained by the one 
second window, we might also think that they are able to better formulate responses. The 
thought being that because we have more time available to consider a written response, this 
might, in turn, give us opportunity to better construct our utterances. I will argue in Section 
2.3, however, that this needn’t necessarily be the case. Because even if it were true that 
digital conversation does indeed afford us more opportunity to better comprehend the 
utterance of an interlocutor and to formulate our responses, it is also true that this is done 
at a greater remove from an interlocutor and this too has its own consequences. The lack of 
synchrony between interlocutors in digital conversation, their lack of copresence, and the 
absence of rigid response speeds results in participants in a digital conversation doing 
much of this work alone as opposed to synchronously. And this might lead us to wonder 
what this means for the type of cooperation we find in digital conversation when compared 
to the type we find in face-to-face conversation (as discussed in Ch.2 §4). 
2  Coordination and cooperation 
We arrive now at one of my central claims; that what makes face-to-face and digital 
conversation interestingly different is the contrast we find between the required process 
tasks in these two types of conversation. It was argued in Chapter 2 (§4), that the type of 
coordination we find in face-to-face conversation is indicative of the type of cooperation 
required to sustain it. That is, due to the features and time constraints of face-to-face 





conversation and must work continuously to achieve this goal. The result being a deep and 
continued cooperation between interlocutors. It was also argued in Chapter 2 (§4.7), that 
we might expect that the close link between coordination at the process level and 
coordination at the content level therefore means that this process cooperation creates 
conditions in which interlocutors might be more likely to cooperate at the level of content.  
What I argue here, then, is that the different nature of process coordination in digital 
conversation is such that the level of required cooperation is also different. The basis of this 
argument is that it appears that process coordination in digital conversation is necessarily 
more solitary in nature than it is in face-to-face conversation. This is not significant simply 
because interlocutors are geographically and temporally isolated from each other which we 
might reasonably expect will result in them feeling somehow more remote from each other. 
What I take to be most interesting about this separation, however, is the consequences it 
has on the tasks of comprehension and production; it entails that the burden of process 
coordination will rest most heavily at any one time with just one conversational participant. 
And what this means is that the type of cooperation is different – interlocutors in a digital 
conversation will still often be cooperating, however this cooperation need not be 
continuous but rather merely fleeting. So it is when we consider these differences in 
required cooperation between face-to-face and digital conversation that we start to see the 
fundamental difference between these two types of conversation. If, as I intuitively take to 
be the case, we generally think of cooperation with another person as being a harmonious 
experience, then we might expect feelings of harmony generally increase relative to an 
increased sense of cooperation.180 When we add to this the experimental findings (first 
discussed in Chapter 2, §3.1.5) that alignment and synchrony with another person also 
increases perceptions of harmony and friendliness in an interaction, we understand why it 
is we so often seem to enter more freely into an unio mystico with an interlocutor in face-to-
face conversation than we do in digital conversation. And unlike the surface-level 
 
180 As an empirical means of testing the hypothesis that the specific requirements of process 
coordination in face-to-face conversation make it appear more cooperative it might be interesting to 
contrast cases of disputation. For on the above account it would be expected that the deeper level of 
cooperation we find in face-to-face conversation should make it more likely that disputation would 
be less likely to escalate than in that case of digital conversation. I have no specific data on this, 
though many observers of internet discourse have wondered about the apparent polarising effects it 
has. I make no claim that this supports my thesis, but rather note it as a potentially interesting line of 





differences discussed in Chapter 3, (§2), there seems like no obvious way in which this 
particular difference might be reconciled. 
2.1 Similar but different: perspective sharing and prediction 
What I want to stress here is that although face-to-face and digital conversations have many 
similarities and some obvious differences, it is the consequences of the differences that hint 
towards the real distinction between the two types of conversation. What I want to suggest 
is that when we contrast face-to-face and digital interactions we have two types of 
conversation and each has its own set of process tasks required to sustain them. Relevant to 
a paradigm case of face-to-face conversation are the concurrent, predictive tasks such as 
those suggested in Chapter 2 Section 3, and relevant to a digital conversation are the more 
solitary tasks of comprehension and formulation of replies (more of which in §2.3). 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (§1.1) and here in Section 1.2.3, face-to-face and digital 
conversations are, in many respects, similar – they can involve the same number of 
participants, address the same topics and progress in similar synocratic ways wherein each 
contributor is afforded a symmetrical influence on the direction of the conversation. And as 
discussed in section 1.2.3, the difference in control features between the two conversations 
is only really by a matter of degree. However, that digital conversation isn’t synchronous, 
and that the predictive requirements are different between face-to-face and digital 
conversation has some important consequences. Recall that it was argued in Chapter 2, 
(§3.1.6), that there is an aspect to paradigm cases of face-to-face conversation in which both 
the out-turner and in-turner must all be arriving at the same (or similar) thoughts at the 
same time. And that this can be best considered to be a form of perspective alignment. What 
is clear, however, is that in a digital conversation between A and B, A doesn’t need to predict 
what B might say, and this is indicative that the type of perspective sharing it involves is 
quite different to the perspective sharing we find in face-to-face conversation.  
Recall now the discussion of what we might call the dynamic facts of face-to-face 
conversation which were derived from Grice’s cooperative principle first discussed in 
Chapter 2 (§4). These dynamic facts were presented as an illustration of the types of 





able to adhere to something like the cooperative principle.181 The information composing 
these facts can be derived from the cooperative principle as follows;  
(5) 
d) what is required of a contribution;  
e) what stage the conversation is at;  
f) what the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange is. 
What I suggested when initially discussing (5) is that in producing an utterance an in-turner 
alters these facts about a conversation. And in order to meet the cooperative principle when 
her turn begins, an in-turner will be required to track the changes to these subtly different 
facts. Though the speed of face-to-face conversation also entails that an out-turner can’t 
merely keep track of these facts, she must also predict what they might be when her turn 
begins. What I hypothesise then is that perspective alignment plays an important role in 
being able to do this. So we might expect that to effectively keep track of facts such as those 
in (5), requires the prediction of the speech act type, of how an utterance will proceed, and 
of how it might end.182 And so in a face-to-face conversation, doing this most effectively 
relies on an out-turner attempting to at least momentarily take an in-turners current 
perspective. That a face-to-face conversation requires rapid turn-taking and the continuous 
attention of interlocutors to the task of sustaining the conversation places upon them 
demands that aren’t paralleled in digital conversation. In digital conversation there is no 
conventionalised required response speed, there is no necessity to attend to an utterance as 
it is being uttered,183 and there is no requirement to predict an interlocutor’s speech act or 
the remainder of her utterance just as she is making it.  
2.2 An arbitrariness worry 
We still haven’t reached the point of being able to say that the difference in response speeds 
in the two types of conversation and the effects these differences have on the process tasks 
required of participants are necessarily substantial. The overall claim in this chapter is that 
due to the difference in process coordination between face-to-face and digital conversation 
there is a difference in the type of cooperation required of these two types of conversation. 
Perhaps, though, we might still worry it is arbitrary to say that because digital conversation 
 
181 Again, it is worth noting that these types of facts are constituents of the common ground.   
182 Recalling Levinson’s preconditions Section1.4. 
183 Which if we take the typing of the message to be the making of the utterance, would be 





is more temporally spread that this makes it fundamentally different to face-to-face 
conversation. We might also wish to argue that because, for example, the necessary tasks 
required for the continuation of a digital conversation rest only with one participant at any 
one time, that this doesn’t give us sufficient reason to think it is of a fundamentally different 
nature to face-to-face conversation. Let’s consider an example to illustrate this worry. 
Correspondence chess is a game of chess in which players remotely send moves to 
each other (perhaps stretching a single game out over years). Yet despite the obvious 
temporal difference and the lack of copresence, there doesn’t seem much reason to suppose 
that correspondence chess is somehow interestingly and fundamentally different to a game 
of over-the-board chess. That correspondence chess will be more temporally spread, and 
that it doesn’t require its players to be concurrently attending to a particular game doesn’t 
seem to alter the nature of the game in any interesting way. It may be that there are some 
advantages in correspondence chess, such as granting players longer to plan their moves, 
which may be strategically beneficial.184 On the other hand, it may be that not being 
copresent with an opponent has other consequences too. For example, having an opponent 
present as moves are being considered might add extra pressure, and even if opponents are 
silent there are numerous ways they might be communicating with each other.185 None of 
these differences appear to be substantial though, it would certainly seem to be a stretch to 
claim that beyond the most obvious differences between the two types of chess that there is 
a genuine distinction. And so if we were to say that it is cooperative to play a game of chess 
in the sense that both players commit to a goal of playing the other at chess and both fulfil 
their necessary roles, then it might seem arbitrary to say that over-the-board chess is 
somehow more cooperative than correspondence chess. Applied to the topic of this chapter, 
then, the argument might be that the structural differences we find between 
correspondence and over-the-board chess are similar to those we find in written and face-
to-face conversation, and as such are equally inconsequential.  
 
184 A player may even use other means to aid them that wouldn’t ordinarily be permitted over-the-
board, such as using computer software, or consulting a friend - though this is rather more a 
conventional difference rather than a necessary one. It would be equally possible to use such means 
over-the-board, though one’s opponent might not be too pleased. 
185 And, indeed, there may be more instances of prediction of an opponent’s move in an over-the-
board game, as white awaits black’s moves she might be trying to anticipate what will happen so as 
to speed up her own turn, especially in a timed match. Though this is not a necessary requirement 





One possible disanalogy here, however, is that unlike in a game of chess, 
conversational partners are not in competition – that is, despite their subsidiary aims and 
goals within a conversation (which may well be competitive in some senses), a primary aim 
will be to successfully communicate with each other. This being the case, it is in 
conversational participants’ own interests (so long as they wish to sustain the 
conversation) that they help each other to complete the tasks required for conversation to 
proceed as smoothly as possible. Now of course in chess it is essential that each player 
makes a move if the game is to continue, and this possibly correlates to the required process 
tasks of face-to-face conversation. Beyond this, however, chess is fundamentally 
adversarial, and players work alone to decide the best moves for them personally.186 
Therefore, it is of little interest to the players that they help each other with a turn.187  
On the other hand, even in an adversarial conversation (face-to-face or written) - for 
example, think of two people trying and failing to convince each other on some matter of 
politics - it is still in the interests of both parties that they understand what each other is 
saying in order to respond to it.188 And to do this requires that they help each other with the 
necessary tasks of the conversation. Therefore, the required coordination at the level of the 
process tasks remain unchanged in a confrontational conversation from that which is 
required in a case of harmonious talk.189 In chess, either correspondence or over-the-table, 
the nature of a move is that a player deliberates alone to make a move which is beneficial to 
her, and so whether this spreads out temporally and geographically doesn’t alter the nature 
of what is required. Although moves are often reactive to those of an opponent, a ‘turn’ in 
chess is generally a solitary activity whether it is an over-the-board or a correspondence 
game. However, as we shall see next, when conversation becomes spread temporally and 
geographically, the burden of process coordination changes in important ways. For in face-
to-face conversation interlocutors (even in adversarial conversation) will spread this 
 
186 Though perhaps we might think there is an element of perspective taking if one were to try to 
anticipate an opponent’s moves.  
187 An exception to this might perhaps be if a chess tutor were playing a tutee. 
188 Although we might all be familiar with such exchanges where interlocutors clearly aren’t 
listening to each other, or even if they are, they don’t really respond to what each other is saying. 
Thinking again about paradigm cases of conversation discussed in Chapter 1, we might think such 
exchanges are at some remove from the paradigm case. The nature of such discussions becomes 
closer to monologues.  
189 Though contra this, it has been observed that arguments do, to some extent, disrupt interpersonal 





burden between them, whereas in digital conversation the burden falls almost entirely on 
the in-turner. 
2.3 The burdens of process coordination 
As suggested at the end of Section 1.4, we might wonder whether due to the requirement of 
continuous attention and the performance of intricate and unceasing cognitive tasks related 
to prediction, comprehension and language production, that perhaps face-to-face 
conversation is somehow more demanding than digital conversation. And the fact that we 
do it at such high speed might make us think that this adds an even further level of 
difficulty.190 In most cases of digital conversation, there will be considerably longer 
intervals between turns. We might think, then, that the absence of the time constraints in 
digital conversation makes the requirements of it somehow less taxing. So it might seem as 
if there is a lot more to do (and less time to do it) in face-to-face conversation in order to 
succeed in communicating. I argue next, however, that there are good reasons to think that 
the contrary is true. Because although it is essential that interlocutors attend to these 
concurrent tasks, the nature of face-to-face conversation is such that it is not simply one 
person carrying out these tasks at any one time. Naturally each conversational partner is 
responsible for (and is doing) her own thinking and making her own contributions, 
however the overall task of maintaining the conversation is continuously shared. The 
continuous attention of the participants in a face-to-face conversation, and the concurrence 
and simultaneity of the feedback produced, allows the communicative load to be shared. 
This is because interlocutors in a face-to-face conversation are able to use each other in 
order to help them formulate contributions to a conversation as and when they are 
producing them.  
I should note here that ability of interlocutors ‘to use each other’ in order to 
formulate contributions will also be true in digital conversation to some extent. In a digital 
conversation between Yasuko and Ichirou, for example, Yasuko can, and usually will, use 
previous utterances made by Ichirou to help develop her own contributions, and vice versa. 
Just as they do in face-to-face conversation, digital interactants can draw upon each other’s 
linguistic output to help shape their own and they will also have a common ground that they 
can both draw upon. However they can’t recruit many of the other resources available in 
face-to-face conversation (such as , for example, the instantaneous feedback of an 
 
190 Though, of course, that we do this so easily and from such a young age suggests we are clearly 





interlocutor) and they often can’t rely that an interlocutor is ready, available and focused on 
the conversation just as they are. Yet it remains true of both face-to-face conversation and 
digital conversation that in order for them to be communicatively successful interlocutors 
must still coordinate both in process and in content.  
The specific purpose of the process tasks doesn’t change depending on the modality 
used – it is true of both face-to-face and digital conversation that a conversational 
participant is still required to comprehend the contributions of her interlocutors and 
produce her own comprehensible contributions in response. So just as it is in face-to-face 
conversation, it is also the case that for a digital conversation to progress interlocutors must 
coordinate at the content level, and to facilitate this they must also coordinate at the 
process level. A key difference between the two types of conversation, however, is that 
whereas in face-to-face conversation the task of coordinating is concurrently shared, in 
digital conversation the burden of process coordination rests at any one time primarily with 
one participant - the in-turner. What I want to argue, then, is that the differences in the 
burdens of process coordination entails two things. First, although there is less pressure to 
respond rapidly and to commit continuously to the conversation, when a participant in a 
digital conversation takes on the role of in-turner, she must carry the weight of the 
conversation herself. And this makes digital conversation more demanding (more on why 
so in §§2.3.2-2.3.4). Second, that the burden of process coordination is shared more in face-
to-face conversation makes it so that it is an intrinsically more cooperative type of 
conversation. And these differences in both difficulty and cooperation can help us to 
understand why we often experience these interactions differently. Let’s now consider an 
example to illustrate the intuition behind these arguments before looking (in §§2.3.2-2.3.4) 
at the specifics of the burdens of process coordination in face-to-face and digital 
conversations.  
2.3.1 There’s a garage around the corner 
Suppose you and I are out driving in my car. The car suddenly splutters to a halt and I say 
‘I’m out of petrol.’ You tell me there is a garage 200 metres around the corner. I take you to 
mean that the garage in question is open and sells petrol, and so see this as an excellent 
opportunity for us to cooperate.191 I suggest to you that we both push the car to the garage 
and you agree this is a good plan. How would we do this then? I might suggest we take it in 
 
191 This is, of course, is taken from one of Grice’s examples (1989c, p.32) only here it is put to 





turns; maybe I push it for the first 100 metres and you push it for the final 100 metres. You 
might then point out to me that it would be much more energy efficient, quicker, and 
generally easier for us both if we push it together for the full 200 metres. You, of course, are 
right. Importantly, though, either way we do it would be a case of us cooperating. In both 
scenarios our shared goal is to get the car to the garage and either way we do it we work 
together to get it there. Though the way in which we cooperate when sharing the load 
concurrently makes it so that even though we are both pushing the car further, 200 metres 
instead of 100 metres, when we share the weight of the car between us, we make the action 
of pushing the car easier. What I think this suggests, then, is if we were to push the car 
together for the full 200 metres we would be cooperating with each other in a much deeper 
way than we would be if I push it for 100 metres and then you do the same. Again, on the 
surface, it might be that the goal and outcome in either scenario is the same, but there is 
something quite different in how we cooperate to achieve it. And it is the intuition that 
there is something substantially different in the types of cooperation in these two scenarios 
that is the basis for some of the rest of my argument.192  
The point I’m getting to is to suggest that in contrasting face-to-face and digital 
conversation we see the same divergence in cooperation. The concurrence of the tasks of 
continuous feedback193 and interactive alignment194 allow us to cooperate in face-to-face 
conversation more efficiently. And that this is what makes face-to-face conversation the 
more likely setting for entering an unio mystico. That in a face-to-face conversation the out-
turner is copresent with and concurrently attending to what the in-turner is uttering as she 
is uttering it, and that the in-turner has some access to the out-turner’s uptake and feedback 
just as she is making her utterance helps her to formulate what she is uttering in a way that 
makes the language production component of her role as in-turner easier.195 And the mirror 
of this is that because the in-turner is copresent and reactive to the out-turner’s feedback 
just as she is making an utterance, this allows the in-turner to develop her utterance in a 
way that can make the comprehension component of the role of out-turner easier. In the 
case of digital conversation, however, the burden of communication sits almost squarely 
with the in-turner. The structure is such that an out-turner has very little to do whereas the 
 
192 As Jenny Saul points out to me, one important disanalogy to note here is that it may well be the 
case that pushing a car alone might not be possible, let’s suppose the car is suitably small, however, 
and that you and I are capable of pushing it alone should we need to. 
193 See Ch.2 §3.1.4 
194 See Ch.2 §3.1.5 





in-turner is solely tasked with the comprehension of the previous contribution and the 
formulation of the next contribution. To recall the above example, then, the in-turner is 
required to push the whole car alone for 100 metres. As I shall argue next, that these tasks 
must be carried out in isolation not only makes them more demanding, but this also 
plausibly has consequences for the type of cooperation required to sustain digital 
conversation.   
2.3.2 The burden of interpretation 
The increased burden on the in-turner works in two interconnected ways. First is 
something noted by Goldberg (2020), that is; the task of interpretation placed on the in-
turner in digital conversation can often be much more complex and cognitively 
burdensome. One such way Goldberg suggests this is more encumbering for the in-turner is 
due to the lack of stability in the norms of digital conversation. For example, consider the 
case of retweets.196 It isn’t clear what type of speech act is being performed by reposting the 
speech of another without comment. It could be perhaps taken that that one person 
retweeting another person’s tweet is endorsing the tweet reposted.197 It might also be taken 
to be a type of quotation of the original tweet.198 Either way it isn’t always clear and so the 
task of interpreting the speech act-type of a retweet can be difficult.  
Perhaps the act of retweeting itself is an oddity if we think in terms of a paradigm 
case of conversation. Retweeting is not, presumably, something one performs mid-
conversation. It may be that an act of retweeting is itself much closer to a broadcast in 
nature.199 Or perhaps it might be taken to be a type of conversation starter. But this 
instability of the norms of digital conversation is not isolated to retweets. Hashtags (#), for 
example, have multiple uses. They can be used as an indexing feature, as a mean of 
 
196 Although a ‘retweet’ is specific to social media platform Twitter, it is, in effect, a more general 
phenomenon of sharing, usually without comment, the post or utterance of another social media 
user. 
197 Though a problem with this, as Neri Marsili notes, is that unlike in the case of an endorsement of 
the following form; ‘I agree with x that p.’. The supposed endorsement of a retweet is defeasible, it is 
common to see, for example, the phrase ‘retweet not an endorsement’ on a user’s bio page, or for 
them to follow up a retweet by stating it is not an endorsement. 
198 The view Marsili argues for is of a retweet being a type of indicative quotation.  
199 Indeed, any public post to a social networking platform that isn’t directed at another user 
specifically might be thought to be of this class. Whatever the specifics of the type of act they are, 
they are, generally at least, speech acts aimed in the general direction of some audience, though 
perhaps not specifically at any particular member of that audience. Where they differ from a 
broadcast, however, is that they may be used as a means of instigating a conversation, or at least an 





expressing emotion or mood, or of adding further context to a post. 200 And hashtags can, 
and are, used in everyday digital conversational exchanges. Now it might be expected that 
these norms will stabilise over time and as they become more stable perhaps hashtags will 
become less burdensome to comprehend. Even if it were the case, however, there are still 
complications and difficulties of comprehension in digital comprehension that we might 
think are less likely to change.201 Specifically these are difficulties relating to the asynchrony 
of digital conversation and the solitary nature of the comprehension involved.  
What  I contend here, then, is that even if there were a hypothetical situation in 
which the norms of written speech acts were as equally stable as those we find in face-to-
face conversation, it would still remain the case that the task of comprehension in digital 
conversation will often be more difficult than in its face-to-face correlate. The absence in 
digital conversation of the time pressures and simultaneity we find in face-to-face 
conversation creates the conditions in which we might expect it is much more likely that 
comprehension is a more cumbersome process. Think again about the timescales of face-to-
face conversation, if average response speeds are approximately 200 ms, then it would be 
unlikely an interlocutor might spend, say, 20 seconds considering an utterance made by an 
interlocutor before making a response.202 On the other hand, in a digital conversation 20 
seconds given to reading an utterance before responding wouldn’t seem to be unusual.203 
Now this alone doesn’t necessarily make the task more difficult. I could walk a mile at a 
leisurely pace and it would be an easier task than attempting to sprint the same distance – 
slower is not necessarily more difficult in and of itself. However, if we keep in mind that the 
primary purpose of both written and face-to-face conversation is to communicate, then 
(recalling our pushing the car alone for 100 metres) we might wonder whether delays such 
as this are indicative of an inefficiency not seen in face-to-face conversation.  
For example, it may be the case that participants in digital conversation and face-to-
face conversation have equal opportunity to request clarification of some unclear point 
 
200 This point is another raised by Goldberg (2020). See (Scott, 2015; Wikström, 2014) for more on 
hashtags and their uses. 
201 There is a further problem of comprehension that relates to the often different intimacy and 
audience dynamics of the online world; this relates, part, to the rise of trolling and non-human 
conversational participants such as so called ‘propaganda bots’ becoming part of our conversational 
lives, and by the spread of targeted attacks by government agencies, corporate interests and 
activists.  
202 They may do, of course. The point being it would be unusual. 
203 And indeed, although an empirical matter, we might suppose that delays in response don’t have 
any of the pragmatic connotations of a delay in response such as in face-to-face conversation (see 





made by an interlocutor. However, unlike in face-to-face conversation where problems with 
communication are generally instantly flagged by the out-turner, in a digital conversation it 
would perhaps seem unlikely that a reader would skim a sentence once and instantly reply 
‘huh?’, for example, without at least giving it a second or third read. If in a conversation 
between A and B, A assumes B’s utterance u adheres to something like the cooperative 
principle and yet A initially struggles to comprehend u, then the burden would seem to be 
on A to at least attempt to comprehend u before requesting clarification from B. Again, this 
need not always be the case, A might simply instantly reply ‘huh?’ or even ‘?’. Though 
without the urgent pressure created by the one second window, A isn’t required to flag this 
trouble instantly, she is afforded more time and opportunity to interpret u, and importantly 
this is done in isolation from B. 
Contrast this with face-to-face conversation; there when a communicative problem 
occurs it is cross-linguistically a norm to respond immediately to flag a problem either 
gesturally or by making an utterance such as ‘huh?’204 So rather than the burden of 
interpretation of an unclear utterance being felt most acutely by the out-turner (recall 
interpretation is a task for an out-turner in face-to-face conversation, but an in-turner in 
digital conversation), the conversational trouble-source is passed back to the utterer of the 
trouble source for reformulation. So rather than A using time and effort to comprehend B’s 
utterance, A can signal the communication has failed and B is able to attempt to remedy the 
problem. The reason we might think this is preferable to A trying to work out alone the 
meaning of B’s utterance is that we should expect that it is B who is best placed to resolve 
the communicative problem; it is B’s initial thought that is being offered for consideration 
after all. Now this might make it appear that by passing back the utterance for reformulation 
the burden falls more heavily on the producer of the unclear utterance, but this too needn’t 
be the case, because related to the difference in the burden of comprehension is the 
difference in the burden of production. And just as we have good reason to think that 
comprehending an utterance alone is more difficult than doing it synchronously with 
another, so too producing an utterance solitarily becomes more difficult.205 
 
204 See for example Enfield (2017, Ch.8) 
205 As with many of the points here, I am speaking in general terms, it need not be the case that the 
interpretation is always a solitary task in this way. I may write my contribution, send it to you, then 
after sending it reread it and think it not clear. I might then send you a further message of 
clarification (a self-initiated repair). The difference is, as always, whereas in face-to-face 
conversation if something isn’t clear, it will become apparent to all of the participants almost 





2.3.3 The burden of production 
The increased cognitive burden of digital conversation relates not only to comprehension, 
we should also expect there is a corresponding increase in the burden of producing an 
utterance for an interlocutor to comprehend. Although ultimately an empirical conjecture, it 
strikes me that producing a written utterance will very often be more taxing than producing 
a spoken or signed utterance. Let’s consider next the following observation from Clark; 
When I write my sister a letter, I may take half an hour, pausing halfway through for 
coffee and revising it several times. She may read it in thirty seconds and 
reread it. Not only are her actions and mine not synchronized. There may be no 
point-by-point correspondence between them at all… Writing and reading are no 
less joint-actions for the lack of synchrony. My actions depend on what I expect my 
sister to do, and her actions depend on what she thinks I would expect her to do. We 
still coordinate on content… But I will also design - and redesign, edit, and reedit – 
my sentences to match the processes I judge she will read them by. I expect her to 
scan the sentences in order at a certain pace and to do so optimally when I pack 
information at the right density. Even though our processes are not synchronous, 
she and I coordinate on them.206 
So for Clark face-to-face and digital conversations are equally joint actions. I see no 
reason to disagree with this, the two different scenarios about how we get the car to the 
garage from Section 2.3.1 are also equally joint actions - that we coordinate them differently 
doesn’t seem to be salient to their status as joint actions. Though the difference in demands 
placed on us in the car example make them different in some other way – in one case, the 
burden is concurrently shared and the task is easier as a result, in the other it is passed 
from one person to another, and this, we might expect, makes the task more difficult. And 
this is the case too with language production. In a digital conversation, in order to 
communicate successfully an in-turner will often be required to write, reread, rewrite, 
reread and edit an utterance to make sure it scans correctly and communicates what it is 
she wishes to communicate before sending it to be read by an interlocutor. In itself this can 
 
conversation to continue it is in the interests of all parties to quickly resolve the problem. This could 
be through a quick negotiation of what the problem source is, for example. In a digital conversation 
wherein I just made a contribution to the conversation, there are no obvious ways of determining 
the success of the communication until an interlocutor responds. And so I am not required to help 
them with comprehension in the way I would be in face-to-face conversation.    





be a time-consuming process (at least relative to making an utterance face-to-face). The 
nature of such a task, too, is that it is essentially a task performed alone. As mentioned 
previously, although some of the content of such an utterance may be aided by the previous 
utterances in the conversation, composing a response is performed in isolation with no 
further input from an interlocutor until after it has been written and sent.  
Contrast this with face-to-face conversation. Any analogue we find there to the 
‘rewriting’ we find in digital conversation is often performed, in part at least, collaboratively 
and synchronously with others. Face-to-face interlocutors will most often respond within 
the time constraint of the one second window, and to do so an in-turner will be required to 
utter something like the first thing that comes to mind. As such, any ‘rewriting’ will be 
performed in front of and with a conversational partner. An in-turner need not ask herself 
whether what she is uttering might be understood by the out-turner, the out-turner will 
very often do this for her by providing simultaneous feedback to help guide the ‘rewrite’ 
process. Once her turn begins she shares a thought with an interlocutor who can then help 
to refine the utterance in real time, if it is so required. The out-turner can help in this task 
by giving what Goldberg (2020) calls audience updates. These updates could be in the form 
of feedback through any of the communicative channels available, for example an out-
turner might look puzzled or nod in understanding. The out-turner can help in other ways 
too, perhaps by initiating repair for any trouble spots, or by helping to finish an utterance or 
fill in a blank for the in-turner.207 
As such, as long as participants remain engaged in the tasks required of them in a 
face-to-face conversation, then they will be concurrently helping each other to sustain the 
conversation. So although, as Clark argues, interlocutors in a digital conversation must also 
coordinate at the process level, the burden of this process coordination will often be placed 
on the in-turner. The in-turner must work alone to produce her utterances and produce 
them in a way she estimates will succeed in communicating. And so as Goldberg (2020) 
observes; if more effort is needed to be put in to digital conversation, then we might expect 
that we need to derive more joy from it in order to compensate for this. This seems fair 
enough, and there is more that can also be said along these lines if we recall from Chapter 2 
 
207 For example, think of a case where an interlocutor forgets a name or noun, and says something 
like ‘Do you remember when we ate that huge sandwich in…erm…’, and the other interjects with the 
place name. Or recall the case in Chapter 2, §3.1.3 where Herb starts to ask about the location of an 
umbrella, he says; ‘where is the other…’ before Eve interrupts by saying ‘on the back shelf’. See 
(Goodwin & Goodwin, 1986) for examples of how interlocutors use gestures to help each other when 





(§3.1.5) the discussion of interactive alignment. There we saw evidence that when bodily 
synchronisation increases, subjects more often report that an interaction is experienced as 
being more harmonious and friendly. So if this is the case, then not only is it the case that 
coordinating at the process level is more difficult in digital conversation, some of the means 
of coordinating in face-to-face conversation are in themselves more pleasurable.  
2.3.4 The harmoniousness of alignment 
In Chapter 2 (§3.1.5) it is was noted that interacting groups align in a number of different 
ways, both behaviourally and cognitively. For example, as conversation progresses eye-
movements, hand positions, facial expressions and word choices of interlocutors will often 
become aligned. This has led some to hypothesise that this alignment at so many different 
levels makes the task of linguistic alignment easier. The argument for this being that we can 
cope with the speed of turn-taking in face-to-face conversation by aligning through various 
channels and that this alignment, in turn, allows conversational partners to distribute the 
processing load between them.  
Clearly many of the potential pathways of alignment used in face-to-face 
conversation will be absent in digital conversation. Without copresence, visibility and 
audibility we lose many of the prosodic and paralinguistic features discussed in Chapter 3 
(§2.3), as well as the opportunity for bodily alignments. Now of course, this isn’t to say that 
digital conversation is without any means of alignment, naturally interlocutors in such 
conversations still have at least the opportunity to align linguistically. Participants in a 
digital conversation also have a common ground (although restricted by their lack of 
copresence), and they can also use previous utterances of the exchange as a basis for 
linguistic alignment. So they are certainly able to align and share some of the load. What is 
clearly different, however, is that the alignment need not, and often won’t be, synchronous, 
and there is evidence to suggest that synchrony itself can be a source of harmoniousness.  
 Recall, then, the studies by Kerry Marsh and colleagues (2009) discussed in Chapter 
2 (§3.1.5). Marsh et al. note that when experimental partners were able to bodily 
synchronise with each other more easily, they report feeling more connected and that their 
interactions were smoother and friendlier. If this is the case, then we might wonder 
whether the processes of interactive alignment which allow some of the process load to be 
shared to enable face-to-face conversation to function at the speed it does might also be 





conversation. For if in simply carrying out these bodily alignments feels friendly and 
harmonious then that this opportunity is not available in digital conversation can help us 
understand why it can appear that digital conversations are often less fulfilling interactions.  
2.3.5 Summary of the difference in process coordination 
In face-to-face and digital conversation, there are different requirements placed on 
interlocutors in order for them to coordinate at the process level. In face-to-face 
conversation these tasks are performed synchronously – as an in-turner is making an 
utterance, an out-turner must attend to the in-turner’s utterance, comprehend it, provide 
feedback on its communicative success and predict its conclusion. She must also use this as 
a basis for formulating her own upcoming contribution to the conversation. The speeds at 
which this occurs, and the availability of various communicative channels creates the 
conditions that allows for participants to concurrently share the process burdens of 
comprehension and production. In sharing these loads interlocutors are afforded greater 
opportunity for perspective sharing, indeed we have good reason to expect that this makes 
the fulfilment of their necessary tasks easier. Through various levels of interactive 
alignment they are able to synchronise with each other, and this synchronisation itself can 
generate feelings of friendliness and harmoniousness.  
On the other hand, in digital conversation the required process tasks are generally 
performed asynchronously and in isolation from a conversational partner. Indeed the 
asynchronous nature of digital conversation is such that at any one time, most of the 
communicative load is the responsibility of the in-turner. This has consequences for both 
comprehension and language production. Taking each of these consequences in turn, it will 
be the case at any one time in a digital conversation the in-turner is tasked with solitarily 
comprehending a previous utterance. There are a number of problems we might think she 
might face in doing this. For, example, due to the relative youth of digital conversation the 
norms of the speech acts used are still unstable, and so comprehending which act is being 
performed can be more difficult. When we add to this that the communicative bandwidth is 
reduced, that the aspects of the common ground relating to copresence are absent and 
perhaps most importantly, that an utterance being responded to will generally have been 
composed with no audience updates during its formulation, then we should expect that the 
tasks relating to comprehension will be more difficult. Whereas in face-to-face conversation 
an utterance is comprehended as it is being made, in digital conversation we might read and 





Closely related to the difficulty of solitary comprehension is the difficulty of solitary 
production. When composing a written utterance we might write, rewrite and edit a 
contribution before sending it to an interlocutor. Contrast this with face-to-face 
conversation where the response speeds of conversation require that contributions are 
made rapidly and so often will be much less finished than written utterances. Although it 
might be tempting to think that more time to deliberate on a response in digital 
conversation is beneficial for reasons of clarity, it certainly need not be the case for reasons 
discussed above in discussion of the difficulty of comprehension. And when we add to this 
that an in-turner won’t have access to audience updates during the composition of an 
utterance, the responsibility for this clarity is placed on the in-turner. So whereas in face-to-
face conversation the updates of an audience can guide an in-turner as to where there may 
be communicative problems, in digital conversation the burden is placed on the in-turner to 
foresee any such problems that might arise. And so any comparative process we find in face-
to-face conversation to the rewriting of digital conversation is done collaboratively. If an 
utterance is unclear, an out-turner will quickly make an in-turner aware of it, and then they 
can work together to solve the communicative problem.   
So both face-to-face and digital conversation carry with them a set of necessary 
tasks required for coordination at the process level and in both types of conversation these 
tasks serve the same purpose. However, the way interlocutors coordinate in digital 
conversation is dispersed. The asynchrony of such exchanges makes it so that at any one 
time the burden of coordination rests with the in-turner. So digital conversation will often 
feel more difficult when carrying the load. But not only is digital conversation often more 
taxing, we have good reason to think that the synchrony we find in face-to-face 
conversation is also conducive to feelings of harmoniousness and friendliness. That face-to-
face conversation is fundamentally a synchronous activity, and that interlocutors will 
interactively align at various levels suggests that face-to-face conversation is more likely to 
produce feelings of harmoniousness. This all leads us to consider once more the type of 
cooperation we might find in these two types of conversation.  
2.4 Cooperation  
In the earlier example (§2.3.1) where you and I were pushing a car to the garage around the 
corner two possible ways of cooperating were considered. First, I would push alone for 100 
metres and then you would push alone for the final 100 metres. In another scenario, we 





synchronously. Intuitively it would appear that even though in both cases we are 
cooperatively working towards the same shared goal it still appears to be the case that 
there is something more cooperative about pushing it together. And it is along these lines 
that I suggest the cooperation in the two types of conversation differ. That we concurrently 
share the same goal and work towards achieving it by continuously attending to the 
conversation we sustain our cooperation for as long as we share the goal. If this is the case, 
then, there is something more cooperative about face-to-face conversation when compared 
to digital conversation.208 
In Chapter 2 it was argued that the intricate and continuous nature of coordination 
at the process level in face-to-face conversation is indicative of a deeply cooperative 
activity, at least at the process level. For participants to be able to coordinate in the way that 
they do in face-to-face conversation requires an almost unceasing commitment to the 
principal goal of sustaining the conversation209 and this goal must be shared by all 
participants. The coordination at the process level is thus the enactment of this 
commitment, and taking cooperation to be the sharing of a goal which cooperative parties 
work towards achieving, this cooperation at the process level allows conversational 
participants to meet the preconditions required of them in order to meet something like 
Grice’s cooperative principle. The significance of this, it was argued, is that using the 
distinction between process and content levels, Grice’s cooperative principle is best 
considered as a means of coordinating at the content level, whereas the precondition to the 
cooperative principle represents how interlocutors coordinate at the process level in order 
to meet these content-coordinative aims.  
Recall that to meet Grice’s cooperative principle (CP); 
(CP) 
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the 
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the 
talk exchange in which you are engaged.210  
 
208 And the caveat again, this is not the claim that all face-to-face conversation is more cooperative 
than all digital conversation, but rather the point is the structure of face-to-face conversation 
suggests it is necessarily more cooperative at the process level, and this, we might expect, will often 
affect the content level. 
209 For at least as long as all parties wish for it to proceed.  
210 (1989c, p. 26). Naturally if we are expecting the CP to hold, we might also expect something like 





face-to-face interactants must satisfy something like the following precondition; 
(PCP) 
In the role of out-turner, concurrently with the in-turner producing 
an utterance; a conversational participant must predict alterations to 
the purpose or direction of the language exchange, the stage the 
exchange will be at following the present turn, and begin the set of 
sub-processes in preparation to produce an utterance.  
As was argued in Chapter 2 (§4.6), PCP is formulated with Levinson’s preconditions in mind 
to show how in the role of out-turner there are prediction and production tasks required 
and that these are dependent on the dynamic nature of the informational elements of CP. 
For it is those contents that the process tasks will track. And so just as we might think that 
two people cooperating in one task might also make them more likely to cooperate in 
another, we might expect that cooperation at the process level in itself encourages 
cooperation at the content level. And indeed, in a face-to-face conversation, just as an out-
turner is attempting to meet PCP, the expectation is that the in-turner is adhering to 
something like CP.  
Now of course if we are expecting conversational participants in a face-to-face 
conversation must meet something like the cooperative principle, then we should expect 
the same in digital conversation. The contrast, however, is that in digital conversation 
adhering to the cooperative principle doesn’t require that they cooperate concurrently, nor 
does it require any of the perspective-sharing we might expect of face-to-face conversation. 
So although it is true that in order to sustain a digital conversation, interlocutors would be 
required to share the same goal to maintain the conversation, and must work towards 
achieving it, the way they achieve this goal is in isolation from each other. A digital 
conversation doesn’t require a continuously shared goal in the same way as its face-to-face 
counterpart, the requirement is only that this goal be shared intermittently.  And whereas 
in meeting PCP in face-to-face conversation it is required that an out-turner anticipates the 
dynamic facts it tracks as they are being altered by the in-turner, in digital conversation this 
isn’t quite the same. So we could propose something like a written precondition, for 
example; 
 
informative as needed (quantity), not knowingly false or undersupported (quality), relevant and not 






In the role of in-turner, upon receipt of an utterance; a conversational 
participant must determine the purpose or direction of the language 
exchange, the stage the exchange is at, and begin the set of sub-
processes in preparation to produce an utterance.  
One difference worth noting here is that WPCP will occur not as an in-turner is making an 
utterance (as in the case of face-to-face conversation and PCP) but rather once it has been 
completed. It doesn’t rely on prediction, or tracking dynamic facts, but rather it is a process 
of determining what has already been uttered. Recall in Chapter 21 (§§4.6-4.7) it was 
argued that this tracking of dynamic facts is indicative of the type of perspective sharing 
and alignment that occurs in face-to-face conversation, and so in the case of digital 
conversation we have reason to expect this perspective sharing is different. And so 
ultimately the cooperation takes a different form. 
3 Some benefits of digital conversation 
I hope what I have said thus far isn’t taken to be a complete denigration of digital 
conversation. It can, and does, provide a wonderful social outlet for many, be it those who 
live in remote areas, people unable to leave their house, or for people who find face-to-face 
conversation difficult, amongst many others. Nothing I have said thus far should lead us to 
think that digital conversation can’t be equally rewarding and satisfying as face-to-face 
conversation, the point, rather, is to suggest some reasons as to why it often isn’t viewed as 
such when compared to face-to-face conversation. And there is no reason to think that 
because face-to-face conversation is intrinsically more cooperative at the process level, that 
this entails that all face-to-face conversations will be somehow more cooperative than 
digital conversation at the content level. This certainly need not follow. Again, what I 
suggest is rather that the structure of such interactions suggests that they more often will 
be. And finally, just because I suggest that the high-level of concurrent coordination, and the 
sharing of the cognitive load better creates conditions for perspective sharing, this 
shouldn’t be taken to mean this will be true in all cases. We might think that in some cases 
this probability is reversed, it will be that in some cases the chances of a satisfying and 
cooperative conversation are increased by being conducted digitally. And in some cases, the 





use one particular type of case as an example, that of autistic spectrum disorders (ASD), but 
I expect many similar examples could be considered to make this same point. 
 Until recently much research into the perceived difficulties with sociability some 
people with ASD experience was conducted by looking specifically at the person with a 
diagnosis, rather than viewing these difficulties as being part of a wider scheme of 
understanding the nature of conversation as being necessarily social or interpersonal. 
There is a recent strand of research, however, that looks at how these difficulties might 
arise not just from people with ASD themselves, but also how those around them react to 
some of their non-verbal behaviour. For example Sasson et al (2017) note (emphasis mine); 
211 
Findings across the three independent studies were remarkably consistent despite 
using distinct samples and methods. Taken together, they offer strong evidence that 
the social presentations of individuals with ASD, particularly their non-verbal cues, 
including prosody, facial expressions, and body posture, are perceived less favorably 
and are associated with reluctance on the part of observers to pursue social 
engagement. This is particularly important given that individuals with ASD self-
reported much greater feelings of loneliness than controls… Negative first 
impressions may serve as a barrier to fulfilling this desire for social interaction, as 
approach and withdrawal behavior towards novel social partners is based on 
subjective perceptions regardless of their accuracy. In turn, this may limit 
opportunities in ASD for developing social connections and friendships.212 
Interesting here, then, is that some of the features highlighted above are important channels 
of feedback we see in paradigm cases of face-to-face conversation and are often used to 
enable interactive alignment. That neurotypical people and people with ASD might struggle 
to align through such channels might in turn be suggestive of the difficulty, often reported, 
people with ASD can have with perspective taking. If, as has been argued here, such 
channels are what help paradigm cases of conversation to function successfully at the 
speeds that they do, then the negative first impressions neurotypical people have on 
encountering people with ASD is helpful for understanding why people with ASD can 
 
211 Another study (Heasman & Gillespie, 2018), looks at how perceptions of Asperger’s syndrome (a 
condition on the autistic spectrum) can be detrimental to social understanding between people with 
Asperger’s and family members. 





sometimes struggle with conversations and with perspective taking. And what makes this 
particularly interesting for current considerations, is an observation in the same paper 
where it is noted that;  
Our findings show that negative first impressions of adults with ASD occurred only 
when audio and/or visual information was present, and not when the transcript of 
their speech content was evaluated.213 
Which suggests that the rich levels of process coordination found in face-to-face 
conversation are actually a hindrance to conversation for many with ASD; both from their 
point of view and from the point of view of their potential interactants. That neurotypical 
people are less likely to interact with a person with ASD based on audio/visual information 
makes it so that in the case of ASD we might think that digital conversation, where these 
features are absent, is actually much more likely to produce fulfilling conversations.  
 So it certainly need not be the case that in all cases face-to-face conversation 
provides better conditions to allow the perspective taking and the unio mystico, in some 
cases the requirements of face-to-face conversation will be a hindrance to such a potential 
interaction. If in digital conversation neurotypical people are more likely to interact with 
people with ASD, then it would seem that digital conversation, in such examples, is 
potentially more cooperative than face-to-face conversation would be.  
4 Summary 
In this chapter I have argued that in one particularly important way face-to-face and digital 
conversation are different. The requirements of face-to-face conversation are such that 
(even in cases of disputation) conversational participants are required to coordinate 
continuously and intricately at the process level and this is not the case in digital 
conversation. And as a result of this even though both types of conversation require 
cooperation, the type of cooperation required in face-to-face and digital conversation are 
notably different. The way that face-to-face interactants cooperate is in sharing the 
communicative burden continuously, whereas in digital conversation this communicative 
load is, at any one time, carried by one particular participant. If the process level and 
content level are indelibly linked (as originally argued in Chapter 2 §4.7), then we might 
expect that more cooperation at the process level is likely to entail more cooperation at the 
 





content level. As such, we might expect that the structure of face-to-face conversation is 
such that it will generally produce more harmonious interactions than digital conversation. 
Finally a scenario was considered where this might not be the case, and in fact, where we 
might expect the probability of a better conversation is increased by using the written 
mode. There is still more to say however, because there is one further notable difference 
between face-to-face and digital conversation that has so far only been gestured towards. 
This difference also emerges from the different media-specific features, the comparatively 
reduced personal nature of the type of conversation and is also a product of where digital 
conversations often take place. The final chapter, then, will act as a case study to show how 
fruitful it can be to consider the contrasting features of face-to-face and digital conversation 
by looking at a particular type of digital speech act – trolling. There I will consider some of 
the consequences we see that arise from the fact that many digital conversations are 











Digital Conversation: A Case Study on The Speech 
Act of Trolling 
In the previous four chapters I have argued that there are important fundamental 
differences between face-to-face and digital conversations. These differences relate to how 
interlocutors in these two types of conversation coordinate their linguistic behaviour in 
order to sustain their interactions. The upshot of this difference, I argue towards the end of 
the previous chapter, is that there appears to be a different type of cooperation involved in 
face-to-face and digital conversations. What I want to do in this final chapter, then, is look 
more closely at what I take to be one example of the type of things we see emerge from this 
difference – trolling. The topic of this chapter will be an examination of trolling as a type of 
speech act that has emerged along with spread of digital conversation. For the reduced 
cooperation, multiplicity of potential audiences and the reduction of interactive alignment 
we find in digital conversation relative to face-to-face conversation opens up the possibility 
for new communicative acts and behaviour. So in this chapter I present what I take to be an 
example of the type of research that is possible when we focus on the conditions of digital 
conversation. 214   
The acceptance of trolling as a feature of internet communication, and the clustering 
together of behaviours that range from playfulness to abusive bullying under the term 
‘trolling’ has interesting moral implications. For it seems that sometimes such behaviour is 
dismissed as ‘mere trolling’ and consequently the trolls who perform these acts are granted 
 
214 I am particularly indebted to many others for this chapter. For formative discussions I am 
grateful to Jenny Saul, Komarine Romdenh-Romluc and Will Hornett. And for feedback on various 
versions of some of the material included here I am grateful to Jenny, Komarine, Neri Marsili, Eliot 





a partial exemption from responsibility for the content or consequences of their speech. A 
result of this is that some acts which might ordinarily be considered bullying, abuse, or 
threats when uttered outside of the internet can be dismissed as mere trolling when carried 
out on the internet. One popular response to this is to categorise acts of trolling based on 
perceived intentions or to argue that, for more virulent acts particularly, ‘trolling’ is not an 
appropriate label to be applied. Although I agree that, for example, there should be no 
special exemption granted for racist speech on the basis that it is used in an act of trolling, I 
argue here that we also shouldn’t ignore the structural similarities of the range of speech 
acts often described as ‘trolling’. Application of tools from the philosophy of language and 
consideration of an act of trolling as a complex speech act can make clear some of these 
similarities. Once these similarities are made clearer we can then start to understand a little 
more about what trolling is and also why it has become such a pervasive feature of internet 
communication. I suggest that central to acts of trolling is a notion of seriousness and its 
interplay between the troll, their target and any onlookers to the act of trolling. By viewing 
trolling in this way we can understand better the rhetorical nature of an act of trolling and 
why we can often end up facing what I call the trolling dilemma – that is, in many acts of 
trolling the directions of reply are either to respond seriously to an utterance and so be 
trolled, or to acknowledge it as an unserious act of trolling and so dismiss it as mere trolling.  
Though far from a complete account of the speech act of trolling, what I present here 
are the grounds for understanding trolling as a systematically divisive act. In an act of 
trolling the audience targeted by the troll is a mere prop to be manipulated for the 
entertainment of the troll and their onlookers. This in-built division between different 
audiences makes trolling a particularly powerful political device, and the trolling dilemma 
makes responding to trolling difficult. So when we consider that the act itself is essentially 
divisive and difficult to respond to effectively, we can start to understand why regimes and 
movements which thrive on unprincipled division have successfully embraced trolling as a 
propaganda tool. 
1.  Trolling preliminaries 
Some terminological notes to begin. Trolling is carried out by trolls on targets. A particular 
target need not necessarily be pre-determined by the troll but is simply anyone who 
responds in a way amenable to the act of trolling. The target is an audience that trolling is 
performed to, but an act of trolling has an audience (which includes the troll) it is 





1.1 Trolling  
Trolling is a complex linguistic behaviour and the usage of ‘trolling’ is still in flux. As such, 
defining it both pithily and satisfactorily is difficult. This is an occasion, though, when 
etymology is perhaps helpful. ‘Trolling’ originally referred to a method of fishing whereby 
bait is placed on a hook, the hook is dangled from a boat, and the angler gently moves the 
boat downstream waiting for a fish to bite.215 With a few slight changes we can see how 
internet trolling is similar. The bait is generally a provocative comment, the hook the social 
media it is written on, and the troll leaves it dangling waiting for a target to bite.  
 Trolling isn’t an entirely new type of behaviour either. Expressions such as ‘baiting’, 
‘codding’, ‘winding-up’, ‘teasing’ and ‘goading’ probably capture similar acts (the first two or 
three are even plausibly fishing-derived terms too). Just like ‘trolling’, those terms can also 
sometimes refer to what appears to be amusing, innocuous or playful behaviour, but also 
cases of abuse and harassment. As I argue later, trolling bears relation to certain types of 
humour, and it is in these terms we might best characterise it. What we might think makes 
trolling worthy of close attention, however, is the scale of its proliferation and successes as 
a communicative tool. It is a conspicuous feature of internet discourse, an implement of 
corporate marketing216 and, most importantly, it has become a tool used for disseminating 
political ideas.217  
1.2 Examples 
The following three examples have all been described as trolling. They have been chosen for 
their differences, and to reflect some of the range of acts that have been termed ‘trolling’. I 




215 Such use of ‘trolling’ dates back to at least Robert Nobbes (1682) 
216 For example Gallucci (2018). 
217 This stretches from the use of large scale so-called ‘troll factories’ by regimes (see, for example 
(Gallagher, 2015; Giles, 2019)), to the use of a form of trolling known as ‘shitposting’ by political 
parties in election campaigns (for example Read (2019); Stokel-Walker (2019), and far-right 





Kenneth McCarthy posts intentionally confused messages on the internet under the 
username KenM and is generally regarded as a troll.218 McCarthy has spoken publicly about 
his trolling and describes it as “playing a well-meaning moron on the internet.” He claims 
that he does it primarily as a reaction to the harshness of internet discourse.219 For example, 
(T1) was posted under a 2015 article titled ‘Clinton, Bush fundraising steady amid GOP 
summer Trump slump’. 
(T1): 
Ben Franklin said politicians are like pampers, they both stink and they act 
like babies.220 
The comment received the following response from user Karl: “ken hate to tell you pampers 
have only been around 50 years. true moron.” 
1.2.2 Donald Trump 
On 14th July 2019 President Trump posted the following comment on social media platform 
Twitter. 
 (T2): 
So interesting to see “Progressive” Democrat Congresswomen, who originally 
came from countries whose governments are a complete and total 
catastrophe… Why don’t they go back and help fix the totally broken and 
crime infested places from which they came. 
This references four US congresswomen; Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Rashida Tlaib, Ayanna 
Pressley and Ilhan Omar. There are numerous ways in which one might view (T2) as racist, 
for current purposes though most striking is that it provides a rendition of the “send them 
back to their own countries” rhetoric eternally popular with racists. Although some of the 
media responses to Trump’s comment correctly condemned it as racist, interestingly some 
of these same critics noted he was also trolling. In one report the Guardian said; “The 
presidential trolling may have been meant as a distraction from immigration raids that 
 
218 (Edwards, 2016; Grossman, 2016) 
219 (Edwards, 2016) 
220 The original article on AP News has since been removed, see 
https://horseysurprise.tumblr.com/image/130477486506 for image, and 





were due in major cities on Sunday.”221 An LA Times editorial on the day of the tweets also 
said; “He is just trolling, as usual. He is just trying to get a rise out of us. He is baiting us.”222  
1.2.3 The RIP Troll 
The following example is a case of so-called ‘RIP trolling’,223 and was posted under a 
YouTube video about the 2011 Christchurch earthquake. 
(T3) 
I and the rest of the world are pleased your piece of shit family… are dead 
squashed filthy shit rotting in the ground. Especially those two filthy babies 
that were squashed REST IN PISS YOU FUCKING RODENT PIECES OF SHIT. 
224 
RIP trolls target articles, videos or memorial pages relating to tragedies and deaths. 
Generally it is supposed that RIP trolls post such comments for the amusement of other RIP 
trolls. The motivations for RIP trolling and the ‘humour’ it evokes will be touched upon in 
§3.3. 
2. Trolling, sincerity and seriousness 
2.1 Academic work 
There is some call in academic discussion for the need to distinguish between different 
types of trolling, for example classifying some acts as ‘kudos trolling’ and others as ‘flame 
trolling’.225 So whereas the ‘kudos troll’ provokes for the entertainment of others, the ‘flame 
troll’ is said to be simply carrying out abuse that isn’t intended to be humorous. Without 
knowing the context from which the examples above come from, we might naively think 
that (T1) is a case of kudos trolling, and (T3) a case of flame trolling, for example. It is 
plausible that (T3) could, on the face of it, appear to be a case of simple abuse, but as 
previously mentioned (§1.2.3), and as will be discussed further in §3.3, even (T3) has a 
component of entertaining an audience. There are clearly merits to drawing distinctions 
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223 See McCosker (2014) and Phillips (2011 & 2015, Ch.7) for detailed discussions of RIP trolling. 
224 Cited in McCosker (2014). 
225 (Bishop, 2014; March & Marrington, 2019), for example, both use such terminology, Whitney 





between particular acts of trolling in the sense that some acts of trolling are certainly more 
offensive or damaging than others. However, there is a fundamental problem with trying to 
draw such a distinction; we might think that any troll is at least, in some way, entertaining 
themself, and beyond a warped version of utilitarianism I don’t see any good moral 
distinction between abusing someone by saying P to entertain only oneself, on the one 
hand, and saying P to entertain oneself and some others, on the other. As such I think it very 
plausible to say that with every act of trolling there is at least one person the troll intends to 
entertain – themself. When analysing trolling the speech act, therefore, I won’t distinguish 
between acts of trolling in such a way.  
There are other arguments we find that suggest that labelling abusive behaviour as 
mere trolling is dangerous as doing so suggests that online abusers are mere trolls, rather 
than, in many cases, anti-social criminals, and so a term such as ‘e-bile’ or ‘cyberabuse’ 
might be a more apt name.226 I agree with the aims of such a project; there should be no 
moral redemption for an act of abuse simply because it was deemed an act of trolling. 
However, I will argue that paying attention to similarities between the seemingly disparate 
acts that get called ‘trolling’ is also an important part of the task of avoiding dismissing 
abuse as mere trolling. By viewing trolling as a type of speech act with some unifying 
properties, we can understand how it operates as a feature of conversation and how it has 
spread. We can also understand that there is nothing ‘mere’ about an act of trolling. It is an 
intrinsically divisive and manipulative act, regardless of the specific goals of the troll. This 
doesn’t entail an act of trolling is necessarily morally bad, manipulation is sometimes 
justifiable after all. The interesting consequence, though, is that abuse shouldn’t be 
considered somehow more acceptable as a component of an act of trolling (‘mere trolling’), 
it is, in fact, even more questionable when used in such a way. Once we see that an act of 
trolling is by nature divisive and manipulative, an act of abusive trolling is therefore better 
thought of not as mere trolling, but as abusive and divisive and manipulative. Just as if I do 
something wrong and lie about it I would be held liable for two wrongs should the lie be 
discovered (the lie and the act I lie about), so too using racist speech, for example, doesn’t 
somehow become more acceptable when used as a means of trolling. The moral 
implications, therefore, are cumulative not diminishing. 
2.2 Defining ‘troll’ 
 





The next task, then, is to find commonality between these seemingly disparate trolling 
behaviours. Claire Hardaker (2010) offers a well-cited definition of what it is to be a troll;  
 (HT) 
A troll is a [computer mediated communication] user who constructs the 
identity of sincerely wishing to be part of the group in question, including 
professing, or conveying pseudo-sincere intentions, but whose real 
intention(s) is/are to cause disruption and/or to trigger or exacerbate 
conflict for the purposes of their own amusement. (p. 237)  
Although useful as a starting point, this is too restrictive for current purposes. Consider the 
examples (T2) and (T3) above, Trump nor the RIP Troll appear to be making any attempt to 
construct an identity of wanting to be a part of a group they wish to disrupt, yet both have 
been described as trolling. Ordinary language usage of ‘trolling’ has changed since Hardaker 
proposed (HT), and it no longer seems correct to suggest that a troll attempts to construct 
an “identity of sincerely wishing to be part of the group”, so I’ll remove this from 
consideration. Hardaker also defines the troll rather than the act of trolling, my focus is on 
the speech act of trolling and so I adjust accordingly. The main point of departure, however, 
will be to move from talk of ‘sincerity’ to talk of ‘seriousness’, I discuss this next.  
2.3 Sincerity and seriousness 
As Hardaker’s definition above seems to suggest, and as we might expect considering the 
role sincerity often plays when analysing duplicitous behaviour, it may be thought that the 
role of sincerity is essential for an understanding of trolling. As mentioned though, I don’t 
want to discuss trolling in terms of sincerity. The main reason for this being that when 
thinking about sincerity it seems right that our focus is on the relationship of speaker to 
utterance.227 A relatively theory-neutral summary of sincerity might be stated as follows; to 
 
227 A standard way of thinking about the role of sincerity in communicative practice, for example, is 
along the lines of that found in Searle (1969). Loosely put, Searlean sincerity is determined by the 
relationship between an utterance u made by S and S’s beliefs about u. So if S believes u (in the case 
of assertion), then S is sincere in uttering u.  Conversely, if S utters u yet doesn’t believe u (assertion), 
then S utters u insincerely. So for Searle a speech act is sincere when the speaker has the mental 
state expressed by their utterance, and insincere when they don’t. The Searlean view meets with 
counterexamples (Chan & Kahane, 2011; Peacocke, 2000; Ridge, 2006; Stokke, 2018 Ch. 8), for 
example, however the direction of these challenges generally aims to question what it is to have 





utter u sincerely is to stand in some relationship to the content(s) of u, and to understand 
sincerity is to understand the nature and type of this relationship. However, what is most 
interesting about trolling is not the relationship the speaker has to her utterance (not 
directly, at least), but rather it is the relationship the speaker has to her intended audiences. 
More specifically, the main point of interest in how a troll intends her multiple audiences to 
take her utterance.  
A trolling utterance is generally placed on widely accessible internet-based social 
media platforms, it is, frequently, a public activity. As with most internet comments it is, 
potentially at least, therefore viewable by a wide audience. As is suggested in §1, in an act of 
trolling the audience can be crudely divided into target and onlooker. Dividing the audience 
in such a way means the targets are the audience the troll intends to troll, and the onlooker 
(including the troll) are the audience the troll performs the act of trolling for. If we think it 
seems plausible to presume that, broadly speaking, the aim of a troll in an act of trolling is to 
provoke a certain type of response from the target and a particular type of response from 
the onlooker, then it will turn out that it isn’t of direct importance whether a trolling 
utterance is made sincerely or not. Though this isn’t to say that on inspection of individual 
acts of trolling, and their case-specific moral ramifications, that this utterer-utterance 
relationship shouldn’t be a consideration. The point is simply that a troll can sincerely utter 
u intending to troll a target, but a troll can just as plausibly insincerely utter y intending to 
troll a target. In an act of trolling the troll can say something she believes to be true, 
something she believes to be false, or even something she has no particularly strong beliefs 
about - it doesn’t matter as long as she gets the response(s) she is aiming for. This type of 
relationship to the truth of one’s own utterance is perhaps closely related, then, to Harry 
Frankfurt’s description of the bullshitter, of which he says; 
[T]he motive guiding and controlling [his speech] is unconcerned with how the 
things about which he speaks truly are….He does not care whether the things he 
says describe reality correctly. He just picks them out, or makes them up, to suit his 
purpose.228 
 
however, my point is that for the present task, sincerity isn’t quite the notion we should be 
considering. 





Whereas in the case of Frankfurt’s bullshitter the purpose is to convince an audience of 
something, we might think that in the case of trolling the primary purpose is to provoke a 
particular type of action from a target. So we might say that for the purposes of an act of 
trolling a troll is indifferent to their utterance beyond its utility within the act of trolling. Let 
us next consider the first two examples in this light. 
(T1): 
Ben Franklin said politicians are like pampers, they both stink and they act 
like babies. 
Knowing as we do that KenM is a contrived character, we might expect that the author of 
(T1) didn’t utter it sincerely. He doesn’t genuinely believe Franklin said politicians are like 
pampers.229 On many accounts of sincerity, then, McCarthy uttered (T1) insincerely, and yet 
this is generally considered a case of trolling, it seems, however, that he is still aiming for a 
particular type of response. Consider too the second part of the Trump example (T2).  
 (T2a): 
Why don’t they go back and help fix the totally broken and crime infested 
places from which they came. 
It seems plausible that Trump is making a sincere statement in (T2a). We might have good 
reasons to think he may genuinely wish the congresswomen would “go back” to the places 
“from which they came”. Whether he sincerely thinks this or not, though, is not salient to 
understanding it as an act of trolling. As an utterance used in an act of trolling it is the 
intended response(s) that is of most importance. Whether or not Trump is sincere in 
uttering (T2a) is secondary to the fact that he did utter it, and the nature of what it is he has 
said (and the use of racist tropes) makes a particular type of response likely. With this in 
mind, what I suggest then is that the particular type of response both KenM and Trump are 
aiming at is related to the notion of seriousness. I use this notion of seriousness to help 
characterise how a speech act of trolling works and so next I’ll offer a few thoughts as to 
 
229 It is possibly a nod to a quote misattributed to Mark Twain about politicians and diapers needing 





what I take this to be. A good starting point is to consider seriousness and its relationship to 
joking.230  
Say S makes a joke to an audience, conventionally we might expect that in making the joke, S 
intends to make her audience laugh.231 It could plausibly be the case that S sincerely 
believes the joke expresses some truth, and as the clichés suggest, many a true word is said 
in jest, and sometimes something is funny because it’s true. However, there is certainly no 
requirement that a joke be of this nature. Satire, parody, irony, sarcasm and absurdity are 
all well-worn jocular devices, and by their nature none of these require that an utterance is 
made sincerely.232 Take irony, for example. Traditionally philosophers have treated irony as 
saying P to convey something like not-P. A speaker, therefore, can make a joke by making 
some utterance sincerely or insincerely.233 So although sincerity might be salient when 
discussing specific jokes, for a general account it is of little interest. What I suggest is of 
interest when thinking about jokes in general is the way in which the audience takes the 
utterance rather than the sincerity or insincerity of the joker. And this is the case with 
trolling. Of importance when considering trolling in general is not whether the troll is 
sincere, but rather the seriousness with which she intends her audiences to take her 
utterance.  
I’ll return to discussion of seriousness in §3.2 & §3.2, next though I speak more 
specifically about trolling and the relationship of troll to onlooker and troll to target. What I 
want to say is that in uttering u a troll intends that the target take u to likely be a serious 
utterance, and that the onlooker take u to likely be an unserious utterance. 234  
 
230 The relationship of trolling to humour is enduring and inescapable. To the type of subcultural 
troll discussed by Phillips, a form of laughter, ‘lulz’, is very often the overall aim of any act of trolling. 
She says; “A corruption (or as the trolls might argue, perfection) of “Laugh Out Loud,” lulz celebrates 
the anguish of the laughed-at victim.” (2015, Ch.2). 
231 Or to amuse them in some way, this is very simplistic and not necessarily the case, of course, it 
may be to humiliate or belittle. 
232 At least in terms of the literal content of the utterance.  
233 I also see no reason why they might not have no sincere/insincere relationship to their utterance. 
For example a comedian improvising during a set could utter anything that occurs to them with the 
aim of provoking amusement. There seems no reason to expect that the comedian need have any 
particular beliefs about the things they say at the point of utterance.  
234 Though I stop short of a precise definition of the speech act of trolling, what I have in mind is 
something along these lines;  





3. Perlocutionary Intentions 
3.1 Perlocutionary acts 
As my interest is in trolling as speech act, and as §2.3 discusses the role of intended 
audience responses (under the guise of seriousness) it seems apt to next consider some of 
the foundational work on speech act theory, specifically what J.L. Austin says of 
perlocutions. Austin says; “[s]aying something…produce[s] certain consequential effects 
upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience…and it may be done with the design, 
intention or purpose of producing them”.235 Perlocutionary acts, then, aim at certain effects, 
and as Austin says later, “‘perlocutionary act[s] always include some consequences’; and are 
‘what we bring about or achieve by saying something, such as convincing, persuading, 
deterring” (1962, p.108). So if I were to persuade you of something by uttering u, it requires 
that you are persuaded by u. The perlocutionary effect is that you were persuaded, and my 
act in persuading you was the perlocutionary act. François Recanati236 refers to the 
intention to produce these types of responses as a perlocutionary intention, and so a 
perlocutionary intention is the intention that a perlocutionary effect is produced by some 
utterance. Considering (HT) and what has been said so far about seriousness, this seems to 
correlate with an act of trolling. Trivially speaking, a troll will naturally have perlocutionary 
intentions when making a trolling utterance, and these can be numerous and diverse even 
within a single act. We can’t hope to account for all such intentions so what I aim to do next 
is to suggest some primary intentions common to acts of trolling. 
 Typically perlocutionary effects are considered to be such things as convincing, 
deterring, surprising and misleading. In the case of a specific act of trolling, a troll’s 
 
  i) A’s beliefs about u are irrelevant to the act of trolling; 
ii) A’s set of target-directed perlocutionary intentions include that u is taken 
seriously by some target(s) B; 
iii) A’s set of target-directed perlocutionary intentions include that B acts in 
response to u based on ii), and; 
iv) A’s set of onlooker-directed perlocutionary intentions include that u is taken 
unseriously by some onlooker(s) C. 
This, then, is fundamentally an unstable type of speech, or perhaps what we might consider to be 
multi-directional.  
235 Austin, (1962, p. 101) 





perlocutionary intentions might, for example, be to cause disruption, anger, confusion, or to 
fluster or unnerve a target in some way. However, this will be case-specific, and indeed even 
specifying one of these perlocutionary intentions for a single act of trolling might prove 
difficult, for a troll could very plausibly be aiming for any or none of these responses. As 
such, we need to take a step away from these more traditional types of perlocutionary effect 
and think of something more general. That it is more general, though, is not to say it is less 
complex, indeed what I propose is a multifaceted notion. It seems to be that there are two 
distinct sets of perlocutionary intentions attached to an act of trolling which relate to the 
troll’s relationship to her multiple intended audiences. Recall §2.3, there trolling is 
discussed in terms of two distinct audiences, the first is the target of the act of trolling (the 
fish the troll intends to catch) the second (which includes the troll) is the onlooker (the 
group that the act of trolling is performed for the benefit of). Let’s look now, then, at how 
the relationship between the troll and these two audiences differ by elaborating on the 
corresponding sets of perlocutionary intentions. 
3.2 Perlocutionary intentions: Troll-target 
The first set of perlocutionary intentions relates to troll and target. We might expect this 
first set includes any (or more, or less) of the above mentioned traditional types of 
perlocutionary intentions (depending on the specific act), plus the effect that the target take 
the troll’s utterance be taken seriously (another way we might put this is to say it be taken 
to be worthy of serious consideration, or to be taken as a serious statement). Regardless of 
the case-specific contents of this set, it will also include the perlocutionary intention that 
the target act in a specific way. To put this another way, although some specific troll will 
likely have a number of specific perlocutionary intentions, each of these intentions is 
secondary to the primary perlocutionary intention to provoke a target into a certain type of 
response. This certain type of response, I suggest, is that a target take the trolling utterance 
to be an utterance requiring serious attention and act accordingly. That is, the intention is 
for a target to respond to the trolling utterance as if it were a serious statement worthy of a 
serious response. This doesn’t, however, preclude that a target might be uncertain as to the 
level of seriousness with which they should take the trolling utterance. A target may 
strongly suspect that the troll is indeed a troll and be suspicious that the troll’s intention is 
to make some target respond in such a way, yet even suspecting this to be the case doesn’t 
entail they won’t respond as if the troll has made a serious statement. Take the Trump 





intention to make them respond in a way that entertains him and his onlooker audience – 
yet they might still respond in a way amenable to his trolling.  
3.3 Perlocutionary intentions: Troll-onlooker 
The second set of perlocutionary intentions relates to troll and onlooker. The intentions in 
this set might include entertaining, amusing, or provoking laughter, for example. It’s not 
immediately obvious that the troll has any specific action-based perlocutionary intentions 
as is the case with the troll-target set and an onlooker need not play an active role in a 
trolling interaction. What we can say, though, is that included in this set of perlocutionary 
intentions is that the onlooker does not take the trolling utterance to be a serious statement 
in the way the target does. The intention of the troll is that an onlooker view their utterance 
as something like a joke, or an unserious utterance. This in itself adds a layer of 
complication that can also help us distinguish seriousness from sincerity. For even if an 
onlooker takes the utterance to be unserious, as they might do a joke, this isn’t to say that 
they don’t endorse it or agree with it. Let’s consider (T2a) again. 
(T2a): 
Why don’t they go back and help fix the totally broken and crime infested 
places from which they came. 
 It’s certainly plausible that some members of the onlooker audience will believe 
Trump uttered (T2a) sincerely, and they themselves might even endorse the view 
expressed in the tweet. However, even if this is the case, it is not incompatible with them 
taking the utterance to be unserious. Consider again the correlation between joking and 
unseriousness. A joke can be taken to be amusing by an audience for a range of reasons. A 
joke might strike us as humorous because it is a shrewd observation, or surprising, or 
cleverly constructed, for example, but there is also an element of humour that develops 
from the confounding of social expectation or convention – jokes often play a taboo-
breaking social role. It is in this socially confounding way that the onlooker takes some 
utterance to be unserious. Recall, then, that in §2.3 it was suggested that seriousness, unlike 
sincerity, doesn’t take as its locus the relationship between speaker and utterance, but 
rather the focus is on the relationship of utterance and audience. So although Trump may 
well sincerely utter (T2), and some onlooker may endorse his view, there is also no 
requirement for an act of trolling that either do endorse it, all that is required is the 





is a challenge to the idea that it is socially unacceptable to say racist things.237 We can see 
this type of social taboo-breaking in even more extreme form by looking at (T3) again. 
 (T3) 
I and the rest of the world are pleased your piece of shit family… are dead 
squashed filthy shit rotting in the ground. Especially those two filthy babies 
that were squashed REST IN PISS YOU FUCKING RODENT PIECES OF SHIT. 
There is clearly a social norm by which it is rarely acceptable to speak ill of the dead. There 
also seems to be something even more socially distasteful about insulting the mourning 
families of the deceased, and yet another more shocking layer is added when making light of 
the death of babies. We don’t know much about the disposition of the author of (T3) or their 
beliefs regarding the comment, so it could plausibly be that (T3) is a sincere utterance and 
the author could simply be intending to do nothing more than cause distress, for example. 
However, the fact that this is not an isolated example, and indeed as RIP Trolling is a well-
documented phenomenon, we have good cause to think that the author is not merely 
abusing the families of the victims, though they are indeed doing this. If it is an act of 
trolling, then they are engaged in abuse and also using this abusive speech as a tool in an act 
of trolling. Phillips (2015, Ch.7) argues that some of the rationale behind RIP trolling is a 
reaction to a perceived mawkishness in internet responses to tragedies, and utterances 
such as (T3) are used to respond to this wider social trend. If this is the case, then 
utterances such as (T3) can be viewed from certain angles as a form of satire. Which again 
moves us back towards the dual-intentional nature of an act of trolling.  
Suppose, then, that the author of (T3) wishes to satirise responses to tragedy found 
on the internet by making an utterance of polar-extremity to those customarily left on 
memorial pages. If this is the case, then in this sense (T3) is to be viewed by onlookers as an 
unserious statement – it’s satire.238 However, clearly the posting of such a comment in a 
social space wherein most other comments are sympathetic in nature will have a particular 
effect, and addressed as it is specifically at the families of the deceased, it seems that part of 
 
237 That it is the actual president making the utterance makes this an even more profound challenge 
to the norm. 
238 This doesn’t exclude that satire can be serious, however if there is such a point to be conveyed by 
an utterance such as (T3) it would take a lot of presupposition for such an interpretation. That is, 
faced with simply what is said in (T3) alone, a lot of background knowledge is required to arrive at 





the ‘joke’ is that it is such an offensive thing to say that a target will likely have a strong 
emotional reaction to it. Unless they accept it as satire, then they might seem to have little 
choice but to respond seriously to the utterance even if they suspect it is an act of trolling. 
The problem for the target, then, is that how to respond is not clear. This, I suggest, is the 
trolling dilemma.       
4. The trolling dilemma 
Central to the spread and success of the phenomenon of trolling and its complex socio-
linguistic role is something we might call the trolling dilemma.239 The dilemma faced is in 
how to respond to an act of trolling. As such, it doesn’t really arise when an act of trolling is 
successful in the sense that the target is unaware that they are being trolled and responds 
seriously to a trolling utterance. We do see the dilemma, however, in almost all other cases 
wherein a potential target is suspicious they might have encountered a troll. Consider again 
Trump and the RIP troll. Many readers encountering (T2) or (T3) might be suspicious that 
these are trolling utterances. In being suspicious in such a way, the reader might also 
suspect that the intentions of Trump and the RIP troll are for the target to take these 
utterances seriously, in some sense, and respond accordingly. 240 Responding to the trolling 
utterance in such a way, though, allows the troll to successfully troll – the respondent thus 
becomes the target and does precisely what the troll wants. However, to not respond as if 
trolling utterances are serious statements. and simply dismiss them as acts of trolling, can 
therefore allow a president to use racist tropes, or an RIP troll to direct abuse at mourners 
without challenge. In effect what this means is that a president using racist tropes can be 
dismissed as engaging in mere trolling. 
If the division I suggest that exists between target and onlooker reflects the 
structure of an act of trolling, there might be another unpalatable conclusion to be drawn 
too. In not responding we might, by default, be an onlooker too. If we assume Trump is just 
joking or the RIP troll is merely satirising in order to troll, then we take their utterances to 
 
239 Thanks to Komarine Romdenh-Romluc for discussion that led me to think about this. 
240 Interestingly enough, the availability of an utterer’s intentions in an act of trolling seems to differ 
from many other types of manipulative speech, such as misleading, where it is essential for the 
success of the act that the intention to manipulate remains hidden. For example consider the covert 
collateral acts such as discussed by Bach and Harnish. These acts “are performed with intentions 
that are intended not to be recognized.” (1979, p. 101). A similar notion too is used by Saul (2018) 
who suggests that dogwhistles are a strain of covert perlocutionary act which are defined as an act 
that doesn’t succeed if the perlocutionary intention is recognised. Even recognising the troll’s 





be unserious. We need not endorse (T2) or (T3), and we might find them repugnant, but we 
take them to be unserious in the sense that we don’t take them to be utterances worthy of 
serious response. This could even be the case in the example (T1), though with much less 
worrying moral implications. 
(T1): 
Ben Franklin said politicians are like pampers, they both stink and they act 
like babies. 
It’s plausible that a reader of (T1) might assume it to be a joke; it’s verifiably wrong and 
makes little sense. (T1) did receive what appears to be serious responses though; recall it 
was pointed out to KenM that pampers didn’t exist during Franklin’s time. Again we have no 
knowledge of what the respondent thought of (T1), but even if they were suspicious that 
(T1) was not intended to be a serious remark, not knowing for certain might still be reason 
enough to respond in a way amenable to the troll’s troll-target intentions. Suppose the 
respondent was someone with an acute concern about the well-documented spread of false 
information on the internet.  This being the case, then, even an example as seemingly 
innocuous as (T1) might push someone towards the dilemma. From that particular point of 
view the dilemma is: should one respond seriously to a suspected act of trolling, and so 
become a target in a successful act of trolling, or should one let the demonstrably false claim 
go unchallenged?  
That such a dilemma arises out of an act of trolling, I suggest, is part of the reason 
why trolling has been embraced by political actors in recent years, particularly those 
wishing to propagate divisive violent ideologies. The ambiguous dual-identity of an act of 
trolling – as speech that can be responded to either seriously or unseriously - allows those 
with racist views, for example, to make public their racist ideas, but with enough ambiguity 
that an effective response is difficult to formulate. That in such a case the trolling dilemma 
can give at least the appearance that there is no good response - the troll either succeeds in 
trolling when taken seriously, or racist views remain unchallenged or dismissed as mere 
trolling when taken unseriously – provides the racist statement with a status not befitting 
its actual content. That is, it can appear like a view or argument that has no adequate 
response. However, in the case of trolling, it isn’t the argument itself that carries this 





used to deliver it.241 There is another closely related side to the appeal of trolling to these 
groups too, and this is the topic I discuss next; the cloak of humour. 
5. The cloak of humour 
So far the characterisation of the speech act of trolling has been based around the notion of 
seriousness. This notion, I claim, is closely related to joking. As such it is worth considering 
the role of humour in trolling in a little more detail. That trolling is often malignant, bullying 
and abusive, and is increasingly used as a tool of propaganda, might make it seem odd to 
suggest that a form of humour or unseriousness underpins it. However, when we remind 
ourselves that humour can be used to dehumanise, poke fun and bully, and can also be used 
to mark out ‘us’ and ‘them’, then it need not be thought to somehow dampen the force of an 
act of trolling. A racist ‘joke’ is still a racist remark, just as a sexist ‘joke’ is still sexist. That it 
is shrouded in the cloak of humour makes it no less potent. In fact, there is an argument to 
be made that it becomes even more forceful in this guise. Indeed consider what Hobbes 
describes in his famous description of what has come to be known as the superiority view of 
humour. 
I may therefore conclude, that the passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden 
glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by 
comparison with the infirmity of others… It is no wonder therefore that men take 
heinously to be laughed at or derided, that is, triumphed over.242   
   
Although Hobbes’s account doesn’t seem to fit with many forms of humour, it 
captures something of the nature of trolling. If the target is merely a prop in an act of 
trolling, then in Hobbes’s terms, the troll’s aim is to triumph over the target, and they do 
this for the entertainment of the onlooker. If this is correct, then what seems to be built-in 
to the act of trolling is a natural division between onlooker and target. The target becomes a 
mere figure of fun, and as I will discuss in §5.2, this has some serious consequences. Before 
 
241 The issues this bring to mind are not modern, we can see correlation in ancient discussions of 
rhetoric. Think of Plato’s observation in the Protagoras of Protagoras’s use of argument as spectator 
sport (335a4-8). Also Aristotle’s rejection in Rhetoric II.24 of the sophists claims to be making the 
‘weaker argument the stronger’ (1402a23–5), in which Aristotle explains how the methods of 
Protagoras used in supposedly doing this were rejected once it was realised they relied on rhetorical 
manoeuvring. On this note, it is worth directing you to the excellent Rachel Barney (2016) account of 
trolling delivered in the style of Aristotle.     





considering this though, I want to discuss how trolling acts can provide a level of deniability 
to trolling utterances. 
5.1 Figleaves 
There are good reasons why we might want to avoid dismissing Trump using racist tropes 
as mere trolling, however this type of deniability is invoked in Trump’s defence (even 
implicitly by his critics). That this type of defence might seem available gives us reason to 
consider that in some respects trolling operates in a similar way to a racial figleaf, such as 
discussed by Jenny Saul.243 
A successful racial figleaf operates by offering a block on the inference from an 
utterer making a racist comment to the conclusion that the utterer is racist (‘I’m not racist 
but…,’ being a familiar example). If it is accepted that Trump is trolling when uttering racist 
tropes, then it leaves open the possibility to read his utterance unseriously. So if it is viewed 
by an onlooker as merely a means to ‘wind-up’ those who do take it seriously, or to force 
them to confront the trolling dilemma rather than taking it as a serious utterance, then this 
changes what it becomes acceptable to say.244 As Saul puts it; “[i]f the audience accepts that 
the figleaf blocks the concern about racism arising from the utterance of racist sentence R, 
then R becomes seen as something one can say without being racist”. Similarly, if someone 
were to accept that by uttering (T2) Trump is merely trolling, this too might provide a block 
to the concern of racism that Trump’s utterance of the racist (T2) might ordinarily entail. A 
conclusion from that being that if (T2) is uttered in an act of trolling, then (T2) is not 
necessarily racist. So whereas with the type of figleaf characterised by Saul a speaker will 
offer some qualifying remark, in an act of trolling the act itself operates in this way. Again, 
this should give us cause for concern and points again to the problem posed by the trolling 
dilemma. For if we dismiss (T2) as an act of mere trolling, we give credence to the notion 
that (T2) can be uttered (without caveat) in a non-racist way (or perhaps less strongly, in a 
‘less-racist’ way), we are in danger of accepting it as an effective figleaf. The dilemma is such 
though that if we do respond to Trump’s racism, we then become props in Trump’s act of 
trolling.245 
 
243 Saul (2017, p.116) 
244 Trump did also offer what Saul terms a diachronic figleaf following the original utterance, 
tweeting ‘I don’t have a racist bone in my body’. 
245 Indeed, claims of ‘joking’ can often be used to block other types of inference, for example a threat. 





5.2 Humour and propaganda 
The use of humour in propaganda is not new.  Humorous media such as cartoons and 
caricature have been used effectively in recent history as a means of disseminating political 
messages. What seems to set trolling apart though is that not only can it be used to 
disseminate ideas, but the people those ideas reach are then equipped to use trolling as a 
means to disseminate them further – even if they are ‘just joking’. So even if a troll is 
initially drawn solely to the seeming irreverent and taboo-breaking ‘humour’ of using, for 
example, racial slurs in an act of trolling, and even if they don’t take themselves to sincerely 
hold racist beliefs, when they use them in an act of trolling they are still spreading racist 
ideas. In doing this the troll is still contributing to a divisive climate both in the content of 
what they say and also with the type of speech act they are using. For it seems that making 
unpalatable ideas appear in some way less serious can detract from their insidiousness yet 
can still be used to broadcast them further. Not only can it be used to broadcast them, it can 
make them more appealing; humorousness and unseriousness are attractive qualities after 
all. 
The last point to make, then, is that trolling has become an effective method of 
spreading authoritarian and far-right ideas in recent times, and based on the previous 
discussion, we might have some good reasons to expect trolling to be such a natural vehicle 
for this type of idea. One of Jason Stanley’s overall points in his analysis of the tactics used 
by fascists to gain power is that they seek to separate populations.246 Trolling as an act does 
this regardless of the content of the utterance.  It is built-in to an act of trolling that there be 
a target and an onlooker, and that the target is objectified – the target is a prop in an act of 
trolling and their worth is as a mere source of amusement. This in itself need not be socially 
divisive, such as in the case of (T1), which seems so absurd as to not be genuinely divisive. 
However, even innocuous-seeming (T1) includes targets to be laughed at, and even (T1) can 
make a reader confront the trolling dilemma. So when already divisive political ideas are 
loaded into the act of trolling, the divisiveness of the act itself, in combination with the 
divisiveness of the content, makes for a powerfully disruptive act. If I’m right about the 
humour component of trolling too, there is further cause for division. To the onlooker, a 
target is lacking humour, they don’t get the ‘joke’. So there is division between those who 
 
Giuliani responded to a question as to whether he was worried if Trump might “throw him under the 
bus” to avoid impeachment, Giuliani responded “I’m not, but I do have very, very good insurance”, 
his lawyer, also on the phone call, then interjected to say “He’s joking”. Kirchgaessner, (2019). 





‘get the joke’ and those who don’t. The power of that as an enforcer of disharmony shouldn’t 
be underestimated. Humour is not to be taken lightly, and if trolling is a form of humour, 
then this makes it no less of a serious matter.  
6. Conclusion 
What I present here is intended as a foreshadowing of the direction of research I think the 
work in previous chapters points us towards. Once we understand some of the fundamental 
differences in the communicative environment digital conversations take part within, we 
can understand more clearly how it is that new linguistic behaviours can arise. Speech acts 
such as trolling, though possible in face-to-face conversation, spread online due to some of 
the particularities we find in digital communicative spaces. That interlocutors are not 
required to coordinate and cooperate in the same way in digital conversations as they are 
face-to-face interaction we might suppose creates an environment in which misleading 
behaviours such as trolling can flourish.247 Recalling some of the features of conversation 
discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, whereas face-to-face we tend to be co-present with 
our interlocutors, in digital conversation we tend to be geographically distant. One result of 
this is that we often don’t know who our audience is precisely. Add to this too some of the 
medium-specific differences such the contrast between the evanescence and recordlessness 
of face-to-face utterances and the permanent recorded nature of written digital utterances. 
A result of this is that digital utterances have potentially much wider and more disparate 
audience than those made face-to-face. Digital conversation therefore has a generally much 
more public character and with this comes a potential multiplicity of audiences. What I 
think this should lead us to consider (though is beyond my scope here) is how this 
multiplicity of audiences can lead to other types of novel linguistic behaviour. If the troll, as 
described above, exploits the multiplicity of audiences to perform different speech acts 
relative to different audiences, then this might give us cause to consider a novel class of 




247 Such environments are also conducive to other types of misleading behaviour. Take for example 
the arguments made in Pepp, Michaelson & Sterken (2019a, 2019b) as to why although one type of 
‘fake news’ predates the internet, the particularities of the digital environment mean that there is 
another distinct type of information spread that relies on the available tools of dissemination online 



































Communication, of which conversation is just one part of, is clearly a rich and sprawling 
object to study. The recent technological developments in communication technology have 
added even more layers to how we can and do communicate with each other. One could 
never hope to do justice to its intricacies and variations in a single dissertation but what I 
hope to have done here is convince you that by focusing on one seemingly small aspect of 
communication – how we coordinate in conversation – that there is a lot we can learn about 
how we communicate. More particularly I hope that it has provided some insight to one of 
the main differences between the types of conversations we’ve been having for thousands 
of years and the newer types of conversations made possible by recent technological 
innovation.  
 I hope too that this hasn’t appeared to be casting a negative light on digital 
conversation. Such an interpretation would be understandable. It could be read that I 
portray the paradigm type of face-to-face conversation as being a harmonious, meaningful 
and cooperative endeavour, whereas digital conversation is made out to be a chaotic, 
burdensome and uncooperative facsimile of face-to-face conversation.  Some of this 
interpretation might be taken from the way that I set up the discussion. In Chapters 1 & 2 I 
present as default face-to-face conversation and then contrast digital conversation in 
Chapters 3 & 4 in terms of some ways in which it deviates from this default. Indeed, the very 
particular aspects I focus on leave open the inference that because digital conversation is 
lacking some of what I consider to be positive features of face-to-face conversation, then it 
must in turn be inferior. That however is certainly not what I take away from this. I take 
these particular differences to be interesting and informative but one of the things I have 
come to realise more clearly over the course of this project is that the differences we find 
between the two types of conversation don’t suggest any general inferiority on the part of 
one when compared to the other. Rather what the spread of digital conversation has done, 
in fact, is increase the communicative possibilities available to us. So whereas we shouldn’t 





communication, nor should we neglect the unique power digital conversation has in 
extending the possibilities of how we can communicate.   
 I briefly discuss in Chapter 4 Section 3 one benefit the particular structure of digital 
conversations might bring as a means to help people with ASD not be excluded from a wider 
conversational life. And this type of benefit will certainly extend far beyond  such cases. For 
people living geographically remotely from others, people living with social anxieties, or 
communicative or sensory disorders, digital conversation can in some cases provide a much 
more harmonious, meaningful and cooperative type of interaction than face-to-face 
conversation can.  Digital conversation can in other ways also allow for conversation where 
perhaps no conversation would otherwise have existed.  
For any of us with friends and family not living in close enough proximity to meet for 
conversation communication technology provides the opportunity to exchange texts, emails 
or view each other’s’ posts on social media and so provide us with interactions that 
otherwise wouldn’t have been possible. It allows groups of geographically disparate people 
with a particular similar interest to meet and discuss it. It has provided a platform and 
meeting place for marginalised groups and provided some opportunity to address 
conversational injustices.  And there are other ways it has added depth to our 
communicative lives. As a means of day-to-day coordination often digital communication is 
often much more useful- face-to-face conversation is useless as a means of explaining to a 
friend that you will be late to meet them at the café. So although in comparison to face-to-
face conversation digital conversation can seem to be a more solitary endeavour. When 
compared to an absence of conversation though, clearly it isn’t more solitary, so ultimately 
it can create new opportunities for conversations to develop. And as part of my reason for 
choosing conversation as the central focus of my dissertation is a love of conversation, I 
take this to be generally a good thing. 
In order to conclude I’d like to highlight two particular strands of future research 
that I think emerge from the discussions here. The first is along primarily empirical 
psycholinguistic lines. As I tried to make clear in Chapter 2, there is a prolific movement in 
psycholinguistics that over recent years that has provided us with a fascinating picture of 
how face-to-face conversation manages to be so successful. It is this body of work that I 
particularly draw upon to make the contrast between face-to-face and digital conversation 
in Chapter 4. The way that I draw this contrast, however, is by taking the findings from 





that some of the requirements of face-to-face conversation don’t hold for digital 
conversation. I then use these hypotheses to form the basis of my discussion on the 
implications this might have for the nature of cooperation in digital conversation. One area 
of empirical research, then, would look to test the validity of these underlying hypotheses.    
The other strand of research that would be productive is along lines that would be of 
interest to philosophers of language, theoretical linguists and social philosophers. In the 
final chapter I moved away from the direct comparative project of earlier chapters and 
focused more closely on the type of phenomena that arise in digital conversation. It is in this 
type of direction that I think future research in the area would be most usefully directed. 
The growth of digital conversation and the peculiarities of the communicative 
environments they take place in have created the opportunities for new types of 
communicative behaviour to develop. So we see the emergence of new types of speech act 
such as trolling, sharing and reposting. There are also new forms of what we might call 
mechanised speech to consider, that is speech that can be created at the click of a button 
such as a like, a retweet or forwarded email which bypasses many of the psycholinguistic 
processes (such as those discussed in Chapters 2 & 4) ordinarily required for language 
production. The emergence and spread of such new types of linguistic behaviour in digital 
conversational spaces make these rich areas worth pursuing in order to develop new 
aspects to our theories. 
A further area of research should look into the effects of the structures of digital 
conversational spaces on the notion of conversational control (such as discussed in Chapter 
2 (§4.1-4.3). Whereas there I assume that digital conversations can very often have 
similarly synocratic levels of control as face-to-face conversations, as is also noted in the 
discussions in Chapter 4 (§1.2.3) many conversations (face-to-face and digital) will have 
more autocratic structures in which the control over the discussion rests predominantly 
with one interlocutor (echoing work such as found in Langton (1993), Kukla (2014), Green 
(2017), Bianchi (2019), this is a type of injustice). An interesting dimension to this debate 
stems from the structures of social media. So one area of interest to look at is how the 
potential to organise in these communicative spaces can provide a place for marginalised 
communities to redress some of the conversational injustices they face by each adding a to a 
collective conversational control redress.   
There are also issues that arise in digital conversation which will put to the test 





philosophy of mind and of AI, currently there seems to be very little in the language 
literature about how we deal with the utterances of bots and AIs. Anyone familiar with 
digital conversational spaces will be aware that many of the participants in digital 
conversations are not human. Be they be chatbots, trollbots, or automated social media 
accounts. Fundamentally these are machines to which we might be hesitant to ascribe the 
type of complex intentions which we generally ascribe to each other. However it is also the 
case that they appear able to make assertions or ask questions. This being the case there are 
questions to be asked of theories which posit complex speaker intentions or beliefs as being 
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